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 Abstract 
This working paper addresses the theme of the transformation of private law considering in particular 
the concepts of autonomy, competition and regulation in European private law. The contributions 
included in this working paper present some of the outcomes of the research done during the fourth 
year of the project on European Regulatory Private law which was presented and discussed with 
external guests at the fourth annual workshop of the project on 18 and 19 June 2015 at the European 
University Institute in Florence.   After having discussed in the three prior annual meetings the 
parameters around which European regulatory private law is organized, the fourth workshop focused 
on the key framing proposition of the investigation, i.e. the transformation of private law from 
autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. 
In the first part of the working paper, the central concepts of the suggested transformation will be 
introduced and placed in the theoretical framework of the research project, addressing the issue of the 
drivers of the transformation, of autonomy and regulation, and of competition.  In the second part, the 
transformation is looked for in specific sectors of European regulatory private law, i.e. 
telecommunication, energy, standardization, and the financial sector highlighting the aspects that may 
illustrate the posited transformation of the operative private law in these areas. 
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Introduction 
 
This working paper addresses the theme of the transformation of private law considering in particular 
the concepts of autonomy, competition and regulation in European private law.  The contributions 
included in this working paper present some of the outcomes of the research done during the fourth 
year of the project on European Regulatory Private law which was presented and discussed with 
external guests at the fourth annual workshop of the project on 18 and 19 June 2015 at the European 
University Institute in Florence.   After having discussed in the three prior annual meetings the 
parameters around which European regulatory private law is organized, the fourth workshop focused 
on the key framing proposition of the investigation, i.e. the transformation of private law from 
autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. 
In the first part of the working paper, the central concepts of the suggested transformation will be 
introduced and placed in the theoretical framework of the research project, addressing the issue of the 
drivers of the transformation, of autonomy and regulation, and of competition.  In the second part, the 
transformation is looked for in specific sectors of European regulatory private law, i.e. 
telecommunication, energy, standardization, and the financial sector highlighting the aspects that may 
illustrate the posited transformation of the operative private law in these areas. 
  
SECTION I. FOUNDATIONS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Factors behind the transformations of private law 
 
Guido Comparato 
 
Private law in Europe has undergone several transformations, especially over the course of the last 
decades.  The notion of European regulatory private law describes the most recent of these. These 
transformations are not a development endogenous to the legal discipline, but have on the contrary 
been linked to more general transformations of the State and economy, which political science 
scholarship has already identified. In turn, these transformations of the State allegedly have different 
causes, and each of them can indirectly or even directly affect private law in diverse ways. This short 
contribution builds upon the main ideas of informative literature, drawn from different areas not 
necessarily and immediately related to legal studies, which show both the theoretical aspects of the 
transformations of the State and particular issues which are relevant for private law in the frame of that 
transformation. After introducing the idea of the transformation of the State, the focus is placed on 
specific factors that can be considered as drivers of these transformations, i.e. economy & 
globalization, technology, and society, considering them in a general sense but looking also at their 
repercussions in one specific field which is highly emblematic for the transformations of the current 
era, i.e. the internet and the regulation of it. 
Introduction 
The idea of European Regulatory Private Law (ERPL) assumes a transformation of private law in 
Europe from autonomy to functionalism in competition and regulation. That is to say, private law is 
taking on new tasks of promoting policy aims such as ensuring competition or establishing an internal 
market in the European Union. These tasks do not necessarily replace the traditional ones; therefore 
Regulatory Private Law can represent at least a partially detached and self-sufficient branch of law, 
distinguished from the traditional one which is still mostly regulated at the national level despite being 
of transnational origin. However, in fact the coexistence of these two sets of rules can be problematic, 
and instances of clashes and resistance can occur.
1
 
The European Union, through its directives and regulations in several fields, has had a fundamental 
impact in this transformation which nonetheless more fundamentally concerns the very structure of the 
State, not only in its European manifestations. Private law is in fact highly dependent on the evolution 
of the State and the developing political economy thereof, although the traditional view of private law 
as based on the principle of private autonomy tends to consider this branch as fully independent from 
public law as primarily produced by the State. As the State regulates the economy (which obviously 
might also include a regulatory choice for non-intervention) it necessarily has to be involved in the 
economic relations among private individuals which are usually governed by private law. The 
dynamics and evolution of this transformation of private law have already been covered abundantly 
elsewhere,
2
 and this paper follows that conceptualization. Instead of focusing primarily on instances 
which show how the evolution of private law is affected by the evolution of the State’s political 
economy through, for example, processes of liberalization and privatisation, this introductory 
contribution will sketch the transformation of the State in more general terms focusing in particular on 
                                                     
1 In this sense, the ERPL idea assumes that the concrete interactions between those legal orders can be described in terms of 
convergence, hybridization or conflict and resistance. 
2 H.-W. Micklitz and Y. Svetiev, ‘The transformation(s) of private law’, in H.-W. Micklitz, Y. Svetiev, G. Comparato (ed), 
European Regulatory Private Law. The Paradigms Tested EUI Working Paper LAW 2014/04, 69-97 
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some pivotal drivers of that evolution, i.e. economization and globalization as well as society and 
technology. These are considered through their interrelations, and as the theoretical background 
through which the concrete transformation(s) of private law in more specific areas have to be placed. 
Without the pretence of offering a full picture of the developments introduced, or a comprehensive 
account of the relevant literature and the trends of scientific debates, the contribution builds upon 
literature drawn from different areas not necessarily and immediately related to legal studies, which 
nonetheless helps to consider both the theoretical aspects of the transformations of the State, and 
particular issues which are relevant for private law in the frame of that transformation. 
The transformation of the state 
The current model of the ‘territorially consolidated, centralized, sovereign state has been the dominant 
paradigm in western political thought […] It was considered to be the model which any political 
community that strove towards modernity was expected to embrace’.3 Even despite our modern 
tendency to take that model of the State for granted, it is essential to emphasise that such a model is 
not universal either in time or in space. Considering space, this model is mostly a European 
phenomenon exported with some significant modifications to America, while its frequently imperfect 
rehash in other extra-European contexts has often been the result of policies of colonialism, in which 
even institutions such as the United Nations have played a role in the universalization and spread of 
the model.
4
 Even less can it be considered universal in time, as the modern State has been the result of 
a long historical evolution in which different stages can be distinguished, and is still the object of 
transformations. While the State has been slowly evolving over the centuries, it is in particular more 
recently that ‘the territorially consolidated, sovereign nation-state has faced increasing pressures over 
the past few decades’.5 
In the scholarly debate, Bobbit among others have distinguished various stages in the evolution of the 
State, of which in particular the latest is of interest for the purposes of describing the evolution of 
private law in Europe, i.e. what Bobbit calls the market-state. This form of State ‘depends on the 
international capital markets and, to a lesser degree, on the modern multinational business network to 
create stability in the world economy’.6 Indeed, in particular the pressures suffered from ‘above’, and 
the rise of global financial markets, have been such that the legitimation bases of the State have been 
weakened, as the State has started to appear incapable of continuing to provide welfare directly to its 
citizens. 
This therefore describes a State which has become highly dependent on private actors at the global 
level, and thus represents the possible evolution of the State in the context of globalization and 
economisation. These trends have already led political science to ask whether, in this global context, 
the State has started to disappear or whether the ‘Leviathan’ has been dispossessed of its power.7 It is 
now commonplace that the phenomenon of globalization has put the State under considerable 
pressure, to the extent that the ‘crisis’ or even the ‘end’ of the State have been preannounced several 
times in political discourse. Several crises have been seen since, but no end is in sight yet. Such 
awareness, interlinked with concerns about the maintenance of world peace and promotion of 
economic integration, has been particularly important in promoting the process of supranationalisation 
in Europe, in which important features of national statehood have been transferred to a higher 
                                                     
3 R. Axtmann, ‘The State of the State: The Model of the Modern State and its Contemporary Transformation’ (2004) 25(3) 
International Political Science Review 259-279, 259 
4 Ibid, 262-264 
5 Ibid, 264 
6 P. Bobbit, The shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History, London, Allen Lane, 2002, 229. 
7 See M. Bach (ed), Der entmachtete Leviathan. Löst sich der souveräne Staat auf?, Sonderband 5 Zeitschrift für Politik, 
Nomos, 2013 
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governance level rather than suppressed. If it is true that globalization has stimulated the emergence of 
new global actors, a different view closer to the trend of ‘realism’ underlines, however, that even in 
the more interdependent globalized context, when it comes to taking economically important decisions 
the State remains the main actor (although of course not all concrete States are influential in the same 
way).
8
 This is visible even in the European integration process, in which the persistence of certain 
national interests is still visible even in certain supranational interventions.
9
  The likely answer to the 
question of whether the Leviathan is disappearing therefore appears to be that the State is still present 
in this context, but its role and function is undergoing modifications. This entails consequences not 
only for public law, but for private law as well. 
It remains to be seen which factors, gathered under the umbrella concept of ‘globalization’, engender a 
State transformation. A now usual, but nonetheless still meaningful, explanation suggests that changes 
to the concept of State and statehood are determined by the fact that national communities find new 
incentives to cooperate due to the new global risks that have emerged recently. In this sense, the new 
global problems and risk, often determined by technological developments and in any case furthered 
by the growing interconnectedness of the planet, pose a kind of ‘cosmopolitan imperative’ which 
requires in the first place an abandonment of methodological nationalism which ‘equates modern 
society with society organized in territorially limited nation-states’.10  
This does not, however, mean that a form of Kantian cosmopolitanism will arise in the form of a new 
super state – which would hint to the recognition of the traditional State model at an improbable global 
level rather than a radical change in the structure and functions of the State – but rather implies a 
process of cosmopolitanization which to a certain extent does not even come into conflict with the 
traditional nation state model.
11
 At any rate, the existence of global risks and trends of 
cosmopolitanization lead to changes in at least some of the characteristics of the nation state 
historically intended as a community of the past, limited and exclusive to the extent that its citizens are 
‘ready to die for the fatherland’, as the rhetoric of the nation-state portrayed them. On the contrary, as 
Beck puts it, cosmopolitanization would require a common view to the future, the necessity of 
inclusiveness and the desire to ‘survive’ rather than to die.12 Beck goes on to explain that the European 
Union, where member states practice ‘reflexive self-limiting strategies in their own best interest’, 
could be regarded, at least in theory, as an example of this tendency in the European context.
13
 At a 
conceptual level, this idea of cosmopolitanization tends therefore to downplay the mostly definitional 
debate as to whether European integration amounts to a form of globalization or rather regionalization. 
Regardless of scientific elaborations, however, the shift towards cosmopolitanization is but one 
possible trend, as current tendencies show that on the contrary the countermove towards more 
methodological or even political nationalism might be stronger. 
Rather than imagining possible global institutional evolutions, which is an exercise as fascinating as it 
is unproductive in this area, it is more opportune for our purposes to look at the way in which 
globalization in particular has affected some features and functions of national states, with specific 
regard for their political economy. That is to say, leaving aside even important political questions of 
legitimacy, accountability, representativeness and the like, what are the consequences for the 
economic policies pursued by nation States? 
                                                     
8 R. Gilpin, Global Political Economy. Understanding the International Economic Order (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 2001) 15  
9 S. Wood, Germany, Europe and the Persistence of Nations. Transformation, Interests and Identity, 1989-1996 (Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 1998) 2  
10 U. Beck, ‘Cosmopolitanism as Imagined Communities of Global Risk’ (2011) American Behavioral Scientist 1346-1361, 
1347 
11 Ibid, 1357 
12 Ibid, 1346-1361 
13 Ibid, 1356 
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In particular, Stiglitz has shown how globalization has had an impact on the State leading to a 
redefinition of its economic role.
14
 This entails consequences specifically for the distinction between 
the role of the private and the public sector. Today, one can say that a third way is generally pleaded 
for between the laissez-faire and socialist model, whereby the former model has more emphasis in the 
private sphere, while the second is more influential in the public sector. More specifically, there is 
now in the US and Europe a larger consensus as to the impossibility of drawing a clear distinction 
between what is public and what is private, and this tendency equally regard both the legal field, in 
which the falseness of the public/private divide has become commonplace – as acceptable in theory as 
potentially hazardous it is in judicial practice – but also, and most importantly, the economy. Here, a 
form of partnership and complementarity between private and public sector can be found. As a telling 
example of this development, one can consider the case of old age security. Since the beginning of the 
20
th
 century, and through the models of administrative and welfare State, providing individuals with 
old age security has mostly been a matter for the State. In more recent times, and as the Welfare State 
was weakened, this model has started being re-discussed also under the influence of global institutions 
like the International Monetary Fund, which have mostly advocated the efficiency of private schemes. 
Yet, in concrete cases, these models have also appeared to be inefficient and have ultimately failed 
both economically and socially. Adopting an integrated private/public perspective which 
acknowledges the interaction between the two dimensions, the question should nonetheless be not how 
to replace the public with the private, but rather how to improve public provisions.
15
 What makes 
things more complicated, however, is that, ‘Everyone agrees that there is a role for the state in 
providing old age security. Everyone agrees that there is a role for the private sector. But they do not 
agree about what constitutes the right mix’.16  
The State and the European integration process 
In the European context, the changing role of the State against the background of the processes of 
globalization and regionalization is best illustrated by the establishment of the European Communities. 
As is well-known, one of the reasons behind this creation was the deliberate intention of tying the 
hands of the nation-state not only in its military potential, which already expressed itself in the first 
half of the 20th century, but also in its economic ambitions, determining a clear blow to the still 
central (though often unspeakable) Weberian idea that economic processes are of pivotal national 
interest and that national economy is a political economy.
17
 In this sense, one of the characteristics of 
the new European model was the development of an economic constitution in the sense and with the 
features of the German ordo-liberal model at the European level (curiously more well represented at 
the EU than at the German level where it coexisted with strong elements of corporatist tradition)
18
 – 
including the later shift to a common currency union – which could coexist with national models more 
oriented to the different types of welfare state that European countries had developed over time. In this 
sense, rather than rehashing the model of the State at the supranational level in a wider federative 
form, the EU has so far led to a situation in which, as Weiler pointed out, there is a balance and 
difficult coexistence of supranational law and intergovernmental politics.
19
 The decoupling of 
                                                     
14 J. Stiglitz, ‘Globalization and the economic role of the state’ (2003) 12 Industrial and Corporate Change 3-26, 5 
15 Ibid, 16 
16 Ibid, 23 
17 C. Joerges, ‘Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise‘ 357-385, 358 
18 C. Joerges, ‘The European Economic Constitution and its transformation through the financial crisis’ 
19 J. Weiler, ‘The Community System. The dual character of supranationalism’ (1981) Yearbook of European Law 257 
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economic and social politics represented, however, a construction mistake which has put European 
integrity in danger several times over the course of history.
20
  
The consequences of the decoupling of economic and social constitutions have always been 
considered problems which could be solved, while the European social model could guarantee the 
coexistence of the different forms of European capitalism. This view has nonetheless appeared to be 
weakened through the years, to the point of making the social model appear utopian
21
 until the 
moment in which it was simply considered to have gone at the peak of the currency crisis.
22
 The way 
in which the common currency was built indeed represented an attempt to decouple monetary policies 
from politics and give them to law coherently with the move away from the politics of 
Keynesianism.
23
 
In the current scenario, even the traditional idea of economic constitution is undergoing a new 
modification in Europe. Initially, the European communities laid the foundations of a microeconomic 
constitution,
24
 which had a direct significance for private law in the extension of private autonomy 
beyond nationa borders through the recognition of the four freedoms.
25
 The Treaty of Rome, on the 
contrary, laid the foundation of a macroeconomic constitution, which included new public objectives 
such as price stability, inflation and so on,
26
 to which more recently the new overall objective of 
financial stability was also added. The repercussions of this approach for private law became clearer 
only later. Most recently, the concept of economic constitution in the aftermath of the crisis is being 
replaced by a more generic notion of ‘economic governance’ the goals, limits, and institutions of 
which are much less well-defined and more problematic from the rule of law perspective.
27
 This seems 
in line with design at the global level, where one can identify uncertain global governance without a 
global government.
 28
 
The financial crisis and the responses which have been given to it represent just the latest and most 
dramatic episode of this development. In general, it can be observed that in the aftermath of the crisis, 
a new consensus as to the role of State and regulation is again emerging. In particular, the role of the 
state and regulation is especially needed in those sectors such as the financial sector or the healthcare 
sector in which problems like imperfect information make markets work in an inefficient way.
29
 The 
above mentioned case of inefficient private pension schemes slowly replacing mandatory public ones 
can be considered as one of these instances too, but in the current scenario the most paradigmatic 
‘risk’ field, with complementarity of the private and the (supranational?) public to counteract certain 
global risks, appears to be internet regulation.  
Even in transnational fields such as the internet, in which the global nature of the phenomenon 
together with the risks that it entails are more evident – the clearest example is offered by the issue of 
data protection – and are counterbalanced by a State organized on a limited territorial basis, new forms 
                                                     
20 C. Joerges, ‘Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise‘ 357-385, 358 with reference to Fritz Scharpf, ‚weshalb die EU 
nicht zur sozialen Marktwirtschaft werden kann‘, (2009) 7 Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften 419 
21 C. Joerges, ‘Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise‘ 357-385, 364 
22 Interview to Mario Draghi, The Wall Street Journal, 24 February 2012 
23 C. Joerges, ‘Europas Wirtschaftsverfassung in der Krise‘ 357-385, 365 
24 K. Tuori and K. Tuori, The Eurozone Crisis. A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
25 P.-C. Müller-Graff, ‘Basic Freedoms – Extending Party Autonomy across Borders’, in S. Grundmann, W. Kerber, S. 
Weatherill (eds) Party Autonomy and the role of Information in the Internal Market (Berlin, Walter de Gruyter, 2001) 
133-150 
26 K. Tuori and K. Tuori 
27 C. Joerges, ‘The European Economic Constitution and its transformation through the financial crisis’ 
28 Stiglitz, 4 
29 Stiglitz, 8 
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of regulation appear to be developing. This has recently become an area in which even the European 
Union judiciary has started infusing fundamental rights thinking in order to obtain better regulation.
30
 
Therefore, even in this context, and despite the repeatedly uttered calls for internet anarchy, therefore, 
the State is completely absent and everything rests on self-regulation. On the contrary, ‘self-
governance is surely gaining in importance in the privacy field, and some of its forms can be seen as 
private equivalents of legal regulation. But the story does not end there. Self-governance mechanisms 
of privacy protection have recently become the subject of closer influence by governments and other 
public bodies again.’31 In particular, mechanisms of consultation, or even certification of compliance 
of self-regulation with standards, are emerging in Europe as a form of ‘regulated self-regulation’.32 In 
particular, the State – or organizations of States – is still intruding in the regulation of contractual 
relations in order to achieve certain policy objectives. These developments therefore affect the 
substance of contracting: one can see that ‘contracts are often used as a case-by-case substitute for 
missing privacy legislation’. 33 This does not mean that the policy objective of data protection is 
efficiently achieved by private parties alone through their contracting; on the contrary, the EU data 
protection directive of 1995 – ‘the most influential international policy instrument to date’34 – ‘accepts 
standard contractual clauses to ensure an adequate level of protection for trans-border data flows to 
third countries. These standard clauses must be verified or developed by the EU Commission’. 35 At 
the same time, companies all over the world are slowly starting to comply with the standards 
incorporating those terms.
 36
 In the more recent case of the regulation of cloud computing services, for 
instance, ‘contracts have played a particularly important role in embracing (and absorbing) some of 
the challenges associated with the technological innovation’, 37 and two phases can be distinguished. In 
a first phase, characterized by more self-regulation, ‘cloud providers and customers have addressed 
core issues using contractual agreements’, 38 while these arrangements continue to evolve in line with 
new developments. In a second phase, the role of the State appears on the contrary  to be more 
important and hints to forms of co-regulation, as ‘various stakeholders have started to work towards 
best practice models’:39 ‘For instance the US CIO Council, in collaboration with other government 
units, developed guidelines for effective cloud computing contract for the federal government’, while 
steps in the same directions have been taken by the European Commission.
40
 
In sum, if one considers not only the reactions to the recent financial crisis, but also particular fields of 
transnational law, one can conclude that ‘the state is coming back – but in a different shape’.41 
                                                     
30 G. Comparato and H.-W. Micklitz, ‘Regulated Autonomy between Market Freedoms and Fundamental Rights in the Case 
Law of the CJEU’, in U. Bernitz, X. Groussot, F. Schulyok (ed), General principles of EU law and European private law 
(Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer, 2013) 
31 R. Bendrath, Privacy Self-Regulation and the changing role of the State. From public law to social and technical 
mechanisms of governance, WP No. 59 Transformations of the State CRC 597 6 
32 Ibid 28 
33 Ibid 17 
34 Ibid 9 
35 Ibid 17 
36 Ibid 17 
37 U. Gasser, ‘Cloud Innovation and the Law: Issues, Approaches, and Interplay’, NCCR trade regulation, WP 2013/21, 2 
38 Ibid, 17 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 R. Bendrath, 6 
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Economization and globalization 
According to the conceptualization of Bobbit, the nation-state is that form of State organization which 
arose after the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 and that, differently from previous forms, accepted the 
responsibility of providing economic security and public goods to its people.
42
 The terminology used 
by this author can be quite puzzling, especially for European scholars who are used to understanding 
the ‘nation-state’ as quite a different and earlier phenomenon, i.e. a political organization characterized 
by the coincidence of State and nation. Re-adapting Bobbit’s terminology, it would be better to resort 
to the more generic notion of the modern State. At any rate, the capacity of this State to provide public 
goods to the citizens represented the political basis of its legitimacy, as appeared quite clearly in its 
later evolution as a ‘welfare State’. Nonetheless, different factors such as, primarily, the rise of global 
capitalism as well as global communication networks, weaken the capacity of the State to guarantee 
what it has promised. It is in this context that the model of the welfare State has started being slowly 
weakened. Those public functions which were initially provided for by the welfare State have started 
being shifted to the private sector itself. This trend determined a sort of ‘economization’ and even 
‘privatization’ of State policies, which have started being delivered through reliance on economic 
private actors.  
One of the factors that has determined this development can be considered to be globalization, and 
more particularly the globalization of capital. There is a wide literature on the rather contentious 
subject of globalization which, although starting in the 1960s from the consideration that State internal 
affairs were becoming more and more dependent on external relation, has evolved in particular since 
the 1980s when capitalism became the main economic ideology worldwide. From that point of view 
and despite having different social and political aspects, globalization is per se a phenomenon highly 
interlinked with (capitalist) economy, at least in its scholarly portrayal. Even the development of one 
of the most pertinent symbols and drivers of globalization, i.e. the internet, is firmly interlinked with 
economic processes of liberalization (in particular of the telecommunication market in the US) and 
immediately appeared to be an ideal playing field for a few big corporations prepared to provide new 
services, even some of those traditionally provided by the public sector, to the citizens/users of the 
internet.
43
 For our purposes, therefore, just two dimensions of globalization can be addressed, i.e. its 
economic and its societal element. 
In economic terms, globalization is most clearly represented by the global dimension of capital. This 
move has had important repercussions for the State. On the one hand, State economy has become more 
dependent on finance, something which can be defined as ‘financialization’, while finance itself was 
becoming less dependent on the State. This phenomenon has been favoured by financial innovation, 
especially in the 1980s, with the invention of new financial instruments such as securitization and 
credit default swaps, which were then traded in global markets.  
At the same time, the shift towards global financialization has not been casual but on the contrary has 
been favoured by specific policies, often of a fiscal nature, in countries which have been forerunners 
of this development, in particular the US. ‘A post-industrial economy is thus largely a financialized 
economy that carries its debt burden by borrowing against capital gains to pay the interest and taxes 
falling due’. 44  
This development stands in contrast with the one of the Welfare State period in different ways. In the 
first sense, the Welfare State relied more strongly on public indebtedness rather than private 
indebtedness, which is on the contrary continuously on the rise in highly financialized economies. 
Inasmuch as it has been favoured by tax law regimes, this development marks a difference from the 
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policies pursued by the State even in older times, as ‘the Progressive Era a century ago advocated that 
taxes should fall mainly on rent and other property returns. The aim was to free economies from rent 
and interest, so that prices would only reflect necessary costs of production – wages and profits for 
labor and capital. But governments have pursued the opposite fiscal philosophy since World War I, 
and especially since 1980’. 45 ‘The idea is that shifting taxes off property and finance promotes a “free 
market”. What it actually does is favour the debt-leveraged buying and selling of real estate, stocks 
and bonds, distorting markets in ways that de-industrialize the economy’.46 According to this reading, 
therefore, financialization almost naturally requires globalization and the spread of the financialized 
model to other countries, since ‘international equilibrium can be maintained only if all other 
economies are financialized in a symmetrical fashion – a proliferation of the debt burden that in fact 
has become a distinguishing characteristic of today’s globalization’. 47 
Nonetheless, this phenomenon comes at the price of important societal repercussions: ‘Global 
capitalism has brought in its wake regional disparities and economic dislocations. Deindustrialization 
and unemployment, rising prices, and declining living standards have intensified the demands by 
citizens for protection and security.’48 On the one hand, the higher mobility of global capital has 
reduced the capability of the State to react and obliges it to be more competitive: the very dynamics of 
globalization weaken the State capacity to be proactive, so that, as Stiglitz puts it: ‘The process of 
globalization, the integration of economies around the world […] has put new demands on nation-
states at the very same time that, in many ways, it has reduced their capacities to deal with those 
demands’.49 Policies of liberalization, privatization and marketization have been often presented as 
necessary in the global context, but have de facto accelerated the transition from the industrial welfare 
state to the new model of ‘competition state’.50 On the other hand, citizens which belong to social 
classes and groups most adversely affected by globalization and ‘thus excluded from strategies of 
purchasing ‘privatized’ services’ expect the State to act in their interest.51 Confronted with such social 
claims, ‘the economic subsystem in its capitalist form has always externalized the cost of securing the 
existence of the worker and let other forms of association, such as the family, state, or charitable 
organizations, deal with it’. 52 The power of the State to regulate appears weakened, paradoxically, 
while societal claims make that power to regulate more compellingly necessary. 
In fact, the phenomenon of globalization appears to a certain extent to reduce voluntarily the role of 
the State, and in particular its capacity to regulate. Most recently, this criticism has been uttered in the 
debate as to new trade negotiations between the EU and the US. Although lobbyists and law firms 
resolutely reject the criticisms as ungrounded expressions of concerns which have always been uttered 
in the history of European legal integration without concretizing, and even represent the manifestation 
of a ‘European closed-mindedness’,53 several commentators circumstantiate their denunciations on 
very specific issues.  Among others, a group of scholars commenting on the proposed investor-state 
arbitration mechanism in the TTIP has denounced the proposal as having the effect of entrusting a set 
of commercial arbitrators with the role of ‘balancing the right to regulate of sovereign states and the 
property rights of foreign investors’,54 in a context in which any contractual breach seems able to 
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become a breach of treaty obligation,
55
 and in which the sovereign power to expropriate,
56
 as well as 
perform ‘haircuts’ on government bonds in case of sovereign debt crises,57 appears to be highly and 
problematically reduced. More generally, commentators have also denounced how these kind of 
investor-state arbitration schemes – a mechanism often used when there is low reliance on the 
domestic courts of certain contracting states – in the TTIP reflects ‘a vision of failed statehood’. 58 
Such distrust in domestic courts should actually not come as a surprise. It has already been argued that 
such a ‘loss of faith in adjudication’ is a characteristic common to both neo-formalist and neo-
functionalist approaches to contract law, as evidence of a ‘turn to market’59 in a globalized scenario in 
which contract law becomes an example of ‘law after the welfare state’ considered mostly for its 
capacity to enable private ordering.
 60
 
Concerning the regulation of the internet, ‘the globalization of the economy led to an increase in trans-
border data flow. On the other hand, one of the official goals of international economic policy was 
(and is) free trade. Personal data, as soon as it was more widely available than before, also became a 
commodity’.61 It was later the fear that data protection rules might limit the possibility of some 
companies in the US to enter the EU market that led the US to push for more self-regulation in 
Europe. The compromise of these divergences was the “Safe Harbor” agreement of 2000 which was a 
link between two different regulatory approaches: ‘The European, law-based and comprehensive 
privacy regulation and the American, private sector-based and sectoral privacy regulation’.62 In this 
framework, ‘most of the oversight function as well as the day-to-day supervision are done by the 
private sector itself. The states only set the minimum data protection level, and it has the means of last 
resort in case there are serious non-compliance problems’. 63  
The importance of this area, and the way in which it is interlinked both to changes in the economy and 
statehood, means that it is compelling now to look more closely at the role of technology in the 
mentioned transformation. 
Technology 
Technological developments have always been an important driver of the change of social and legal 
relations throughout human history. The very beginning of new eras in the history of mankind is 
marked by some technological development which considerably alters social organization. Concerning 
the effect on legal relations, and without having to look too far back in history, it suffices here to think 
of the developments of industrialization and labour law. Technology, however, certainly does not 
influence only productive processes. For example, the creation of nation-states (in the common 
understanding rather than in the aforementioned conceptualization of Bobit) and the spread of a sense 
of national belonging were also due to the new printing technologies which allowed people all over the 
country to be informed about events taking place in all parts of the newly formed nation state.
64
 In this 
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sense, technological developments served not only the economy, but also had important repercussions 
for society at large. 
Just as technologies trigger economic innovations, they also have an impact on society and social 
awareness about certain facts. In this sense, Beck has noted that global crises are certainly often the 
result of technological developments in fields like nuclear power and financial markets characterized 
by high communication interconnectivity, but that they are also ‘extremely dependent on global news 
media’.65 This has an impact on the formation of global awareness about such problems, since 
‘cosmopolitan events are highly mediatized, highly selective, highly variable, highly symbolic, local 
and global, national and international material and communicative reflective experiences and blow of 
fate. They transcend and efface all social boundaries and overturn the global order that holds sway in 
people’s minds’. 66  
Curiously, while the spread of global risks is not always counterbalanced by political institutions 
which are equally global, ‘the only institutions that are just as global and operate in real time just as 
the financial system does, are the mass media’. 67 The reporting of such news, and in particular of the 
recent financial crisis, might in this sense contribute to the creation of a ‘public sphere’.68 If the 
concept of State is still undergoing transformation in a global dimension then economy, technology 
and societal awareness are already, though to different extents, ahead in that process of globalization. 
If it is true that such public spheres, potentially capable of sustaining democratic deliberations in the 
Habermasian sense, are evolving at the global level, it seems consequent that those global institutions 
have to become more representative of those claims. 
The State organization has already been strongly influenced by technological developments as well, in 
as much as these have triggered a series of economic innovations and social modifications. For 
instance, the fall of communication and transportation costs was one of the forces that led first to 
nation-building and that are still driving the process of globalization.
69
 Technological development has 
had and will arguably still have ‘enormous impacts, not only on the economies, but on the role of 
government’. 70 
This concerns not only the historical development of the nation-state and the evolution of statehood 
after industrialized countries. For Bobbit, the transition from older state forms to the market State is 
mostly technology-driven, although mediated through political leadership.
71
 The development of new 
technologies for moving people and information is more likely to make social communities 
discontinuous rather than homogeneous as required by the traditional nation-state model, pointing to a 
focus on function rather than territory.
 72
 In this sense, one can say that ‘with the increasing importance 
of high-tech, high know-how economies, scale and space become less important in economic terms’.73 
One of the most direct consequences of these developments, which in modern society comprehend 
technical evolutions in telecoms, energy, mass media, pharmaceuticals, the internet and so on, is that 
in order to effectively regulate such intricate fields, the role of expert- and knowledge-based regulation 
and co-regulation has emerged more strongly. 
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Again, these dynamics are best illustrated by the development of the internet. In respect to older 
phenomena, the internet presents some aspects which are novel and pose new challenges, the most 
important of which is its transnational character, which makes the idea of State regulation a 
particularly complex issue. This is even hardly comparable to telephone networks, ‘which were 
designed by hierarchical forms of coordination in and between nation states’, while ‘the Internet 
seemed to be immune to any form of central steering’.74 In this framework, a wide literature has dealt 
with the subject and can be roughly divided between ‘cyber-separatists’, often claiming ideologically 
the separateness of the phenomenon of internet from the State, and ‘traditionalists’ who, starting from 
the consideration that even internet infrastructure remain territorially based and therefore linked to a 
particular legal order, claim a more important role for the State.
75
 What might be noticed in this regard 
is a certain complementarity between self-regulation in the private sector and by the State, often 
organized in supranational or international forums in which new devices are being created to regulate 
the phenomenon. This appears in particular if one considers the much discussed issue of privacy on 
the internet, which obliges law makers and private norm-setting bodies to reach to technical change.
76
 
‘The driving force behind the move towards more self-regulatory approaches in data protection was 
therefore a change in the structure of the regulated problem. If everybody became a potential user and 
collector of personal data, then top-down enforcement and central oversight mechanisms would not 
work anymore’. 77  
Pure self-regulation in the field has, however, been considered inefficient to a certain extent, and has 
not gained much popular support, thus leading to a more prominent role for State regulation. 
Nonetheless, given the structure of the phenomenon even regulation has assumed a particular form, 
occasionally considering the technical characteristics of the phenomenon to be regulated: ‘instead of 
regulating individual data banks and data centres like in the 1970s, it is concentrating on technical 
infrastructures and standards that will have a widespread impact on the use of personal data’. 78  
Such an approach is the idea of the ‘code’, introduced by Lessig,79 according to which individual 
behaviour can be steered, and therefore the same result of ‘regulation’ can be achieved not by 
imposing a certain conduct on individual operators, but rather by influencing the technical 
infrastructure of their activities.
80
 In this sense, the development of certain technologies offers to the 
State not only new challenges and problems to be regulated, but possibly even new instruments of 
regulation. This is evident in particular if one considers one of the most recent developments of the 
internet, i.e. the spread of cloud computing services, ‘outsourced systems where third parties provide 
aggregated computational resources and services on an as-needed basis from remote locations’.81 
These pose renewed concerns in terms of data protection for which different regulatory responses are 
conceivable, including a stronger role for contract law and the development of best practices.
82
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Societal changes 
The model of the modern state, mostly in its nation-state form, developed in a context characterized by 
social pluralism, while ‘the modern state project aimed at replacing these overlapping and often 
contentious jurisdictions through the institutions of a centralized state’.83 This was created as an 
allegedly ‘homogeneous’ institution with an overlap of nation and state through an operation that was 
also determined by nationalism, which assumed the cultural homogeneity of the national society. The 
social model in this context was one in which loyalty was given directly to the State, especially in war 
times.
 84
 Much of today’s structure and principles of private law in Europe stem from this period.85 
Later, the development of the welfare state made it possible for the state to start addressing the ‘social 
question’, in which the state could ‘shape the national economy through state subsidies, the 
elimination of internal trade barriers (such as tariffs), and the imposition of import duties; and to 
expand the transport infrastructure as well as the communication infrastructure more generally, 
including state education’.86 
In this sense, the modern state ‘pulled society into its political space, at the same time as it was trying 
to shape society according to its own objectives’. 87 This development was characterized mostly in 
democratic terms through an association of nationalism and liberalism which assumed that every 
individual was well-equipped to participate in the democratic process.
88
 This state therefore created a 
homogeneous legal space where the members of the national community could move freely, and in 
which citizens are equal and not differentiated on the basis of intermediate communities.
89
 The State 
has in this sense an active role inasmuch as it helps to produce such homogeneity, while even laws and 
judicial decisions and all the other ways in which individuals are regulated are instruments to this aim. 
It is in this context that in continental Europe the first civil codifications were enacted. Therefore, ‘as a 
moral regulator, the state ‘creates’ society’, although recently its ‘moral regulation has become ever 
less powerful’. 90 
This societal model, fully coincident with the State organized on a national basis, is however 
considered also to be  in a state of crisis, again mostly through heterogeneous processes such as 
globalization, which implies both financialization and multiculturalism, but also through endogenous 
factors such as functional differentiation and growing complexity. In such complex and multicultural 
settings, differently from the past but paradoxically similarly to the pre-modern State era, autonomous 
groups claim ‘self-government in certain key matters such as education, health, or family law’. 91 New 
models therefore respond to such forms of functional differentiation.
92
 ‘Restrictions on the exercise of 
any centralized power as well as the dynamic of the ‘subsystems’ as a result of the increase in 
‘efficiency’ […] lie behind the incessant drive to ever greater specialization, professionalization, and 
organizational structuration of each ‘subsystem’’. 93 
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This augmented complexity, associated with the phenomena of globalization, determines that ‘we live 
in a world of radical uncertainty’,94 characterized by the ‘internationalization of problems’ and the 
emergence of global risks, as touched upon above, which are detached from the exclusively national 
level and can be the result of technological improvement consisting for example in environmental 
risks. Modern societies are characterized by the spread not only of risk, becoming risk societies, but 
also global risks.
95
 These are mostly due to human activities connected with ecological and 
technological factors, as well as from insufficiently regulated financial markets.
 96
  
In this context, ‘in a world of global crises and of dangers produced by civilization, the old dualisms of 
internal and external, national and international, and us and them lose their validity, and the imagined 
community of cosmopolitanism becomes essential to survive’.97 If, on the one hand and as already 
stated, this results in a ‘denationalization of the state’,98 which among other things requires a 
redrawing of the public-private divide and the reallocation of tasks accordingly,
99
 on the other hand it 
determines the development of a new space for the ‘civil society’, which is particularly active, for 
instance, in environmental matters both at the national and at the global level.
100
 
The consequence of such ‘internationalization of society’ can become a claim for an ‘internationality 
of political decision-making’101, especially when the societal perception of problems as being of 
international significance may lead to transnational cooperation between societal actors and hence to 
societal internationalization.
102
 Indeed, it is not only the spread of global problems but also the spread 
of awareness about those problems that contributes to that development: ‘the reception of such media 
reporting creates an awareness that strangers in distant places are following the same events with the 
same fears and worries as oneself’. 103 This is a process of economic globalization and technological 
evolution as well, which as a result entails a globalization of communication, so that ‘the flow of 
information and communication on a global scale has become a regularized and pervasive feature of 
social life’. 104 This is a process which is in a way comparable to the one described by Anderson of the 
creation of nations as imagined communities where news spread freely from one side to the other of 
the country thanks to print technologies.
105
 In this sense, the literature has for many years started 
wondering whether or not the new information technologies might help develop a new international 
public sphere in a context characterized by the globalization of an economic neoliberal model.
106
 
Again, the internet offers a good example of these new risks, but also of changes in the societal 
structure of States which call for new forms of regulation. As the internet became more important for 
society and the possibilities of abuses linked to data retention were augmented, there arose a stronger 
need to protect citizens directly. In this sense, ‘contrary to the first generation of data protection laws 
that tried to regulate the corporations, the new laws and amendments, and the developing case law in 
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the 1980s gave the citizens a say in the process. Their consent – at least in Europe – became a 
precondition for the use and processing of personal data’.107 Even more recently, news about misuse of 
personal information by internet companies, fears about credit card data frauds and so on have ‘led to 
a public demand for more effective privacy protection online’.108 This has translated into a renewed 
need for State involvement in the regulation of the internet.
 109
 
The economic role of the State also has to be considered in light of the social demands in certain 
countries. In the first place, given the social structure of some countries, it is not clear whether certain 
institutional principles like, for example, the independence of central banks could work efficiently. In 
this sense, ‘the degree of independence is something which democracies should debate’. 110 
Unfortunately, global institutions like the IMF are structured in a way that does not give sufficient 
consideration to the social claims coming from the population of some countries, and while their 
policies ‘affect the livelihoods and lives of millions of people, workers and small businesses’,111 
occasionally leading to social and political turmoil,
112
 these policies are highly dependent on the 
governance structure and do not seem to allow for a sufficient democratic process which takes into 
consideration the requirements of social justice.
113
 This situation does not seem to have significantly 
changed even after the reforms in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and it might even have 
deteriorated.  
Even if in this period new efforts have been made at the global level to coordinate the macroeconomic 
responses to the crisis, the G20 design, which show institutional problems of both representativeness 
and efficiency, might even represent ‘a step in the wrong direction’114 because an ‘ad-hoc self-
appointed body can never replace representative institutions in a well-structured international 
governance framework’.115 
These internationalising tendencies therefore have an obvious dark side, which is an ‘extreme tension 
between the effectiveness of political problem-solving at the “international” level, on the one hand, 
and democratic legitimacy which remains embedded in “domestic” political institutional 
arrangements, on the other’.116 The problem is that ‘while “democracy beyond the nation-state” 
remains weak, “democracy within the nation-state” is thus weakened as well’.117 Again, private law is 
not indifferent to this process: the renewed research interest in the link between contract law and 
democracy,
118
 for instance, can be considered as a possible reaction to these deeper developments. 
Conclusion: What role for private law? 
This contribution has tried to highlight some of the dynamics which are taking place in contemporary 
society, and which are contributing to the evolution of our traditional idea of public and private law. 
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Statehood and law in more general terms have been constantly in a process of modification over the 
course of history. What is important then is to highlight both the characteristics of this evolution, and 
the factors which are determining it. Private law cannot be considered as detached from that 
background. In this sense, the development of a new but still embryonic and difficult to conceptualize 
form of post-modern State, or Market State, poses challenges to both traditional autonomy-based and 
social-functionalist visions of private law, employing private law in possible new ways in the 
heterogeneous yet interlinked processes which characterize this historical era such as liberalization, 
privatization, globalization and digitalization. This development is inscribed at least partially in the 
picture already outlined a decade ago by Duncan Kennedy, who depicted the emergence of a third 
form of globalization of law and legal thought tentatively labelled as contemporary legal thought.
119
  
It is possible to see in particular how the concept of private autonomy, which is of pivotal importance 
in contract law theory, has undergone modifications during the phases of those transformations, and 
under the influence of the elements identified. Despite the tendency to consider private autonomy as a 
pre-legal form of liberty detached from the State, it is in particular clear that modifications in the 
structure of the State have led to modifications to private autonomy as well. The liberal approach to 
the economy which characterized the 19th century liberal State did not require particular regulation of 
the contents of contracts, and therefore allowed for the liberal choices contained in the grand 
codifications of private law in continental Europe at that time. This has progressively changed over the 
phases of the transformations of the State, in which the regulation of the contents of contracts has 
become more important.  
Later codifications adopted in the era of a rising interventionist State included norms which gave the 
already long unified State a more prominent role in the regulation of even the economic contents of 
the contract, including notably the power to dictate prices. The later development of the democratic 
state paradoxically employed those very provisions to achieve results in line with the policies of the 
welfare State. This process has determined the emergence of a new rationale of private law which has 
been difficult to reconcile within the political framework of a code thought of as the economic 
constitution of a liberal or even economic interventionist State. As is well-known, it is in this context 
that in Europe the idea of code started going through a crisis, leading to a tendency to ‘de-
codification’, which refers to the loss of centrality of the category of the code with its rationality, and 
the emergence of a series of special statutes outside of the code often inspired by social regulation.
120
 
The development of this kind of socialized private law which relies on a materialized autonomy is 
indicative of the growing influence of social regulation of a new State which, having liberalized and 
privatized several of its key areas, can only regulate and demand a higher consideration for economic 
and social objectives in those fields. Different to the liberal State, and more similar to the welfare 
State, however, the regulatory State cannot rely on a classical understanding of private law by 
renouncing its role in employing private autonomy as an object of regulation and at the same time a 
regulatory tool in itself.  
The timid re-regulation of areas such as the financial sector adopted in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis, often under the influence of European law, does not however represent a return to the logic of 
the welfare state nor the liberal state. Still, the new regulatory approach impacting on contractual 
relations can be viewed as a new wave of limitations to private autonomy, bringing new informative 
requirements, and even heading towards a more ‘paternalistic’ direction. In this case as well, the 
dynamics of private autonomy point to a contextual extension and limitation, and more fundamentally 
to a continuous redefinition of autonomy within the context of the new legal and social order. 
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Competition or regulation? Private law platforms for transnational market-making 
 
Yane Svetiev 
 
By way of background 
“Arriving at constructive solutions demands rethinking radically, the ordoliberal straightjacket that … the 
European legal order [has] created for states.  It may well be necessary to abandon the strictures that 
European competition law presents for states. States are necessary, not only to provide public services, 
but to offer employment for those who do not want to live competitive lives. It may be wise to return to 
an understanding of fundamental freedoms that predates the revolution brought about by cases such as 
Cassis de Dijon, Bosman, and Centros.”121 
“The ‘darker’ side of [Van Gend] – a proxy for governance – [is] its contribution to a European narrative 
of efficiency which disregards the traditional mechanism of democratic legitimacy. … The preliminary 
reference always posits an individual vindicating a personal, private interest against the national public 
good …[It is] another building block in that construct which places the individual in the centre but turns 
him into a self-centred individual.”122 
“No Treaty should ask a state to commit to a purpose unless that purpose is rigorously ring-fenced, highly 
consensual or unless [it] contains workable mechanisms for deep political legitimation, and for self-
questioning, so that autonomy is moved rather than eliminated … Perhaps the most urgent need, if we are 
not to entirely re-write the treaties, is for more precision about what an internal market needs – both what 
kind of harmonization can be said to serve the object of the internal market and what kinds of national 
measures can be seen as obstacles.”123 
“Contrary to what I have argued at several occasions … I no longer believe that the seminal holding in 
Cassis de Dijon can be translated into a conflicts-law decision.  … Since both countries were committed 
to the free trade objective, they should also be prepared to accept that restrictions of free trade must be 
based on credible regulatory concerns. The ECJ, however restricted the concerns which European law 
accepts as legitimate drastically. There is a striking parallel with the infamous Lochner case of 1905”124 
Introduction 
Darkening clouds over Europe have been accompanied by increasingly gloomy reflections on the state 
of EU legal integration.  Many of the original advantages of the integration process, including the 
(neo)functionalist focus on building a common market as the route for deepening interdependence and 
peace, as well as the introduction of competitive principles and deliberative discipline on national 
policy-making are increasingly identified as crucial constraints for EU democracy, legitimacy or social 
justice.  The “genius” of the preliminary reference, as well as the hallmark cases of the once lauded 
“integration through law”, are reinterpreted as the original sin through which self-interested 
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individuals (and firms) could exploit EU law to gradually undermine the bases of national solidarity 
embodied in national democratically legitimated law.  Such scholarly reflection on the EU as a purely 
market-promoting actor must be viewed in conjunction with the  evidence of an apparent Polanyian  
“double movement” of a distinctly national if not nationalist character125. 
The general tenor of disappointment palpable in the EU scholarship is reminiscent of the despondent 
tone prevalent among American Critical Legal Studies (CLS) scholars at the dusk of the Great Society 
era of court-led emancipation of group rights and social justice in the US.
126
  The CLS scholars 
lamented the passing of the era in which robust Supreme Court majorities favoured progress in 
emancipation of disadvantaged groups and individual rights.  However, by focusing too narrowly on 
the proximate realities at the court level, CLS possibly over-looked limited outcomes on the ground of 
court-triggered emancipation, unless it produced policy and deliberative innovations at both State and 
federal level, supported by civil society.  Further, possible deeper transformations of both the social 
and economic environment in which the legal system operates were overlooked, which may operate as 
further constraints on court-led emancipation.  The combined effect of such blindspots tended to 
inhibit the capacity of the CLS scholarship to offer a constructive and affirmative project. Namely, to 
the extent that robust Supreme Court majorities in favour of gender or racial emancipation, affirmative 
action, rights protection of marginalized groups were unlikely to be either forthcoming or successful, 
what were other mechanisms that could advance those causes through alternative routes?
127
 
The same tenor can be detected in the scholarship on EU private law.  Much of the initial complaint 
against EU intervention in private law was the instrumental character, which undermined conceptions 
of autonomy and inter-personal justice said to underlie national private law orders.  Such complaints 
saw promise in the proposal for a codification at the EU level, because a codification would temper the 
instrumentalised interventions with more traditional justice-based rules.
128
  The unfavourable political 
reaction to that project, focused on traditional concerns about national competences and EU 
competence creep was paralleled by academic claims about the impossibility of harmonization of 
private law as a reflection of national identity encoding national legal culture and practice.
129
  
However, somewhat lost in the debate about competences, national identity and culture was a more 
Europeanist critique of the codification project.  Namely, Wilhelmsson argued that private law, at 
national as well as EU level, typically does embody various and differing welfarist concerns that are 
impossible to subsume in a comprehensive codification.  Instead, he argued that EU private law should 
cherish and stimulate pluralism and provide a platform for mutual learning, a view that is wholly 
consistent with Joerges’130 conceptualization of diagonal conflicts of law as a source of deliberative 
learning across legal systems: 
“A general European civil code … would probably be too static an instrument to allow sufficient space 
for a welfarist, more scattered and decisionistic, improvement of the rules. [T]o safeguard the legitimacy 
of the decisions—as the legitimacy cannot be sought in the idea of a coherent system—there should be 
sufficient room for continuous development at national level in addition to the required EC measures. 
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Welfarism requires a constantly learning law …  a process of Europeanisation through a free movement 
of legal ideas and doctrines, across the borders”131 
EU institutions and private law: Rationality or habit? 
In the area of private law, the attempt by the Commission to salvage some of the work and resources 
committed to the private law harmonization crystallized in a proposal for a Common European Sales 
Law optional instrument to be used for cross-border sales of goods.  This initiative must be viewed in 
the broader context of the Digital Agenda for Europe and the identification of the completion of the 
digital single market as a top political priority for the Commission.  The criticisms of the CESL 
project, now itself apparently doomed to failure, have a similar undertone to the broader scepticism 
about the effects of EU law outlined above.  Thus, Bartl argues that EU private law building is driven 
by an “internal market rationality”132.  While the proposal does contain certain measures protective of 
transacting parties who have a weaker bargaining power and contracting capacity, on this view, such 
protections are consistent with the market rationality.  Namely, such protections help individuals only 
in their capacity as consumers who are to be empowered to act as agents of and for the digital single 
market, but not in the other capacities in which individuals may act consistent with their other 
normative or social commitments.
133
 
Moreover, the argument is that the market rationality is so all-encompassing that it disables EU level 
actors to even problematize the goals that they set out to achieve, such as market integration or the 
digital single market.  Once the legislative goal is set out by the EU Commission’s legislative 
initiative, it is not subjected to contestation, even by actors who would be expected to do so by 
pointing out the possible costs of completing the digital single market by adversely affecting other 
policy goals, such as environmental and health protection, or even social cohesion and urban planning.  
Thus, Bartl argues that such issues were not ventilated in the pre-legislative knowledge production, 
through the preparatory documents or regulatory impact assessments.  Moreover, the politicization and 
democratization of EU law-making through the enhanced role of the Parliament does not help either, 
as neither the left nor the green parties’ groupings sought to raise those objections in the debate before 
the EU Parliament.  Notably, neither did the Member States’ government representatives do so.134 
It may be helpful to make a number of refinements to this argument from the perspective of the ERPL 
project, including (i) the necessity to focus on drivers of the transformation of the form and function of 
private law beyond EU interventions; (ii) the need to look at the problem from both the EU and the 
MS perspectives and (iii) the need for more precision in the concept of “internal market rationality”. 
Thinking from the perspective of the broader drivers of transformation can help to be more careful in 
the attribution of causation and responsibility for certain outcomes to singular factors or actors.  Thus, 
it may be fair to say that by the time the proposals for a cross-border sales law and the digital single 
market were put on the EU legislative table by the Commission, the online market was by and large 
already a reality for quite some time due to technological developments.  Moreover, given the 
ubiquitous nature of Internet technology online market platforms ordinarily do not respect existing 
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State-jurisdictional boundaries.  Novel forms of reaching consumers directly for promotion and 
marketing, as well as platforms for concluding transactions and dispute resolution have challenged 
national private law and regulation substantively and procedurally, as well as challenging EU law 
itself, thereby producing both national and EU-level reactions.
135
 
Consistent with other EU legislative interventions aimed at regulating the impact of technology on 
transactions,
136
 we may fairly ask whether in light of the proliferation of online platforms for 
transacting and dispute resolution, the addition of an optional cross-border sales law even contribute 
towards the creation or completion of an online market, or whether it would have had little or no 
influence on that goal in light of technological, economic and social developments. Thinking on the 
basis of the drivers of transformation is useful not because it helps to identify a single exogenous 
cause of transformations in the transacting environment: these factors operate simultaneously and 
endogenously influence each other.  However, thinking in terms of broader drivers - in the context of 
EU scholarship – may prevent  the tendency to ascribe effects (either actual or just potential) to EU 
interventions.
137
  It may also help to clarify whether the EU is a cause, just a catalyst or can even be 
seen as a coping mechanism for transformations in the underlying environment for law and regulation. 
But if the optional instrument was unlikely to be particularly effective either as a response to or an 
instrument for the construction of online markets, we might ask why the EU legislator would go to the 
trouble of producing, justifying and promoting its enactment?  This leads us to another interpretation 
of  “rationality” of a legal order that is based not on an all-encompassing code or logic that fully 
explains each intervention, but on habit.  Thus, if functional differentiation of normative orders can be 
understood through the prism of specialization, the “rationality” of a legal or regulatory regime may be 
understood as the combination of the goal(s) habitually pursued with an allocated instrument for 
achieving that goal.
138
 EU action is typically justified on the basis of the goal of creating the internal 
market through the tool of legal harmonization.
139
 Specialised institutions may pursue the allocated 
policy instrument even in circumstances where it is unlikely to be effective in achieving the allocated 
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goal or may cause damage to other relevant objectives not within the actor’s purview.140 In the case of 
the common sales instrument, for instance, this path-dependent tendency towards harmonisation may 
be worsened by a variant of the sunk-cost fallacy: an attempt to salvage the investment in the failed 
project of codifying an EU contract law. 
Such a path-dependent goal-instrument combination is reinforced by the competence view of EU 
integration and the way in which the EU’s competences are defined in the Treaties, which gives 
greater flexibility in the use of the internal market power.  It is also reinforced by the forms of 
discipline on the exercise of the legislative initiative by the Commission through ex ante tools, such as 
regulatory impact assessments which are constrained due to the lack of reliable methodologies to 
predict the impact of an instrument such as CESL even on the most directly salient parameters, such as 
the quantity of transactions and intra-Community trade, let alone longer-term effects on more diffuse 
goals such as the environment or social cohesion. Such ex ante exercises therefore invite efforts at 
self-justification.  Thus, if the EU, and in particular the Commission is expected to be a specialised 
technocratic trustee of economic efficiency
141
, it should not be a surprise if it acts as one. 
As such, the promotion of harmonised instruments, such as CESL, may be regarded as an instance of 
what Sparrow characterizes as beginning from legal rules and yet thereby targeting conduct or issues 
that are not of real regulatory concern.
142
  He contrasts this by a problem-solving orientation, which 
begins with actual problems detected on the ground, triggering a search for available legal or 
regulatory tools with which to solve them.  An example of problem-oriented EU action in the context 
of the digital market may be the recent Commission investigation of Google practices with respect to 
search results on Internet shopping websites.  The investigation was triggered by complaints that 
Google search results favoured Google-related businesses, thereby disadvantaging other operators.  
Given Google’s overwhelming share of search queries, the Commission pursued the problem as a 
potential abuse of dominance under the competition laws, even if there was uncertainty about the 
likely effects of such conduct and whether it fell within the scope of Art. 102. Precisely the uncertainty 
about the extent of the problem and about possible solutions suggests that neither reliance on prior 
rules or precedents, nor technocratic methodologies may offer particularly promising bases of 
intervention.
143
  The Commission initially envisaged using the commitments procedure, by negotiating 
remedies directly with Google, including formats for the presentation of search results and provision 
of real-time disclosures to consumers to interpret search results in the context of Internet shopping.  
Moreover, given that commitments are subjected to pre-implementation market testing as well as on-
going monitoring obligations, such interventions create platform for on-going deliberation about the 
online transaction ecology among different stakeholders in a way that might both advanced the online 
market, while also identifying and remedying other policy concerns triggered by online transactions.  
Such an outcome is made possible by the elasticity of the competition rules on abuse of dominance, 
the absence of narrow competence constrains on the intervention, flexible instruments for intervention, 
as well as the fairly heterodox goals of EU competition policy never formally limited to short run 
allocative efficiency.
144
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The CJEU and policy-making in the Member States 
Quite apart from the EU legislative process ordinarily triggered by the Commission’s initiative, the 
CJEU has itself been subject to criticism for its decision-making under free movement law, which is 
said to disturb delicate and stable national balances between market autonomy and welfarist regulation 
promoting social and cohesion policy goals.  Such criticisms became more vocal in the wake of the 
CJEU’s decisions in cases such as Viking145 and Laval,146 and more recently have led to a re-evaluation 
of the Court’s previously lauded role as the key motor of integration through law.  The bases of such 
criticisms appear to be two-fold.  Firstly, there is the familiar criticism about the limited structural 
capacity of courts to advance positive rights, such as social, economic or environmental rights that 
have increasingly found expression both in the Treaties and in secondary legislation.  Thus, even when 
the CJEU, as in Laval, recognizes the fundamental nature of social rights, in the one-shot litigation 
game the fundamental freedoms of movement are more easily susceptible to judicial enforcement.
147
  
The second reason for criticism relates to the way in which the CJEU’s free movement jurisprudence 
restricts the available public interest justifications that Member States can proffer for their 
(democratically approved) rules and regulations.
148
 Both of these reasons for criticism invite some 
comment and refinement. 
Let’s begin with the second argument about the restriction of policy-making and in particular policy 
justification autonomy of the Member States.  To analyse this claim, it might be helpful to recall what 
is arguably a quite typical anecdote from teaching EU law cases such as Cassis de Dijon
149
 or the 
German beer case.
150
  A typical reaction by an uninitiated student to hearing the facts of the Cassis 
case is puzzlement due to a combination of national stereotypes and the peculiarity of the national 
rules at issue.  Moreover, even before hearing the full reasoning of the Court, students will typically 
struggle to understand the policy behind the rule, including grappling with the justification offered by 
the court, some will resort to “culture” as a limit to any explanation, others might wonder if it is 
somehow a measure that protects existing players.  The very persistent student will go on to ask 
whether there is any effect from admitting Cassis in the German market.  The intuition is that to 
understand the effects of the case holding, it is also necessary to understand the way in which it has 
been contextualised and the effects that it has in the local context following the CJEU and national 
court decisions. 
The anecdote may seem banal, but it illustrates a few important points.  Namely, the uninitiated will 
subject national rule-making to equally searching scrutiny as that of the EU institutions. She may also 
be interested to know about how a decision of the CJEU is ultimately contextualized back into the 
national setting, where it might have negative, but also positive or altogether negligible effects. Even if 
the rule is not protectionist, a national rule might reflect insider concentrated interests who are better 
represented in the national political process, in turn excluding even domestic let alone foreign 
“outsiders”.  Or it might simply reflect the omission of a worthy public policy objective that was not 
salient at the time the rule was enacted, but that can be illuminated by confronting national with EU 
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law obligations.
151
  Some degree of deliberative examination of the purpose or effect of domestic rules 
that could foreclose market access is inevitable in an organization such as the EU.   
That does not exclude the possibility that national rules could take on either their purpose or their 
expressive value through implementation, rather than through enactment. The CJEU – and EU law 
more broadly - does not typically foreclose public interest requirements for a regulation that have 
emerged through its implementation, nor has it foreclosed facially valid considerations of the public 
interest of a more expressive kind, such as shop opening hours or the protection of media pluralism. 
Even the Commission in exercise of its competition enforcement powers acceded to the national book 
pricing laws that may have emerged as a type of cartel, but were said to have taken on an expressive 
and cultural purpose.
152
 To this day the existence of such schemes are a source of comparative 
knowledge about how different jurisdictions are coping with the emergence and effects of online 
markets
153
, which could lead to reevaluation of the utility of such arrangements in the countries that 
adopted them and a source of inspiration for the others. It is precisely EU law that has provided 
deliberative architectures for such reevaluation
154
, whether through the preliminary reference before 
the CJEU, networks of administrative authorities, or even pan-European networks of consumer 
representative organisations. 
This brings me to the other complaint about the effect of the CJEU jurisprudence, namely that it 
asymmetrically promote negative (in the case of the EU free movement) rights as opposed to positive 
socio-economic or environmental rights.  Here, it is possible to point to the fact that in individual cases 
over time the CJEU has acted so as to protect rights including positive rights,
155
 but this does not 
exclude the possibility that on balance the jurisprudence might favour economic freedoms, not only 
just facially (ie, in the decisions themselves) but also in how those decisions eventually touch down 
and are contextualized locally.  Moreover, the Court may be bolstering individual rights and capacities 
only to the extent that they act as (selfish) market actors, but not otherwise. 
More recently, considerable attention has been attracted by the increasing activity of the CJEU in 
contract law cases, with numerous preliminary references reaching the court pursuant to the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive on the basis of contacting problems in the regulated network sectors, such as 
energy or financial services.
156
  Quite apart from the fact that such cases have resulted in sustained 
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attention by the CJEU to the social dimension of EU integration, Gerstenberg
157
 has argued that the 
Court’s jurisprudence in these cases has acquired both a regulatory and a constitutional dimension.  
The result is a particular style of constitutionalisation of private law reasoning through an 
experimentalist form of judicial review.  This form of review, through the medium of proportionality 
analysis, both allows for a European frame for the protection of socio-economic rights, as well as for 
their contextualization by private actors within the setting of particular relationships or transactions.
158
  
Proportionality analysis permits a discursive process through which to strike a fair balance between 
simultaneous commitments to private law autonomy and to the legitimate interests of vulnerable 
consumers.
159
   
According to Gerstenberg, what allows the CJEU to escape the role of social engineer under such a 
scenario – where outcomes reflect judicial preferences – is the fact that it is not the “final decider”.160  
Instead, it is the national court in reaching the decision that both performs the proportionality analysis, 
a division of labour that transforms the CJEU and the domestic court into “mutually co-dependent 
interlocutors”.161  
As I have argued elsewhere, both the “Solange” formula and proportionality analysis can provide 
judicial platforms for the integration of the various rationalities (in the sense of goal/instrument 
specialisations) of different legal orders.
162
  However, there are two (related) limits on the emergence 
of this experimentalist form of judicial review, whereby one court simply dislodges an existing 
equilibrium in the other legal order and generates experimentation so as to accommodate different 
normative commitments under conditions of uncertainty and mutual monitoring.  One is the fact that 
the CJEU does not remain seized with the specific case after it gives an answer to the questions posed 
by the national court in the preliminary reference, unlike for example American courts that have 
upheld parties’ destabilization rights and thereby created regimes for the reform of broken institutions 
such as prisons or schools.
163
  Typically, this means that the CJEU does not even decide the fate of the 
litigant in the particular case, although it has happened that different iterations of the same case have 
been considered by the Court, as in the RWE litigation discussed below.  In any event, the CJEU 
certainly does not supervise any regime that the decision might subsequently trigger. 
 
A second and related limitation is the fact that courts typically do not have the infrastructure for 
mutual monitoring and in particular for the monitoring of the outcomes of cases over time to 
determine how they stack up to common normative concerns.  Therefore, it is quite difficult to assess 
the extent to which national courts both contribute to and protect the emergence of a European 
understanding of contractual unfairness, or whether they upgrade domestic procedural rules and 
remedies to enable contracting parties to take advantage of such an understanding.  This may be one 
reason for the introduction of a comitology updating procedure in the failed 2008 proposal for a 
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Consumer Rights Directive, under which national court or regulatory decisions would be notified to 
the Commission so as to trigger a revision process.
164
  Such a proposal reflect a recognition that courts 
typically lack the infrastructure and procedures for ongoing monitoring even in individual cases 
brought before them, let alone of broader adjustment processes that judicial decisions may trigger. 
The extent to which “judicialization ‘beyond the state’” may deepen democratic solidarity by making 
the formulation of and implementation of broad framework commitments more pluralistic, 
participatory and experimentalist in the EU setting will depend upon the extent to which (i) the 
framework goals in secondary legislation
165
 rigidly adhere to a market rationality and (ii) the 
availability of architectures for mutual monitoring and adjustment in the face of judicial destabilisation 
as between different actors at different policy-making levels. 
Autonomy, competition and regulation in the networked services sectors 
With the foregoing background, I now turn to the so-called vertical sectoral silos including electronic 
communications, energy and financial services, areas in which EU regulation has also had a profound 
– though often understudied - impact on private law.  Particularly in telecommunications and energy, 
under the cover of the internal market programme and the primary law provisions favouring 
competition, successive generations of EU secondary legislation has pursued the goal of liberalization 
of previously publicly owned and operated vertically integrated monopoly suppliers. The goal of such 
interventions was to introduce greater competition in such markets, as opposed to the prior scenario of 
state provision and heavy regulation.  This programme is typically attributed to the EU, even if the 
Member States did agree to this agenda, albeit gradually and progressively.  One view could be that 
such interventions were undergirded by an internal market rationality, largely imposed on the Member 
States with well-functioning existing domestic arrangements.  However, an alternative argument might 
be that the transformation of these sectors was also driven by other factors, including dissatisfaction 
with service provision outcomes based on political steering and planning, absence of innovation, 
combined with emergent technological possibilities for introducing competition and dynamism in 
these markets.   
Schweitzer argues that “public service monopolies [in the Member States] had become detached from 
their original purposes and ultimately pursued self-interests and ad hoc political interests, losing user 
interest out of sight”166.  This was in part possible because there was no “monitoring of economic 
outcomes”, as political accountability was relied upon to discipline actors, though in the absence of 
monitoring and benchmarking of service outcomes electoral accountability was obviously a very 
limited constraint.  It is such background conditions, combined with transformative pressures of 
transnational interdependence and technological change, that may have provided fertile ground for 
certain political and even intellectual
167
 trends. As Zumbansen
168
 explains: 
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“The empowerment of market actors often results from a complex combination of historically evolved 
individualism, decentralized government and regulatory competition. The promise of private autonomy 
and individual freedom … can only be understood against the background of this historically grown and 
continuously evolving polycontextural architecture.  … [P]rivate autonomy neither arises from nor exists 
in a normative or structural vacuum” 
The liberalization packages were of course sold as the convergence of the internal market project and 
with an appetite for the benefits of competition for improving market outcomes, in terms of consumer 
prices, incentives to invest and innovate and, through privatization, perhaps to even shift the fiscal 
burden away from the State.  But through provisions to bolster access to potential competitors, the 
agency of consumers to benefit from competitive discipline,
169
 as well as to guarantee them universal 
service access, such packages reflected the intuition that markets are both social and legal 
constructs.
170
 
 In a competitive market, the legal infrastructure for transactions and for disciplining market actors is 
supplied by private law (contract and tort) as well as ex post competition enforcement to control 
collusive behaviour and dominant positions of market power.  As such, liberalisation should reduce 
the reliance on classic regulation, since competitive rivalry disciplines market players to deliver the 
various aspects of the public interests, from lower prices to improved service.  In fact, in the regulated 
markets, EU legislation explicitly envisages regulation and competition as alternative disciplining 
devices on market actors. In the electronic communications package there is an explicit recognition of 
the aim “progressively to reduce ex-ante sector specific rules as competition in the markets develops 
and, ultimately, for electronic communications to be governed by competition law only”.171 
Notwithstanding some differences in market conditions, structure and policy goals, a similar 
“rationality” may be detected in the energy legislative package.  In the Federutility case, the CJEU 
examined the continued practice of price regulation in gas prices in Italy vis-à-vis the provisions 
aiming to promote competition at the expense of price regulation in the energy legislative package. 
AG Colomer in Federutility will set out the goals of the package and the remaining space for state 
regulation in the following way: 
“Since the Single European Act, when competition was installed as the new deity on ‘the altar of political 
ideas’, public service has become an obstacle to be overcome in the name of a liberalisation on which all 
hopes were pinned. … 
The creation of an open market is the first step of this policy, but once barriers have been removed there 
remain certain requirements which the market alone is not able to meet. Hence the origins of public 
intervention, in the form of ‘services of general interest’ and ‘public service obligations’, imposed by the 
authorities on undertakings in liberalised sectors in order to safeguard public interests which, because 
they are inalienable, cannot be left to market forces to take care of. …”172 
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He will go on to add that “state involvement in the market must be limited so as not to postpone true 
liberalisation indefinitely, and should focus on the protection of the rights of the consumer.”173 
The decision of the CJEU followed a similar logic, in that it affirmed the continued ability of Member 
States to engage in price regulation for the purpose of the “general economic interest” though “for a 
period that is necessarily limited in time”. This was because a measure limiting the freedom to 
determine the gas supply price to consumers “by its very nature constitutes an obstacle to the 
realization of an operational internal market in gas”.  On the one hand, it is true, as Gerstenberg 
argues,
174
 that the CJEU decision creates a framework for discursive discipline for the different policy 
commitments (the internal market and social policy) to which both the EU and the MS are committed 
through the obligations of proportionality, transparency, non-discrimination and verifiability.
175
  On 
the other hand, it does not appear to be the case that the EU law regards competition either as a 
sufficient disciplining force or as the sine qua non of the internal market, nor does it limit the 
justifications available to the Member States for price regulation.  
An experimentalist architecture does require the identification of shared framework goals (even if 
provisional) jointly by the EU and Member States, but it also allows for lower level units to devise 
their own strategies about achieving such goals and allows also for the framework goals to be further 
specified or reformulated in light of the experiences in implementing them.
176
 This is precisely 
because laws are arguably domesticated or contextualized to local circumstances and divergent policy 
goals through their implementation and enforcement, even more so than ex ante in their drafting.  
Thus, even legislative frameworks intended to be centralised and rigid can be contextualised in the 
face of enforcement difficulties and constraints.
177
 
There are at least a number of possible ways in which the liberalization framework goals and 
instruments for both electronic communications and for energy could be problematized in light of the 
experience of implementation in the various sectors. Some ways in which the 
competition/liberalisation “deities” can be contested include: 
 the identification of the goal of a competitive market as coincident with the internal market; 
 the idea of competition as a sufficient disciplining force on market actors both in terms of 
consumer market outcomes, but also in relation to other public policy goals, and not only 
because textbook competitive markets are unlikely to emerge in such sectors.  The idea of 
competition being a sufficient disciplining force on market outcomes is particularly problematic 
when policy goals are more complex and divergent and may require some degree of 
coordination.  For instance, in both telecoms and energy, infrastructure investment is a relevant 
goal that must be pursued even when infrastructure and service are not supplied by the same 
entity. There are also other policy goals that present challenges in a competitive environment, 
including network neutrality in electronic communications, the transaction costs of unbundled 
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energy supply, as well as stability of supply and environmental/climate goals in the energy 
sector; 
 problems in the transactional architecture for business-to-consumer relationships which are 
stable, yet should be subject to competitive pressure, which may reveal weaknesses both in 
contract law and in dispute resolution.  
Apart from the problems and limits of competitive markets revealed above, local experiences with 
alternative models of market organization and service delivery which reveal successful outcomes 
would also provide a way of instrument correction and goal reformulation within an experimentalist 
architecture. 
Thus, experimentalist market regulation would begin with the premise that there is no natural market 
model towards which these different sectoral regimes would converge. Therefore a mutually 
supportive process of error corrections (in instruments) and goal reformulation leads to a co-evolution 
in market construction and regulation, which is essentially never ending as markets are continuously 
buffeted by various transformative forces – exogenous and endogenous.  The balance of the paper 
draws attention to further episodes in which experiences in implementing the EU legislative packages 
for electronic communications, energy, financial services have produced discursive disruptions that 
problematize the “deity on which all hopes were pinned” and trigger a search for workarounds. It 
remains an open question to what extent such episodes lead simply to instrument adjustments, and 
whether any adjustments in the habituated goals of EU-level and national actors are openly 
acknowledged or simply subsumed to the existing goal/mandate.
178
  
The limits of competition in forging an internal market in electronic communications 
An open acknowledgment of the limits of competition in delivering both the internal market and 
favourable market outcomes for consumers by the EU legislator was in the Roaming Regulation,
179
 
which were subsequently acknowledged by the CJEU in the litigation that this regulation generated. 
The Roaming Regulation was an exercise in price regulation at EU level, capping both the wholesale 
and retail charges that mobile operators can charge for providing roaming services on public mobile 
networks for calls between Member States, promulgated under the Art. 114 internal market 
competence.  
The EU legislator offered a number of motivations for the Regulation, including the deficiency in the 
regulatory instruments available at both EU and national level.  The Regulation noted that the 
telecoms legislative package did not provide NRAs with “sufficient tools” to address the problem of 
excessive roaming charges (Recital 4).  This was in part due to the NRAs’ limited jurisdictional reach, 
which did not extend to operators on the visited network in another MS (Recital 8).  Moreover, 
limitations were also identified in the analytical tool that triggers regulation under the telecoms 
package (borrowed from competition law), by pointing out “the difficulty in identifying undertakings 
with significant market power in view of the specific circumstances of international roaming, 
including its cross border nature” (Recital 6). 
As the cause of the high roaming costs, the Regulation identified the “high wholesale charges levied 
by the foreign host network operators” as well as the “high retail mark-ups” of the customer’s operator 
(Recital 1).  While the EU legislator notes that the relationship between costs and prices is higher than 
would prevail in competitive markets, there is acknowledgment that relying on competition would not 
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necessarily correct that problem.  This was because, even if wholesale charges were to drop, operators 
had no incentive to pass on reductions to retail prices, both because typically operators compete on 
packages of which roaming charges are a small part, but also because “the dynamics of roaming 
markets are complex and in the process of changing” so that the relationship between wholesale and 
retail charges was neither linear nor stable.
180
 
The limits of competition law and (national) regulatory instruments, together with uncertainty about 
the robustness of the competitive mechanism in delivering consumer outcomes was sufficient for the 
CJEU to affirm the proportionality of the regulation of both wholesale and retail prices at EU level.  
Notably, in affirming proportionality, the CJEU does stress that the “intervention is limited in time in a 
market that is subject to competition”.  The sunset clause of the Regulation may be regarded as an 
experimentalist tool that triggers another round deliberation of reflection on the complex and changing 
market dynamics and precisely such a recursivity mechanism makes even a strong departure from 
market autonomy through price regulation proportionate under EU law. 
One might ask at this point, whether the transnationally mobile roaming customers, Somek’s 
“accidental cosmopolitans” who most benefit from EU integration, are afforded more consumer 
protection than the less mobile who do not wish to lead mobile or competitive lives (for which the 
Federutility customers might be a proxy)? I would argue not, since in both cases price regulation is 
triggered by insufficient rivalry or, more to the point, ineffectiveness in the competitive disciplining 
mechanism due to features of the market or consumer behaviour. In both cases, price regulation is 
proportionate if the reasons for this restriction of autonomy are set out, the measure is limited and 
subject to a sunset clause, so as to allow re-examination of market dynamics and the appropriate 
regulatory response to changing market circumstances.  The Roaming Regulation explicitly recognised 
the limits of competitive markets and, at the same, time promotes an important expressive value for 
the EU in promoting cross-border communications as an aid to the freedoms of movement. 
Identification of new policy goals and priorities 
Infrastructure investment and competition 
Writing in 2012, William Melody, a key protagonists of telecoms liberalization both in the EU and 
elsewhere,
181
 perhaps somewhat surprisingly laments about the “closing of the liberalization era in 
European Telecommunications”.182  In particular, he argues that notwithstanding a quarter century of 
reforms, while the markets in different MS are more diversified compared to the national monopolies 
of before, there is no seamless EU-wide telecoms market, incumbent operators continue to possess 
market power, and there is a shortage in infrastructure investments for a digital economy broadband 
era.  Nonetheless, he suggests that both the EU and Member States have given declining priority to 
market access and competition, returning to a “policy agenda based primarily on direct state 
intervention and government aid”.  Notwithstanding the benefits that two decades of reform have 
brought to European communications markets, the current policy framework makes “no mention of 
new liberalization initiatives” or projects for expanding competition.  Part of the reason he identifies is 
the fact that the Digital Agenda for Europe 2020 has shifted focus on “financing solutions for the 
investments needed to upgrade” to high speed infrastructures, which are expected to come from 
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dominant incumbent operators’ profits, which are thus subjected to less pressure through increasing 
competition or antitrust enforcement. 
This illustrates the point that when policy objectives in a particular sector change, or at least are re-
prioritised, this may lead to the reexamination of the instruments that have been adopted thus far.  The 
problem of securing the investments for the digital agenda is by no means trivial, particularly in light 
of the fiscal pressures that have affected public finances in recent times. 
Note however, that even in this respect the Member States themselves have been using innovative 
implementation mechanisms, which allow them to elide the distinction between ex ante regulation and 
ex post competition enforcement and as a method of simultaneously pursuing apparently conflicting 
commitments.  One example comes from a joint decision of OPTA (the then telecommunications 
regulator) and the NMa (the then competition regulator in the Netherlands) to approve a proposed joint 
venture agreement between the incumbent telecom operator KPN and Reggefiber (a new entrant in the 
business of laying optical fibre networks) intended to exploit complementarities between the two 
undertakings. In particular, KPN, which had been relying on the existing copper network and facing 
competition from cable companies, was “to leverage its customer base and marketing expertise, 
whereas Reggefiber would bring in its technical expertise in rolling out optical fibre networks”.183  The 
problem with the proposal was that while the joint venture would ensure investment in the rolling out 
of the optical fibre network, once completed KPN would control both the copper and the fibre network 
and would have incentives to foreclose downstream competitors from accessing the fibre network 
further strengthening its incumbency.   
To promote both infrastructure investment and competition, the Dutch competition and 
communications authorities – which have since been merged into a single authority – cooperated to 
approve the venture, but subject it to commitments by the parties to provide access to downstream 
competitors to the network as well as a monitoring regime for implementation. As such, the case may 
be regarded as a platform for pursuing two different public policy goals, whereby “private investments 
in a new network can be combined with an open structure, guaranteeing reasonable access conditions 
for third parties”.184 
Vertical integration and competitive access 
Turning to the energy sector, the EU Commission was not in a position to include an obligation of 
vertical ownership unbundling in the third energy liberalization packages as a way of stimulating 
competitive access in the markets of electricity and gas due to strong opposition from the Member 
State governments.  Nonetheless, the Commission has been pursuing that goal indirectly through 
commencing antitrust actions against incumbent energy suppliers under the Art. 102 abuse of 
dominance positions.
185
  Since 2008, the Commission in a number of commenced cases, has accepted 
commitments by the defendant incumbents in both electricity and gas markets, such as E.ON and ENI 
“to divest their transmission networks to avoid further antitrust scrutiny”186, as well as divestitures of 
electricity generation capacity (CEZ). 
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Motivated by similar policy concerns, the Commission in 2008 commenced a formal investigation 
against GDF France
187
 based on an allegation of foreclosure of downstream supply markets for natural 
gas in France, through (i) a combination of long-term transport capacity reservations; (ii) a network of 
import agreements, and (iii) through underinvestment in import infrastructure.
188
 Following the 
opening of the case, GDF offered to negotiate commitments with the Commission. Internally GDF 
identified an important goal for offering commitments to the Commission that would avoid GDF being 
forced to a divestiture of the network operator. Quite apart from the opposition of France, like 
Germany, to the introduction of ownership unbundling in the energy liberalization package, as GDF’s 
Head of Competition and Regulatory Affairs explained within the company, from an “engineering” 
perspective the costs of any eventual vertical de-integration through divestiture were judged to be 
extremely high.
189
   
Thus, GDF offered a set of long-term commitments, including an immediate release of a large share of 
its long-term reservations of gas import capacity into France, amounting to about 10% of the total 
long-term import capacity.  Further it committed to continue to reduce its share of such reservations to 
below 50% in a subsequent 5-year period.  Finally, at the conclusion of that period, from 1 October 
2014 and for a period of 10 years, GDF’s capacity subscription reservation would be limited to below 
50%. Finally, there was “Good faith commitment” that from 1 October 2024 to 1 October 2029, 
capacity reservation would be limited to less than 50 %, in all infrastructures existing as of 1 October 
2014. 
As the Commission recognized the commitments would “have a major structural impact on the 
possibility for other companies of competing on the French market, to the benefit of domestic and 
industrial gas consumers”.  Thus, the Commission considered GDF’s commitments to be equivalent to 
structural remedies.  For GDF, apart from avoiding any risk of divestiture, the commitments also 
offered an alternative route to cope with the capacity reductions, by for example investing in new 
import terminals.  As the GDF official recognized, both the format and the length of the commitments 
will mean that the implementation of the decision is very “cumbersome”, involving the work of a 
dedicated department within GDP in cooperation with a monitoring trustee, the French energy 
regulator as well as on-going communication both internally within the GDF group and with other 
market players (such as alternative gas suppliers who wish to take advantage of the released capacity).  
She suggested that the Commission intended to provide access to gas infrastructures to other gas 
suppliers and as such the commitments are a mechanism (alternative to divestiture) to promote the 
desired outcomes of liberalization, which simultaneously enables GDF to continue to reap the 
transaction cost efficiencies of vertical integration (presumably a key policy goal that motivated 
Member State opposition to vertical unbundling). 
Resolving contracting problems in B2C relationships 
The liberalization of the provision of services such as telecommunications and energy leads to a 
contractualisation of the relationship between suppliers and final consumers.  However, such contracts 
are clearly quite different from the ordinary contract law paradigm of the one-off arms-length sale of a 
widget, where both parties can observe the widget and at the very least make inquiries about its 
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characteristics and value.
190
  Standard terms contracts concluded by a single entity with multiple 
consumers, who have less market knowledge, conclude far fewer similar transactions and are, thus, in 
a much weaker bargaining position have long been recognised to present specific issues in both 
negotiation, demonstrating assent and subsequent enforcement.
191
   
A problematic issue in B2C gas supply contracts has been presented before the CJEU in a succession 
of preliminary references involving the German gas supplier RWE. These cases presented the question 
of how to adjust final consumer gas prices to final consumers in gas supply contracts of indeterminate 
length. RWE offered standard term contracts which allowed it to unilaterally vary the price paid by the 
final consumer, without any statement of the grounds or scope of the price variation, so long as the 
final consumers were informed of the price change and were free to terminate the contract.  The issue 
was whether such a price variation term was consistent with secondary EU law, namely the Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive. 
In light of the fact that the contracts were of indeterminate length, during which time costs and other 
circumstances are likely to change, the CJEU recognized that the supplier has a legitimate interest to 
alter the price of the service.  However, it also held that a term allowing such adjustment must “meet 
the requirements of good faith, balance and transparency”192.  In particular, the CJEU thought it of 
fundamental importance that the contract transparently set out “the reason for and method of the 
variation of the charges” so that the “consumer can foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, 
the alteration that may be made to those charges” and “whether the consumers have the right to 
terminate” if the charges are altered. 
The question of the price variation clause in a contract for energy or telecommunications presents two 
fundamental problems of the use of contracting in B2C relationships in these sectors.  The first is a 
transactional or contracting problem, namely that of assenting to the terms of the contract.  If the 
CJEU’s decision implies that a price variation clause must make price movements predictable for 
consumers, it is not clear that such a price variation term would provide fair balance vis-à-vis the 
supplier.  A price indexed to inflation changes predictably for the consumer, but may not be adequate 
to ensure cost recovery for the supplier in cases of unpredictable cost events.  A formula might be 
transparent, but may not be predictable for consumers, nor may it take into account significant and 
structural fluctuations in the market that cannot be captured by an ex ante formula.   
Quite apart from the contracting assent problem, price variation clauses also highlight a regulatory 
problem.  Namely, the energy package guarantees that consumers should have access to gas at 
reasonable prices, and for vulnerable consumers at affordable prices.
193
  In the absence of price 
regulation, one issue is whether the satisfaction of such obligations vis-à-vis consumers can only be 
determined through ex post litigation.  The fact that consumers in many situations may not even have a 
viable exit option since they face only one local operator make both the contracting and the regulatory 
problem even more challenging. 
The framework provided by the Court does (per Gerstenberg) seek to balance the various interests, as 
well as the policy commitments of market liberalization and national private law (that grant market 
participants autonomy of choice and decision-making) and of the protective objectives of the unfair 
terms directive.  However, the framework offered as such is incomplete.  The fact that the final 
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decision is left to the national court does not solve the problem of regime incompleteness, since there 
is no easy recipe that the local court can offer to what constitutes a fair and reasonable price variation 
clause.  The framework is in need of what might be regarded as a “contextualizing regime”194 that 
incorporates input from the parties and stakeholders either in the process of devising contract terms or 
in the process of price adjustment over time. 
This problem has of course been recognized on the ground, particularly in light of national and EU 
litigation in the RWE case, and has triggered a number of responses by various actors.  In particular, a 
legal practitioner who represents energy utilities has indicated that in the face of such court decisions 
“some experts doubt that there is a legally valid price adjustment term under German law” and neither 
mutual negotiation nor fixed term contracts are seen as a viable alternative in the market.  Thus, from 
the utility suppliers’ perspective the contextualizing regime must satisfy both (i) the suppliers need to 
unilaterally adjust prices and (ii) the customers need to verify the scope of the price adjustment as a 
pre-condition to an informed decision whether to switch or not (which mere transparency requirements 
do not provide in a meaningful way).  Summarising the perspective of the energy utilities to resolving 
this seemingly intractable problem, the practitioner suggested that legislative action has already taken 
place in Germany and that further institutional innovation may be necessary. One proposal amenable 
to the utilities is the creation of an “independent board” of experts or regulators who can check the 
range of a price adjustment through “a cost-effective process” which would be paid by the consumer if 
adjustment is fair and otherwise by the supplier (who would also then have the obligation to repay all 
consumers on that tariff).  Note that this is an ex post mechanism that preserves the price setting 
autonomy of contracting parties, though a similar process could also operate ex ante through the 
involvement of various stakeholders and regulators in price setting, which would be akin to price 
regulation through stakeholder input.  
The RWE case highlights another limitation of the contracting technology in the context of supplier-
customer relationships in the energy sector.  Namely, the fact that the resolution of the dispute going 
through various judicial stages, including first instance, appellate and preliminary reference, lasted for 
quite a long time.
195
  This created problems for the consumers, who had to incur expense, be denied 
recovery due to the passage of limitation periods and wait for a long time to recover relatively small 
sums of compensation.  But it also created problems for the suppliers, who were subject to uncertainty 
for a long period of time as to the validity of the terms and of successive price adjustments, that could 
eventually make them subject to substantial payouts due to the large number of consumers involved. 
The dispute resolution constraints in contracting relationships in network services were examined at an 
earlier time by the CJEU in the context of the Italian telecommunications market in Alassini.
196
  This 
triggered substantial efforts at devising easily accessible and affordable dispute resolution 
mechanisms, with participation from both suppliers and consumer organisations and also with the 
support of AGCOM, the Italian telecommunications authority.  Not only are such ADR schemes made 
mandatory by the EU telecoms package, but they have more recently been subject to disciplines as to 
both form and substance by the EU legislator.
197
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Adopting Member State policy innovations into EU law 
The final example discloses how more intrusive policy innovations developed at national level are 
adopted into EU legislative packages.  It comes from the field of financial services and the changing 
approach to financial regulation disclosed by the latest post-crisis EU legislative package (MIFIR and 
MIFIDII
198
). 
The previous forays of the EU legislator into the field of financial services, while not having the same 
liberalisation format as in telecoms or energy, were guided by a similar competition and market-
enhancing logic.  Namely, the EU legislator sought to allow financial institutions to establish 
themselves or offer their products cross-border in different Member States following the mutual 
recognition principle as a way of both generating inter-penetration (the ‘shallow’ view of the internal 
market) together with introducing greater competition in national financial markets.  Moreover, from 
the consumer protection side, the EU legislation focused principally on strengthening disclosure and 
providing pre-contracting conduct of business rules intended to both help consumers take advantage of 
greater competition and thereby also strengthen the disciplining force of competition on suppliers. 
The MIFIDII/MIFIR package was enacted in the aftermath of the financial crises, reflecting to some 
extent the weaknesses in financial regulation that were revealed by such crises, including 
 The general weaknesses in financial supervision at national level in the Member States of 
financial institutions 
 Failures in consumer protection in the wake of the growing retailisation of the sector, whereby 
both disclosure and conduct of business rules were proven to be of limited effectiveness, 
particularly given supervisory weaknesses 
 The fact that agency problems pervade financial institutions themselves, so that the inability of 
the management of financial institutions to fully supervise internal staff and processes further 
impedes the regulatory/supervisory tasks 
 That the shallow internal market, characterized by interpenetration of supply of financial 
services can lead to cross-border spillovers of systemic risk. 
While much of the scholarly and practitioner attention on the new legislation has focused on the 
product intervention powers granted to EU-level authorities (a sharp regulatory limitation on party 
autonomy), the centre-piece of the MIFIDII regulatory scheme appear to be the product governance 
obligations imposed on financial services providers, which are to be overseen principally by national 
supervisors.  As opposed to disclosure and distribution obligations at the point of sale, the product 
governance rules go further back in the product life cycle and on the processes through which firms 
manufacture and target financial products.  As such, the EU legislation recognises the limits of 
competitive discipline in the context of complex contractual products, thus mandating internal 
processes of oversight of the design and targeting of products, the internally identified basis of 
profitability as well as continued review of their performance and effects in a changing market.  
This approach of tracing throughout the product’s cycle from its very inception, similar to food safety 
tracing obligations that are themselves a recognition of the way in which (transnational) regulation 
aids competitive discipline, was in fact elaborated in a number of Member States in response to 
significant financial product weaknesses that revealed both regulatory short-comings and the limits of 
competitive discipline in the financial sector. Such problems triggered a search for new regulatory 
approaches and this national policy innovation took place at a time when the relevant authorities did 
not even have formal powers to influence the product manufacturing process.  These innovations were 
developed by the regulatory authorities of jurisdictions such as the UK and the Netherlands, identified 
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as liberal market economies,199 and are much more intrusive than the approaches followed by 
authorities in France or Germany.200  And yet, it is also not necessarily the case that product 
governance approaches involve a regulatory suppression of freedom of contract.  With respect to 
financial services providers, this approach leverages the fact that agency problems in internal 
governance could lead to product misselling which brings short term profits, but could ultimately lead 
to disastrous outcomes even for firms.  From the customers’ perspective, product governance 
interventions have created monitoring regimes for product outcomes, which could lead to the 
elimination of products from the market, but also to improved targeting of both products and product 
disclosures to the intended customers.
201
 Finally, the adoption of these new forms of financial 
supervision in the EU legislation is not done through prescriptive rules. Instead they allow Member 
States, their financial authorities and regulated firms substantial autonomy to devise solutions sensitive 
to local circumstances and policy priorities, while safeguarding customer protection and financial 
stability in the internal market. 
Concluding remarks 
In light of the above examples of how the transnational regulatory architectures created by EU law 
allow for the joint construction of market interventions that promote both EU level and local goals, it 
might be argued that the despondent tone of scholarly reflection on EU market regulation reflects two 
aspects of legal scholarship about the EU. 
The first is that legal scholarship on EU integration typically does not consider a counterfactual, 
perhaps because the traditional approach in legal scholarship is to take rules and institutions as they 
are.  This has the result of tending to ignore broader transformative drivers that influence individuals, 
firms, as well as States and their capacity for regulation. Ignoring broader transformative drivers may 
inadvertently over attribute effects, so that the phenomenon under study, such as the EU in this case, is 
seen as a causal factor. Where scholars do consider a counterfactual, it often tends to be an implausible 
one, including the EU as a non-functional or non-purposive entity or as a source of political solidarity 
based on a very broad generalization of the “self-understanding” of European citizens.  Unlike the 19th 
century nation-State, violence and suppression of difference are not available to the EU to create either 
identity or solidarity.  Otherwise, in the general EU scholarship the implicit counter-factual appears to 
be the nation-State absent the EU, which might both overlook deficiencies in the national policy-
making and decision-making processes as well as the extent to which EU architectures have upgraded 
national regulatory capacities. 
The second feature of legal scholarship is the tendency to focus on legislation as enacted or on the 
decisions of courts, such as the CJEU, as the raw material for analysis.  This may produce the 
tendency towards broad assessments of European private law as being based on internal market logic.  
While looking at the process of enactment and the text of secondary legislation might occasionally 
suggest that, such appearances may simply reflect competence constraints and the specialization of 
goals and instruments that competence-allocation encourages.  Once we look at a broader sample of 
EU interventions in private law, any rationality or “deity” seems to dissolve.  Internal market building 
based on undistorted competition does not foreclose either EU or MS measures that put into question 
either the goal or the instrument of competitive markets.  True it is that such interventions are subject 
to scrutiny by judges and by regulatory peers and that such scrutiny extends over time.  But our 
examples suggest that such on-going scrutiny of effects should only improve both tailoring and 
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efficacy of market interventions, including by Member States.  As such, EU law invites policy 
innovation by the Member States to respond to emergent problems, though it is another matter whether 
this invitation is always taken up. 
The assemblages of autonomy, competition and regulation in the examples discussed suggest there is 
no natural market model towards which different sectors can converge so as to make regulation 
unnecessary.  Instead markets are socially constructed institutions that can be calibrated towards the 
achievement of different salient policy goals, particularly in response to concrete problems.  Neither 
the EU, nor the Member States - on their own - have a comparative advantage in manufacturing 
socially embedded markets.  The moral of the story is they are much better at this task together, within 
the deliberative and mutually disruptive platform supplied by EU law. 
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Clarification and the argument  
Transformation, private law and competition 
There is a need to clarify what I mean by ‘transformation’, ‘private law’ and ‘competition’. The 
overall theoretical background to the concept of ‘transformation’ is taken from the changing role and 
function of the nation state, for which the European could be taken as a blueprint and a laboratory.
203
 
The drivers behind the transformation are (1) the changing economy, - the internationalization of the 
economy in the aftermath of the collapse of communism with the fall of the Berlin wall as the break-
even point going hand in hand with the financialisation
204
 of the economy, (2) the rise of a new 
technology – the internet which is gradually substituting the industrial age – and (3) the borderless 
society in which the rights and duties of citizens are no longer bound and shaped by the nation state 
alone.
205
 This is not to say that the drivers are not inter-connected. The forthcoming analysis of the 
transformation of private law through competition will have to raise the question whether there is a 
fourth driver which needs to be kept separated from the others – (4) ‘crisis’ that triggers action. In our 
context it is the economic crisis and the Euro-crisis that sets the agenda and that has made ‘crisis’ and 
crisis management the permanent state of affairs of the European constitution, but also of private law, 
as will be shown. 
First consequence: for the search of a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
transformation of the nation state and the drivers behind, there is a need to draw a distinction 
between private law in the realm of the changing economy in the aftermath of the economic and 
political disruptions of the late 1980s – in EU speak the Internal Market Project (1) and the impact 
of the economic crisis and the Euro-crisis in the aftermath of Lehman Brothers (4) – in EU speak 
the political decision to establish a European Banking Union. The rise and importance of the new 
technology is wonderfully condensed in the most recently adopted paper of the newly elected 
European Commission ‘A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe,’206 which sets an agenda also 
for the future of European private law. What about the (3) the changing society then? The question 
leads to the role and function of the civil society, of the European civil society – provided there is 
one - on the making and the enforcement on statutory rules within the EU as well as self-
constituted and self-enforced rules outside public law rules made by democratic organs. 
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Private law is understood as being an integral part of economic law.
207
 This leads to the distinction 
between traditional private law and regulatory private law, traditional private law being understood on 
the European continent the grand codifications, with its congenial counterpart in common law 
countries. Regulatory private law can be broken down into three waves for regulation, the first going 
together with the rise of the regulatory state in the late 19
th
 early 20
th
 century, the second with the rise 
of the welfare state in the second half of the 20
th
 century and the third triggered by the Single 
European Act, which submitted private law to the completion of the Internal Market project.
208
 The 
different waves have produced different set of rules, the first wave yielded labor and employment law 
in the early 20
th
 century, but also regulatory means to shape markets, the second wave building on the 
first wave realized the political claims of the labor movement in the Sozialdemokratisierung 
Europas
209
 (the social democratization of Europe independent of the political party in power) but 
added a new layer – consumer law in reaction to the consumption society.210 The third wave bears a 
different connotation and shifts the focus from the national to the European level.
211
 The Internal 
Market project gave rise to a new value paradigm which gradually but steadily penetrated from the 
borders into the core of private law – the anti-discrimination principle.212 It equally led to the 
liberalization and privatization of former public services, an area not commonly being understood as 
the field of regulated markets, telecommunication, postal services, energy (electricity and gas), 
transport (airlines, railways, ships and buses) – here referred to as the ‘silos’. Financial services have 
to be added to the regulated markets although due to the financialisation of the economy they enjoy a 
particular status which heavily impacts the other regulated markets. 
Second consequence: there is a need to distinguish between traditional private law and regulatory 
private law, there is equally a need to draw a distinction between b2b and b2c relations. What 
really matters, however, is to understand that European private law building is following its own 
pathway and that only a broadening of perspective, the inclusion of regulatory private law, be it 
horizontal though status related labour law, anti-discrimination law and consumer law, be it vertical 
enshrined in silos of regulated markets allows for fully catching the change private law is 
undergoing since the European Union was established in 1957. 
The third clarification refers to the use of ‘competition’ in relation to private law. For a German 
scholar the relationship between private law and competition is very much shaped by the impact on 
ordo-liberalism in the building of the German market and the German society after the Second World 
War.
213
 The ‘Privatrechtsgesellschaft’ (literally private law society, however this is a term which 
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cannot really be translated as it does not make sense
214
) this is the credo of the ordo-liberals can only 
unfold within a competitive environment which has to be shaped via public law (competition law) and 
whose compliance needs to be guaranteed by national cartel authorities, to tame private power. Only if 
competition is secured, there is room for individual freedoms, freedoms to do business and to conclude 
contracts, but not only this. The ordo-liberals are promoting a particular society not only an economy, 
a society where the individual in the Kantian sense remains responsible for himself and where the state 
refrains from intervening into the economy and the society. E.-J. Mestmäcker
215
 quite successfully 
succeeded in transferring the ordo-liberal to the European Union, at least it its founding period until 
the adoption of the Single European Act. What matters in our context is the seemingly clear distinction 
between private law, private autonomy, freedom of contract on the one hand and competition law on 
the other. This is not the place to go into the debate on whether or not this has ever been the only 
model in Germany or Europe
216
 or whether and to what extent ordo-liberalism vanished away in the 
ongoing process of European integration, as documented in the various Treaty amendments.
217
 For the 
sake of my argument I am using the distinction as a starting point of my analysis of the transformation 
process through European integration. The overall idea behind the paper is to demonstrate how this 
original distinction vanishes away over time and how regulatory intervention through the EU hand in 
hand with the building of regulatory private law
218
 promotes an extremely instrumentalistic 
understanding of private law that oscillates between using private law to enhance competition in the 
Internal market and at the same time using private law to shut down competition for the sake of 
‘higher’ regulatory purposes, the building of the internal market, the building of the banking union, the 
now envisaged building of the digital single market. So the Internal Market has two faces, competition 
promoting and competition restricting. The moving target of instrumentalisation leaves us with the 
question whether the ‘political objective’ is a ‘means to an end’ or whether the market is ‘the end 
itself’. 
Third consequence: European private law being understood as regulatory private law is per 
definition in conflict with competition and competition law. Following the ideology of the private 
law society, regulatory intervention necessarily sets limits to personal freedoms, to freedom of 
contract, thereby restricting competition, mostly for the sake of protecting the weaker against the 
stronger party. This means private law is regulating power, a domain which in ordo-liberal 
thinking is and should be left to competition. However, this is only half the truth. In the EU 
context regulation might also mean enabling competition in newly established markets, where 
private law is used as a tool to create competition in areas where there was none before. Here 
enlarged individual autonomy and competition go hand in hand.
219
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How the argument is built 
The development of European private law follows the changing policy patterns of the EU that are 
driving the development. The most stable policy frame is the Internal Market project that has paved 
the way for the development of the different forms of European private law in a rather stable fashion – 
the completion of the internal market through competition and regulation under the overall design of 
economic efficiency. The crisis in 2008/9 has added a new layer to the debate. The Banking Union 
project reaches dimension which come close to a revision of the European Constitution, through by 
and large outside the Treaty through secondary EU law. Instead of competition and efficiency, the 
Banking Union is driven by financial stability as the overarching principle that downgrades 
competition as a leading paradigm. Despite the considerable amount of rules adopted to establish the 
Banking Union the impact on European private law rules is yet rather difficult to grasp. It seems, 
however, that financial transactions – also contractual relations – are being put into an ever tighter 
jacket that frames the leeway for private autonomy of creditors and debtors. Last but not least the 
European Commission just launched its new Digital Single Market Strategy, which brings back the 
DCFR and CESL though in modified form. The outcome might be regulatory competition between the 
rules on digital transactions and rules on analog transactions. There is no clear pattern yet. A tentative 
conclusion will have to take the competing paradigms into account. 
The Internal Market project 
Competitive contract law as a starting point in 1986-2005 
The first is the Internal Market project and how it impacts on the design and use of private law rules. 
In so far I can build on an analysis which is now exactly 10 years old and where I developed the 
concept of ‘competitive contract law’.220 I tried to show how the EU is designing private law relations 
in b2b and b2c so as to enhance competition to complete the internal market. The regulatory model 
behind can be broken down into seven elements: (1) instrumental protective device (the status of the 
party in the contractual relation, the consumer and/or SMEs), (2) the vanishing line between 
commercial communication and contract conclusion, (3) the distinction between competitive 
transparency prior to the conclusion of the contract and substantive transparency so as to submit 
contractual stipulations a kind of a fairness test, (4) the use of information duties so as to shape 
standard form contracts, (5) the instrumentalisation of fairness doctrines for the purpose of market 
clearance, (6) the introduction of post contractual cancellation rights so as to allow for ex-post 
corrections for the sake of engaging into a better contract and last but to least (7) the attempts of the 
EU legislator and the ECJ to ensure that the rights granted maybe effectively enforced. Constitutive 
for competitive private law is its submission to a higher purpose – Internal Market building and 
competition.  
The ‘person’ required to meet these standards is the famous circumspect omnipotent consumer/SME 
who is constantly comparing prices and looking for a better deal, ready to use withdrawal and 
cancellations right to ‘reap the benefits’221 of the Internal Market. The rise of the efficiency doctrine 
promoted in the Lisbon Summit 2000 coincides with a decrease of social distribute justice and a kind 
of utilitarian economy, where the price serves as the key parameter for decision. The competitive 
element introduced in European private law, in consumer law, in regulated markets and in distribution 
agreements – these were at the forefront of the analysis – follows mainly from the functionalisation of 
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private law itself. Regulation is used to insert rules into private law relations that allow for the 
promotion of competition. Under the overall purpose of the completion of the Internal Market, private 
law and competition law are going hand in hand.  
10 years later it seems by and large that the further development in law making and in particular in its 
application through the European Commission and the European Court of Justice follows the model of 
competitive contract law, though certainly not in a streamlined way. The most obvious confirmations 
of the overall hypothesis may be overserved in the ever narrower relationship of commercial 
communication and contract conclusion, the importance of the differences between competitive and 
substantive transparency, post contractual cancellation rights and the elaboration of effective legal 
protection.
222
 Less obvious at least in consumer law is the relationship between the consumer image 
(the circumspect) and fairness as market clearance. In the aftermath of the financial crisis it seems as if 
the ECJ has turned into a regulator to protect those who suffered most from the economic crisis and 
the Eurocrisis from being excluded from the society.
223
 What is missing and what is not yet enshrined 
in the 2005 stock taking is the long term impact of the move in competition law to the more economic 
approach towards contract law and contract regulation.
224
  
The continuation of the Internal Market building 2005-2015 
Three major developments have changed the interrelationship between the Internal Market, 
competition and private law: the rise and decline of the Draft Common Frame of Reference, the move 
towards full harmonization very much inspired by the ideology of the more economic approach and 
last but not least the unprecedented development in regulated markets. In putting together the three 
strands I would like to hypothesize that the more recent development (2005-2015) can be caught in the 
language of ‘managed competition’, where the rights and duties of individual parties are subjected to a 
much more important goal than preserving and developing individual freedoms – that of making the 
EU the ‘most competitive economy of the world’.225  
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reducing the administrative costs associated with bureaucracy.’ 
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DCFR and CESL  
There is no need to reiterate again and again the story of the Draft Common Frame of Reference which 
was said to be an ‘academic project’ (2001-2008),226 turned under Commissioner Reding into a 
‘political project’ having a short career under the heading of ‘CESL’ (the Common European Sales 
Law in 2011),
227
 before it was buried through a letter of six member states to the new commissioner 
Juorová in November 14.
228
 It is the design of CESL which matters in our context. CESL was drafted 
as the 28
th
 legal order (side-by-side with at that time 27 national legal private law orders). CESL if 
adopted would have introduced serious competition between the national legal orders on the one hand 
and the 28
th
 or 29
th
 European legal order on the other.
229
  
The access to the substantive body of common sales law rules should be guaranteed via the so-called 
optional instrument. This was in essence an opt-in mechanism where the parties to the contract should 
voluntarily decide on the applicability of CESL. Setting aside whether the OI was seriously taking into 
account whether consumers have been given a choice or whether the supplier chooses and makes the 
choice binding on the consumer,
230
 CESL would have opened up a new pathway in the interplay 
between national legal regimes and the EU regime. It would have introduced for the first time an open 
element of competition between legal orders, though it is a particular form of competition as a 
supranational order (CESL) but have had to compete with the Code Civil, the Codice Civile, the 
Wetboek, the German BGB of the recodified civil codes of the new member states. It is not clear 
whether the Member States – in particular the six behind the letter to the Commissioner – were afraid 
of the competition or whether they were more seriously concerned by the competence shift. DCFR and 
CESL were strongly promoted by the European Parliament as a building block for a more fully 
integrated European Union, being originally composed of a European Constitution and a European 
Civil Code.
231
 Therefore it might very well be that those Member States which openly expressed their 
concern regarded their national private legal order (codified or not) as part of their national identity.
232
 
However, such language does not show up in the letter of the six. 
The revision of the consumer acquis 
The second story is equally well-known, at least to consumer lawyers. There is a direct way from the 
rhetoric of the Lisbon Summit in 2000 – making the EU the most competitive economy of the world – 
                                                     
226 Research Group on the Existing EU Private Law (Acquis Group), Principles of the Existing EU Contract Law (Acquis 
Principles): Contract I (2007); Ch. v. Bar et al. (eds), Principles, Definitions and Model Rules of European Private Law, 
Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) (Outline Edition, 2009). 
227 COM (2011) 635 final, available at 
 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0635:FIN:en:PDF. 
228 On file with the author. The six member states, Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands and the UK highlighted in 
between a number of concerns the lack of competence.  
229 St. Grundmann, Kosten und Nutzen eines optionalen Europäischen Kaufrechts, AcP 212 (2012) 502-544 (Vortrag auf der 
Tagung der Zivilrechtslehrervereinigung vom 20./21. April 2012); in English, Costs and Benefits of an Optional 
European Sales Law (CESL), (2013) 50 CMLR 225-242 
230 H.-W. Micklitz/N. Reich, The Commission Proposal for a “Regulation on a Common European Sales Law (CESL)” – Too 
Broad or Not Broad Enough, EUI Working Paper 2012/4, 1-93 
231 H.-W. Micklitz, Failure or Ideological Preconceptions? Thoughts on Two Grand Projects: the European Constitution and 
the European Civil Code, in K. Tuori and Suvi Sankari (ed.), The Many Constitutions of Europe, Ashgate 2010, 109-142 
= EUI Working Paper 4/2010. 
232 It is an open question whether civil codes could be regarded as part of national identity in the way the Treaty of Lisbon 
intends to preserve it. In the Lisbon judgment the Federal Constitutional Court started to shape the eternal core of the 
German Basic Law, but did not mention the BGB, H.-W. Micklitz, German Constitutional Court 
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to the promotion of full harmonization in the Consumer Policy Programme 2002-2006.
233
 Originally 
the European Commission intended to unite 8 consumer contract law directives into one single fully 
harmonized body of law. If realized this would have been the starting point for the elaboration of a 
European Consumer Civil Code. After Horaz ‘Der Berg kreißte und gebar eine Maus’ – in English 
something like ‘an elephant went into labour and delivered a mouse’, first the ambitious project shrank 
down from eight directives to four (doorstep, distant selling, consumer sales and unfair terms), then – 
after strong resistance from the Member States and from the academic environment around Europe,
234
 
only two remained, doorstep and distant selling, which were finally adopted under the misnomer of 
‘Consumer Rights Directive 2011/83/EC’. This is a misnomer as there are many more consumer rights 
enshrined in other directives.  
How is full harmonization related to competition? Let us assume for a moment that the EU would be 
able and competent to adopt a fully harmonized European Consumer Code by way of a Regulation. 
Let us equally assume that the rules enshrined in that body of law define a common standard for 28 
member states and let us set aside all questions about possible differences in the application and 
enforcement within the Member States. The EU would be governed by one single set of rules as if the 
EU would be a state like any other EU Member State. Competition between legal orders would not 
exist. Harmonisation through regulation would have eliminated all potential differences between 
national consumer law orders. Reality is different. The EU has managed to adopt a dense body of 
consumer rules, most of them are based on the principle of minimum harmonization. Where they are 
based on full harmonization like in distant selling of financial services or more importantly in 
consumer credit, the scope of the fully harmonized EU rules is so small that substantial differences in 
the respective fields sustain despite the directives. That is why there could be – in theory – competition 
between the Member States on the level of consumer protection. However, neither the European 
Commission nor the Member States demonstrate political willingness to engage into competition over 
the level of protection, of which Member States provide for the best and most comprehensive 
protection. The reasons behind the Commission unwillingness are self-explanatory. The Member 
States try to promote the advantages of their national private legal orders in business circles, with little 
success though.
235
 An obvious explanation would be that businesses, in particular big businesses, 
prefer arbitration to litigation in (European) courts. If they opt for a particular court, they choose New 
York, London or Switzerland as the place of jurisdiction.
236
 In the choice of law perspective the 
remaining legal orders do not really play a role for b2b relations at least not under the aspect of 
competition between legal orders.  
The European consumers themselves are much more sensitive than big politics. The Eurobarometer 
demonstrates that the degree to which consumers trust in the national legal orders to protect their 
rights differs considerably. The survey confirms the hearsay evidence that consumers in the northern 
part of Europe are better protected than in the Southern part and that this complies with the degree of 
                                                     
233 H.-W. Micklitz, The Targeted Full Harmonisation Approach: Looking behind the Curtain, in Howells/Schulze (eds.), 
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234 G. Howells/R. Schulze (eds.), Modernising and Harmonising Consumer Contract Law, 2009, 47-86; H.-W. 
Micklitz/Norbert Reich, Crónica de una muerte anunciada: The Commission Proposal for a ‘Directive on Consumer 
Rights’, Common Market Law Review, 47 (2009) 471-519 
235 Smits, Jan, “Private Law 2.0 On the role of private actors in a post national society”, Inaugural Lecture, University of 
Maastricht, 30.11. 2010; Hague Institute for the Internationalisation of Law and Eleven International Publishing, 2011; 
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satisfaction.
237
 Comparative lawyers so far have shied away from confronting the preconceptions or 
prejudices with a substantiated analysis of the differences between the level of protection, let alone 
with a socio-legal study. This is all the more astonishing as the Consumer Law Compendium – which 
is regularly updated – provides for a solid ground of information. It seems as if the comparative 
consumer lawyers are about to miss out a field of research which might be conquered by economists 
and/or political scientists.
238
 The reluctance of lawyers to engage into such an exercise, to code 
consumer laws and to rank the 28 Member States according to quantitative and qualitative criteria 
might be explained by the Savignyian heritage which governs until today the relationship between 
national private legal orders. National private legal orders have to be treated equally. Each legal order 
is given the same value and the same status in international private law. By and large this philosophy 
is condensed in the European rules on international private law, the Brussels Regulations on 
jurisdiction and enforcement and the Rome regulations on contract and tort.  
European regulatory private law  
The story of the rise of European regulatory private law outside consumer law and outside anti-
discrimination law is less-known. In the European context this has to do with the more or less total 
neglect of the law of regulated markets in the European Civil Code project. With the exception of 
consumer law and anti-discrimination law, neither the Study Group nor the Acquis Group engaged 
into a deeper analysis of the regulations and directives adopted in the aftermath of the Single European 
Act to liberalise and to privatise telecom services, energy, transport and financial services. There was a 
working group engaged in the analysis of services proposing a particular set of rules on services.
239
 
However, it did not integrate these new services which account for more than 70% of Europe’s gross 
income.
240
 The reason might be that the EU is regulating the silo top down, from the establishment of a 
competitive market through unbundling and third party access, supervised and monitored by sector 
related regulatory agencies down to the regulation of private law relations in last step. The majority of 
private lawyers will treat the EU rules as administrative law, outside the reach of private law. It is here 
where the understanding of private law as economic law ties in.  
The respective EU rules in the different regulated markets are aiming at establishing competition, 
competition between the former incumbent and the newcomers which must be granted access to the 
grid or the market. Competition this is the philosophy behind should work to the benefit of the 
‘customers’. There is no need to discuss the intricacies of the different regulated markets. Again the 
focus is put on the role and function of private law in the shaping and building of these markets. The 
overall paradigm behind is efficiency – the Lisbon Summit. Liberalising and privatising former public 
services is being regarded as increasing efficiency in the relevant sector. Competition between 
different suppliers, this is the ideology, prevails over publicly owned companies. Private law, private 
regulations are just a means to an end. In so far the logic of the Internal Market project, which is the 
driver behind the liberalisation and privatisation policy, shines through the sector related polices.  
From a private law perspective two issues dominate the discussion: in b2b relations it is third party 
access, in b2c relations it is switching. If third parties have no access competition cannot work. The 
former incumbent have used and are still using all sorts of tricks, legal or semi-legal, to render access 
                                                     
237 Th. Wilhelmsson, The Abuse of the “Confident Consumer” as a Justification for EC Consumer Law, Journal of Consumer 
Policy September 2004, Volume 27, Issue 3, pp 317-337. 
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difficult. Twisted into private law language the national regulatory agencies are mandated to pave the 
way for contractual relations where there were none before. In b2c relations the functional role of 
private law relations is even more evident. The ‘c’ is not the consumer in the narrow meaning of the 
eight consumer law directives mentioned above, but the ‘customer’ who might even be a small and 
medium sized company. The dominant mechanism which shall secure competition is switching. 
Switching requires short term contracts and easy mechanism to get out of contracts and to get into new 
contracts. Over time the EU has constantly strengthened the rights to switch and the necessary 
informational environment in which switching has to be embedded.   
In both areas private law rules are functional. They have to serve a purpose. The regulation is not 
about freedom of contract, but about competition and choice. The new entrants as well as the new 
customers are instrumentalised for the purpose of market building. This comes close to the model of 
competitive contract law as explained above. There might be a tension between efficiency driven 
competitive contract law in regulated markets and the differing ‘rationalities’ of the regulated markets, 
though. Each of the regulated market is governed by a particular rationality, this is true for telecom, 
energy, transport and financial services. The rationality derives from the particular needs of the 
markets and the deeper cultural environment in which it is embedded.
241
 The internal rationality of the 
respective silo might clash with the overarching efficiency paradigm.
242
  
However, contrary to consumer law and anti-discrimination law, regulated markets are governed by 
regulatory agencies. These agencies are involved in the making of the sectorial rules below the level of 
binding laws and regulations and they are in charge of monitoring and surveying the market. The EU 
legislator has gradually turned these agencies into bodies which do not only have to guarantee the 
functioning of the market, they are ever stronger obliged to look after the collective interests of the 
respective customers in these markets. It is here where the threshold towards private law is trespassed. 
The above mentioned private law rules in regulated markets are submitted to regulatory purposes, such 
as third party access and switching.
243
  
How and where does competition come in?  
The overall idea of the regulatory design behind these silos is to develop uniform rules, co-ordinate 
them in European fora – the respective European agencies – and enforcement them throughout the EU 
as a whole. The regulatory means are ‘guidelines’ and ‘recommendations’ adopted by the European 
Commission. These guidelines and recommendations may take a quasi-binding effect. In the telecom 
sector they are subject to a compatibility test with EU law.
244
 Similar conflicts maybe reported from 
the financial services sector, within the scope of application of the MIFID and the competence of the 
European Commission.
245
 There should be no differences between the Member States, there should be 
no regulatory arbitrage. Agencies should not compete in the application of the EU rules. They should 
not engage in conflicts over who of the 28
th
 is best promoting third party access or switching, who is 
the most customer friendly or the most new entrants friendly authority. In theory, however this would 
be possible, as the EU regulations and directives on regulated markets are regulating private law issues 
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in bits and pieces, sometimes via maximum harmonization rules, sometimes via minimum 
harmonization rules. However, the degree to which there is maximum or minimum does not play a 
crucial role with regard to private law issues, as there remains ample room for national private law 
when it comes to conflicts that reach the court level.
246
 In theory there could be competition over the 
level of protection and in practice there is a form of competition. It suffices to compare the UK and 
Germany. In the UK customers were collectively compensated for the harm they suffered from illegal 
telecommunication rules through AFCOM,
247
 whereas in Germany customers had to go through a 
highly complex litigation process which ended successfully for 50 customers who were actively 
involved in the litigation whereas the hundreds of thousands behind were left with empty hands.
248
 
Interviews taken with public officials from different Member States in different regulated markets 
confirm openly or implicitly that there is regulatory arbitrage.
249
 
However, what kind of competition is it? Member States are competing in their entirety, with their 
deeper cultures and traditions. There is no cross-border dimension that allows companies or customers 
to leave the national jacked behind. New entrants cannot approach Member State X to get access to the 
grid, if X has the reputation to be more new entrant friendly. German consumers cannot approach the 
UK AFCOM to get compensated for a harm they suffered from a German company. There is 
definitely more information needed on how regulatory arbitrage works in regulated markets, what kind 
of effects regulatory arbitrage produces and how it impacts private law as a tool for market building. 
2005-2015 – the changing international environment and its impact on European private law 
Since 2005 the overall economic, political and social environment in which the EU operates has 
dramatically changed. Some of the developments I am tracing started earlier than 2005, but their 
importance and impact reached the EU only later. They could be condensed into two major trends, the 
thrive for (1) competition between common law systems and continental legal systems and the (2) 
growing importance of behavioral economics as a test of regulatory efficiency. The first brings the 
divided world between the common law countries and the countries with a codified private law order 
to the fore. The second puts social regulation on trial. Consumer law is at the forefront of discussion. 
The growing pressure stems from the rise of behavioural economics in the United States and more 
recently also in Europe.
250
  
Competition between legal orders 
In 1998/2008 Raffael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrej Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny 
(LLSV)
251
 published their ground breaking analysis of financial markets using legal families as a 
starter of comparison. The texts can be assigned to the line of research called LOT – i.e. Legal Origin 
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Theory.
252
 The authors’ most important statement is that the historical origins of a legal system have 
an essential impact on the economic development and opportunities for future development. By this 
they claim the precise opposite of the Marxist social theory. The approach correlates with the idea of a 
common European legal culture. However, the crucial difference is that the ius commune highlights 
the European communities, beyond the moats of continental European and Common Law, whereas 
LOT declares the differences between continental European and Common Law systems to be the 
central parameters of analysis. 
The analysis of the variables is characterised by a clear preference for the Common Law system 
compared to the ‘French Civil Law countries’ being countries with Roman legal systems. LLSV has 
provided the impulse for a variety of further research projects - partly with the participation of the 
authors - which use the same method and involve beyond business financing the ownership structures 
of banks, rules about market access, labour market provisions, media ownership structures, formal 
requirements for the judicial procedures as well as the level of independence of courts. They are listed 
and explained by LLS in the 2008 text. According to LOT, these examinations sharpen the original 
findings of 1998 and reinforce the superiority of Common Law:
253
 ‘In all these spheres Civil Law is 
associated with a heavier hand of government ownership and regulation than Common Law. Many of 
these indicators of government ownership and regulation are associated with adverse impacts on 
markets, such as greater corruption, larger unofficial economy, and higher unemployment’...and 
further:
254
 ‘in strong form (later to be supplemented by a variety of caveats) we argue that Common 
Law stands for a strategy of social control that seeks to support private market outcomes, whereas 
Civil Law seeks to replace such outcomes with state-desired allocations. In words of one legal scholar, 
Civil Law is ‘policy implementing’ while Common Law is ‘dispute resolving’ (Mirjan R. Damaska 
1986). In the words of another commentator, French Civil Law embraces ‘socially-conditioned private 
contracting‘, in contrast to Common Law’s support for ‘unconditional private contracting‘ (Katharina 
Pistor 2006). The path to a clear demand for the Common Law is obvious. This is the only way to 
organise economic growth efficiently. 
Hall/Soskice’ Varieties of Capitalism in 2001255 and the Doing Business Report of the World Bank in 
2003 point into the same direction. ‘Varieties of capitalism’ are the response to the elimination of 
differences between capitalism and a state-trading system as a consequence of the collapse of the 
Soviet empire.
256
 In essence, it is an attempt to transfer the findings of New Institutional Economics 
from the micro (company level) to the macro level (national economies). The elimination of 
differences made it possible to examine the various forms that could be taken by a capitalistic 
economic order more widely than in the past, eventually with regard to possible ‘recipes’ which might 
be of help to the former socialist states going through upheaval, changes and development. At the 
same time these efforts, which have been going on for more than 20 years, are directly linked to the 
new orientation of comparative law, be it in the form of LOT (Legal Origin Theory) or with regard to 
the rethinking of the assignment of legal systems to legal families.  
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If you were to follow Hall/Soskice as the thought leaders of ‘varieties of capitalism’, only two forms 
of appearance of comparative law would be relevant, the liberal market economy (LME) and the 
coordinated market economies (CME). This would amount to a clear cutting of comparative law - 
Bohle/Greskovitz refer to Occam’s razor 257- which opens up new perspectives of comparative law. 
Their comparative capitalism is explicitly not linked to any value judgment: ‘Although each type of 
capitalism has its partisans, we are not arguing here that one is superior to another’258. However, a 
direct path leads from comparative capitalism to LOT and to the report of the World Bank first 
published in 2003,
259
 in which the superiority not only of the Anglo-American economic model, but 
also of common law over the continental European legal system, is proclaimed.  
The Impact on European private law 
The changing environment, the pressure towards efficiency and the proclaimed superiority of the 
common law system over the continental one has not left the European private law unaffected. 
Already the DCFR and even more so the CESL came under pressure from law and economics, from 
authors who were questioning the gain in efficiency of a 29
th
 legal order. The competitive element 
foreseen in the Optional Instrument can be traced back to the rising idea of ‘competition between legal 
orders’ which also gained ground in Europe.260 Whether competition between legal orders in the inner 
world of the EU will gain ground remains to be seen. For the time being it is hard to imagine. Member 
States are advertising the use of their private legal orders, obviously with the intention to make it 
attractive for business. However, these websites look more helpless and somehow touchingly, but 
certainly not professional. The impact of the claimed superiority of the common law system by LOT 
and VoC might even have promoted the withdrawal of CESL, at least this could have inspired the UK 
to subscribe to the letter to the Commissioner. Needless to say the claimed supremacy provoked strong 
reactions, in particular in France.
261
 
The rise of behavioral economics 
Contrary to classical law and economics (Coase, Calabresi and Posner), behavioural economics 
brings reality back into economics. For economics, this comes close to a ‘revolution’ – this is at least 
the provocative formula used by F. Esposito.
262
 BE is shifting the focus away from the market to 
behaviour. This is in line with the claim that the function of competition law is changing from market 
structure to consumer welfare.
263
 This shift might also explain why the US is leading the debate on 
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consumer economics, despite the fact that US consumer law looks rather underdeveloped from a 
European perspective.
264
 Behavioural economics relates to economics and economics relates to 
efficiency. Here, there is a clear value system. Law is submitted to the efficiency paradigm. Research 
along the line of behavioural economics has amply demonstrated the need to take the real behaviour of 
the market participants into account, if efficiency is to be achieved. Only market efficient legal tools 
are legitimate and justifiable. Managing market efficient solutions cannot be achieved through 
modelling the economy and modelling the behaviour, but through taking due account of the varieties 
of human behaviour. The value paradigm, however, remains the same: market allocation.
265
  
Economic efficiency as a paradigm enshrined in a liberal market economy (in the meaning and 
concept of Hall and Soskice), heavily supported by behavioural economics, argues in favour of a re-
conceptualisation of consumer law. From this perspective, European consumer law is dysfunctional 
due to its unsophisticated reliance on the information paradigm, on doubtful interventions into the 
regulation of standard contract terms. It is counterproductive because it distorts market effects by not 
taking into account that consumers are biased, that they over- or underestimate their capacities to take 
rational decisions, and last but not least that it is exactly this behaviour which may result in re-
distributional effects to the detriment of the most disadvantaged consumers.
266
  
What is the broader picture here? What are the reasons behind the different concepts of consumer law 
– the European being closer to a co-ordinated market economy and the US to a liberal market 
economy? Where and how does behavioural economics fit in? What kind of role could and should 
behavioural economics play in two different economic and social environments? In an extremely 
insightful analysis J. Whitman explains the differences between US and EU consumer law through the 
different dominating understandings of the economy, which are deeply rooted in history, culture and 
tradition. US consumer law is associated with US consumerism and European consumer law with 
European producerism.
267
 Within the framework of this article it is not necessary to discuss whether 
and to what extent it is useful, feasible and justifiable to speak of ‘European Consumer Law’, despite 
all the differences between the Member States.
268
 From that perspective it seems fair to speak of 
European producerism.  
Based on this distinction, the role and function of behavioural economics cannot but be different. The 
two recent publications from Oren Bar-Gill, Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl Schneider
269
 provide deep 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Art. 102 TFEU and the instrument of the ‚commitment decision’ as introduced in Reg. 1/2003 to shape markets along the 
line of the consumer welfare program. For a nuanced analysis, Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning: Commitment 
Decisions as a Competition Enforcement Paradigm, Yearbook of European Law 2015, 466. 
264 It is based on three pillars, public regulation - the FTC – the Federal Trade Commission, information disclosure in banking 
and finance and class actions.  
265 Some might argue that market allocation is a prescriptive paradigm. It tells you of a technique of allocation. However, 
there needs to be a normative reason for preferring market allocation to other forms of allocation (read, distribution). Is it 
efficiency? But what does that mean? Is it regulatory distrust? Is it social Darwinism? Is it producerism?, see J. Whitman, 
loc. cit.; Is it the state-nation ideology? On the later A. Afilalo/D. Patterson/K. Purnhagen, Statecraft, the Market State 
and the Development of European Legal Culture, Genevieve Helleringer/Kai Purnhagen (eds.), Towards a European 
Legal Culture, München/Oxford/Baden-Baden, Beck/Hart/Nomos, 2014, 277. 
266 See for an insightful overview on the current strains of discussion, F. Esposito, Consumer protection in the world of 
bounded rationality: an attempt to understand the contribution of behavioural law and economics, MS 2014, on file with 
the author; very helpful H. Collins, Review of O. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in 
Consumer Markets, OUP 2012, Modern Law Review (2014) 77, 1030, who gives an account of the current – mainly US 
discussion. 
267 J. Whitman, Consumerism Versus Producerism: A Study in Comparative Law Yale Law School, Yale Law School Legal 
Scholarship Repository, 1-1-2007: A. Afilalo/D. Patterson/K. Purnhagen, Statecraft, the Market State and the 
Development of European Legal Culture, loc. cit. 
268 Hans-W. Micklitz, Norbert Reich, Peter Rott and Klaus Tonner, European Consumer Law, Intersentia 2nd edition, 2014 
269 Seduction by Oren Bar-Gill Seduction by Contract, 2012 and Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider More Than You 
Wanted to Know:The Failure of Mandated Disclosure. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014. 
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insights in the investigated consumer markets and deliver an explanation for the emergence of over-
complex contracts and highly sophisticated and deliberately confusing standard contract conditions.
270
 
However, US consumer behavioural economics tends to promote only one regulatory solution: the – 
this time – correct and efficient disclosure of information. The normative design of US consumerism 
remains largely
271
 untouched. Banning particular detrimental contract terms is not discussed as a 
serious option, although there are exceptions to the rule.
272
 However, very much in line with US 
consumer law, BE is supporting collective redress schemes provided they meet the efficiency 
standards.  
Impact on European consumer law 
This might all sound very abstract and academic. However, the conflict over the correct design of 
consumer law has long reached the court fora. The big multinational companies operating from the US 
question the core of EU consumer protection law. Apple started the first blow in promoting the quite 
expensive Apple guarantee in the EU, thereby neglecting the existence of a cost free legal guarantee 
under Directive 99/44/EC.
273
 The next blow comes from Amazon. The company has inserted in its 
standard terms that the place of jurisdiction for all litigation is Luxemburg. The Austrian consumer 
organisation Verein für Konsumenteninformation has challenged the legality of the term. After referral 
of the Austrian Supreme Court the ECJ will have to decide over the admissibility of jurisdiction 
clauses and its compatibility not only with the Rome I and II regulations but also with Directive 
2009/22/EC which grants the consumer organisations an action for injunction as a European minimum 
standard.
274
 Are such clauses simply illegal despite Article 3 Rome I – the principle of free choice of 
                                                     
270 H. Collins, Review of O. Bar-Gill, Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets, OUP 
2012, Modern Law Review (2014) 77, 1030 at 1035. 
271 See for a notable exception, J. D. Hanson/D.A. Keysar, Taking behaviouralism seriously: the problem of market 
manipulation, NYU Law Review 74 (1999), 630; same authors Taking behaviouralism seriously: some evidence of 
market manipulation, Harvard Law Review 112 (1999), 1420. 
272 Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, Stanford Law Review 2013; Y. 
Bakos/F. Marotta-Wurgler/D.R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Testing a Law and Economics Approach to 
Standard Form Contracts, NYU Law and Economics Research paper No 09-40 (2009). 
273 M. Djurovic,The Apple Case: The Commencement of Pan-European Battle Against Unfair Commercial Practices, (2013) 
9 European Review of Contract Law 253. 
274 Vorabentscheidungs-Verfahren des Öst. OGH – 2 OB 204/14k – VKI v. Amazon EU S.à.r.l. Luxembourg:  
1. Ist das auf eine Unterlassungsklage im Sinne der Richtlinie 2009/22/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 
23. April 2009 über Unterlassungsklagen zum Schutz der Verbraucherinteressen anzuwendende Recht nach Art 4 der 
Verordnung (EG) 864/2007 des europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 11. Juli 2007 über das auf außervertragliche 
Schuldverhältnisse anzuwendende Recht (Rom II-VO) zu bestimmen, wenn sich die Klage gegen die Verwendung 
unzulässiger Vertragsklauseln durch ein in einem Mitgliedstaat ansässiges Unternehmen richtet, das im elektronischen 
Geschäftsverkehr Verträge mit Verbrauchern abschließt, die in anderen Mitgliedstaaten, insbesondere im Staat des 
angerufenen Gerichts, ansässig sind? 
2. Wenn Frage 1 bejaht wird: 
2.1. Ist als Staat des Schadenseintritts (Art 4 Abs 1 Rom II-VO) jeder Staat zu verstehen, auf den die Geschäftstätigkeit des 
beklagten Unternehmens ausgerichtet ist, sodass die beanstandeten Klauseln nach dem Recht des Gerichtsstaats zu 
beurteilen sind, wenn sich die klagebefugte Einrichtung gegen die Verwendung dieser Klauseln im Geschäftsverkehr mit 
Verbrauchern wendet, die in diesem Staat ansässig sind? 
2.2. Liegt eine offensichtlich engere Verbindung (Art 4 Abs 3 Rom II-VO) zum Recht jenes Staats vor, in dem das beklagte 
Unternehmen seinen Sitz hat, wenn dessen Geschäftsbedingungen vorsehen, dass auf die vom Unternehmen 
geschlossenen Verträge das Recht dieses Staats anzuwenden ist? 
2.3. Führt eine solche Rechtswahlklausel aus anderen Gründen dazu, dass die Prüfung der beanstandeten Vertragsklauseln 
nach dem Recht jenes Staats zu erfolgen hat, in dem das beklagte Unternehmen seinen Sitz hat? 
3. Wenn Frage 1 verneint wird: 
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law? Can Article 6 (2) be invoked which guarantees the consumer the protection via his come 
country? Are Austrian courts obliged to apply Luxemburg law when they have to decide over an 
action for injunction that aims at protecting Austrian consumers? Or are Austrian courts entitled to 
apply the same law for the procedural side – the action of injunction – and the substantive side – the 
unfair terms regulation? For international private lawyers the case is an asset test, not only on the 
feasibility to apply Rome I and II which are designed for individual litigation for collective actions, 
but also on the potential outcome which must be in line not only with Rome I and II but with the 
substantive body of EU consumer law. The legal technical arguments that could be brought forward 
should not set aside the important political dimension behind the case. What kind of incentive should 
an Austrian consumer organisation have to launch an action for injunction if the standard of protection 
is taken from a different EU legal order which is unknown to them? What incentive should have the 
Luxembourgian consumer organisation – to stay with the example – to launch an action for injunction 
to protect Austrian consumers from a proclaimed illegal practice, or even more important the overall 
community of European consumers? Provided procedural and the substantive side falls apart, an 
overall involvement of consumer organisations, a kind of cross-border solidarity and cross border 
financing (?), sounds nice in European identity building, but EU law and EU politics is not yet at that 
level. International companies are benefiting from the prevailing differences in European consumer 
law, not only in terms of the substantive level of protection (minimum-maximum), but more 
importantly from the still unsolved issue on how transborder enforcement could be effectively 
organised. 
It remains to be seen whether and to what extent the European Commission is ready to engage into a 
serious debate on the efficiency of EU consumer law regulation.
275
 This would require a hard look at 
the information paradigm which is so predominant in EU consumer law. It would equally require to 
seriously consider the introduction of the incriminated class action as a European remedy to overcome 
the type of ‘Amazon’ conflicts, presented above. Be that as it may the potential clash between the US 
efficiency paradigm and the EU (social) justice paradigm is certainly one of the most interesting 
phenomena to study in the years to come. It is hard to imagine that the so-called Brussels effect
276
 in 
consumer law does not belong to the TTIP agenda. 
The Banking Union project 
The argument is that the Banking Union changes the outlook of the European Constitution, certainly 
of the European Economic Constitution.
277
 It implies a paradigm shift from Internal Market – 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Wie ist das auf die Unterlassungsklage anzuwendende Recht dann zu bestimmen? 
4. Unabhängig von der Antwort auf die vorstehenden Fragen: 
4.1. Ist eine in Allgemeinen Geschäftsbedingungen enthaltene Klausel, wonach auf einen Vertrag, der im elektronischen 
Geschäftsverkehr zwischen einem Verbraucher und einem in einem anderen Mitgliedstaat ansässigen Unternehmer 
geschlossenen wird, das Recht des Sitzstaats dieses Unternehmers anzuwenden ist, missbräuchlich im Sinn von Art 3 Abs 
1 der Richtlinie 93/13/EWG des Rates vom 5. April 1993 über missbräuchliche Klauseln in Verbraucherverträgen? 
4.2. Unterliegt die Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten durch ein Unternehmen, das im elektronischen Geschäftsverkehr 
mit Verbrauchern, die in anderen Mitgliedstaaten ansässig sind, Verträge abschließt, nach Art 4 Abs 1 lit a der Richtlinie 
95/46/EG des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates vom 24. Oktober 1995 zum Schutz natürlicher Personen bei der 
Verarbeitung personenbezogener Daten und zum freien Datenverkehr unabhängig vom sonst anwendbaren Recht 
ausschließlich dem Recht jenes Mitgliedstaats, in dem sich die Niederlassung des Unternehmens befindet, in deren 
Rahmen die Verarbeitung stattfindet, oder hat das Unternehmen auch die Datenschutzvorschriften jener Mitgliedstaaten 
zu beachten, auf die es seine Geschäftstätigkeit ausrichtet? 
275 A.L. Sibony/A. Alemanno, Nudge and the Law: A European Perspective, forthcoming. 
276 A. Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 2012 Northwestern University School of Law Printed in U.S.A. Northwestern 
University Law Review Vol. 107, No. 1 
277 H.-W. Micklitz, The Internal Market Project and the Banking Union, MS May 2015. 
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competition – economic efficiency to Internal Market – Banking Union – financial stability. Economic 
efficiency through competition is temporarily suspended by financial stability through regulation.
278
 
This shift will not remain without consequence for the role and function of competition as the leading 
paradigm to implement the Internal Market project through competitive contract law. The claim 
requires a short look in the emergence of the Banking Union, which explains the paradigm shift in 
light of the Internal Market programme before it is possible to shed some light on the potential impact 
of the shift on the design of European private law. 
Paradigm shift 
In order to understand the importance of the shift, some facts behind the decision to establish a 
Banking Union need to be highlighted. There is a direct line of argument from the OMT decision in 
July 2012 ‘Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro’279 via 
the OMT programme announced in September 2012
280
 to the Banking Union. In that respect I rely on 
the reconstruction of the history of the BU by Alessandro Busca,
281
 who quotes H. Van Rompuy, the 
former President of the European Council: 
282
  
“The Central Bank was only able to take this decision because of the preliminary political decision, by the 
EU’s Heads of State and Government to build a banking union (emphasis added H.-W. M.) This was the 
famous European Council of June 2012, so just weeks before Draghi’s statement; he himself said to me, 
during that Council, that this was exactly the game-changer he needed.” 
The BU is built on the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), the Singly Resolution Mechanism 
(SRM) and the still incomplete deposit guarantee scheme (DGS).
283
 The ground-breaking decision in 
favour of establishing the BU cannot be separated from the OMT declaration and the circumstances in 
which it was made. There is discussion of whether Draghi only implement what the European Council 
in June 2012 had decided, or whether Draghi went beyond the mandate of the ECB. The answer to that 
question is crucial for the political legitimacy of the Draghi declaration. This can be left for another 
discussion. What matters in our context is that from June/July 2012 on the EU is governed by a new 
Economic Constitution, one in which financial stability has become the predominant paradigm. 
Financial stability is a difficult factual and normative category. It implies both a technical assessment 
which lies in the hands of the banking and finance experts and a value judgment on the kind of action 
to be taken. The overall research on risk regulation might serve as a source of inspiration to clarify the 
normative content of financial stability.
284
 What is needed is a sort of risk management, at the macro 
level via the control of systemic risks and at the micro level via the control and supervision of 
‘dangerous’ financial products.285 Risk regulation has definitely entered banking and finance. 
                                                     
278 See H. Schweitzer, A second step of integration through constitutionalisation? From competition to Banking Union, on 
file with the author. 
279 See President Draghi’s speech: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120726.en.html. 
280 ECB Press Release 6 September 2012 - Technical features of Outright Monetary Transactions. 
281 The OMT Decision and the Banking Union, Manuscript May 2015, on file with the author. 
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283 K. Lannoo, ECB Banking Supervision and beyond, Report of Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) Task Force, 
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284 L. Nottage, (2013). Innovating for 'Safe Consumer Credit': Drawing on Product Safety Regulation to Protect Consumers 
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Achieving financial stability means in the EU first and foremost the adoption of a new wave of 
regulation.  
The process of establishing the Banking Union can be characterized by the following mechanisms a) 
the sheer quantity of rules (by now more than 1000 already), b) the outstanding use of delegation 
powers in regulations and directives to the European Banking Authority (EBA), c) the broad discretion 
which is left to the EBA in shaping the technical standards. 
On the supervisory mechanism there are 2 major EU Regulations and 4 ECB Regulations, 5 major 
Decisions and 3 Guidelines of the ECB, 1 Recommendation of the Council, 1 Interinstitutional 
Agreement between the EP and the ECB, 1 MoU between the ECB and the Council and 1 MoU 
between the ECB and the Single Resolution Board in respect of cooperation and information exchange 
for a total of 450 pages of rules and regulations directly affecting banks and interested parties. 
On the resolution mechanism there are 2 major EU Regulation and 1 Intergovernmental Agreement for 
a total of 120 pages of rules and regulations directly affecting banks and interested parties. 
The single rulebook is made up of 1 EU Regulation and 2 Directives for a total of 595 pages of rules 
and regulations directly affecting banks and interested parties. To this rules one has to add the binding 
technical standards for the implementation of the CRD IV package and the CRR, issued by the 
Commission on the proposals of the EBA. Up to 8 Implementing technical standards decisions and 17 
Regulatory Technical Standards decisions have been taken. 
This is not yet all. Just as in the Internal Market programme ‘technical standards’ will have to play a 
key role in the achievement of the Banking Union. Insiders are speaking of more than 10.000 that are 
needed. Under Directive 2013/36, the EBA is given the mandate to develop ‘technical standards’. 
These standards cover the whole field of banking and finance, as listed in Art. 8. Contrary to the 
technical standards adopted under the so-called New Approach to Technical Harmonization and 
Standards’286 these BU technical standards can be made binding. Two procedures have to be kept 
separate: the procedure in Art. 290 TFEU – specified in Articles 10-14 of Regulation 1093/2010 – and 
the procedure in Art. 291 TFEU – specified in Art. 15 of Regulation 1093/2010. Needless to say there 
is a thin line between the two procedures. The distinction between the two is subject to intense debate 
between the European Commission and the European Parliament. The first draft of BTS (binding 
technical standards) has to be sent to the European Commission by 31.12.2015. Provided the European 
Commission intends to adopt the draft technical standards – what should be the rule287 – the European 
Parliament and the Council have one month to object to the adoption (Art. 149). These drafts will be 
based on banking and financial expertise. In particular, in the recitals to the Directive and the 
Regulation, constant reference is made to the particular expertise needed. Expert knowledge should 
normally prevail over any political reservations. In crude language: where engineers play a key role in 
adopting technical standards under the New Approach, economists have to fulfill this function for 
technical standards adopted under the BU. There is no need to go into the details of the regulations and 
directives. However, the often rather vague language in the EU law establishing the BU opens up 
space for discretion and interpretation which is filled through technical standards and expertise. 
The huge machinery which is set into motion, the massive new rules, the established administrative 
infrastructure, the new supervisory body all these means serve one single purpose – to manage and 
guarantee financial stability not only on the level of systematic risks or dangerous financial products, 
but also at the level of private law management. Private law is deeply dug into this new spell, the 
doctrine of financial stability. 
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Impact on EU private law 
There is a retrospective and a prospective dimension to the relationship between financial stability and 
private law. Retrospectively the question is how existing private law relations can be balanced against 
the needs of the financial stability paradigm. L. Buchheid and M. Gulati have demonstrated how bonds 
contracts in Cyprus were submitted to a substantial haircut based on a bold interpretation of a few 
contractual stipulations.
288
 The risk of financial instability prevails over pacta sunt servanda. 
Household debts are another area that attracted political, economic and judicial attention, not least due 
to the potential risk for de-balancing the national budget. There are thousands and thousands of 
Mohamed Aziz in Europe.
289
 Courts are at the forefront around Europe to strike a balance between the 
contractual obligation to pay the mortgages or more generally the debts, the social and political 
consequences of private insolvency for the economy and the society in the respective countries and the 
potential impact of safeguard measures on the financial stability in that country.
290
 Courts have to deal 
with individual cases. Help and support in individual cases may not endanger financial stability. 
Courts, however, may trigger a political debate in the democratic fora on how and where to strike the 
balance between the conflicting objectives, contractual obligations, insolvency of the individual and 
state default. Not least motivated by strong court judgments Greece and Iceland have introduced a 
moratorium by means of a parliamentary decision, which raises many questions with regard to the 
maintenance of financial stability, Spain takes a different position not least because the major creditor 
is the Caixa bank, which has been bailed out by the Spanish government.
291
  
Prospectively the EU is adopting new rules in the field of financial services which are meant to keep 
the risks of financial transactions under control. F. Della Negra
292
 demonstrates that MIFID II and 
EWIR are meant to put tight boundaries to financial transactions through public/administrative 
regulation without interfering into contractual relations themselves. The opposite is true for derivatives 
as H. Marjosola
293
 demonstrates. Here the EU does not shy away from regulating contracts directly. 
It is hard to say by now whether the rules adopted in light of financial stability will have an 
overarching impact on other regulated markets, thereby imposing on b2b and b2c relations a new 
paradigm different from the design of a competitive contract law. However, as banking and finance 
cuts across all economic fields it is hard to imagine that the financial stability doctrine will not affect 
other areas than banking and finance itself.  
The Digital Single Market and the European private law 
In May 2015
294
 the new European Commission launched the Digital Single Market Strategy as the 
overall objective of political activities throughout the forthcoming years. The Commission document 
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does not even mention ‘financial stability’ but refers to competition and ‘fair competition’ several 
times as a means to promote ‘jobs and growth’. Priority no. 2 reads as follows: 
"I believe that we must make much better use of the great opportunities offered by digital technologies, 
which know no borders. To do so, we will need to have the courage to break down national silos in 
telecoms regulation, in copyright and data protection legislation, in the management of radio waves and in 
the application of competition law…” 
There is a lot of trust in the strategy paper in the positive role and function of competition law in the 
telecommunication market. So it seems as if the competition paradigm is back on the agenda. But how 
does the new strategy on the Digital Single Market relate to private law in general and contract law in 
particular? The European Commission seems ready to transform the DCFR and the CESL into a 
Regulation on Sales Contracts for b2b and b2c.  
Under 2.1. of the DSM Strategy paper
295
 the following reference can be found. It is quoted in full as it 
enshrines the logic from which the European Commission starts:  
2.1. Cross-border e-commerce rules that consumers and business can trust 
One of the reasons why consumers and smaller companies do not engage more in cross-border e-
commerce is because the rules that apply to these transactions can be complex, unclear and may differ 
between Member States. Having 28 different national consumer protection and contract laws discourages 
companies from cross-border trading and prevents consumers from benefitting from the most competitive 
offers and from the full range of online offers. EU consumers could save EUR 11.7 billion each year if 
they could choose from a full range of EU goods and services when shopping online. 61% of EU 
consumers feel confident about purchasing via the Internet from a retailer located in their own Member 
State while only 38% feel confident about purchasing from another EU Member State. Only 7% of SMEs 
in the EU sell cross-border. 
In a Single Market, companies should be able to manage their sales under a common set of rules. Some 
aspects of consumer and contract law have already been fully harmonised for online sales (such as the 
information that should be provided to consumers before they enter into a contract or the rules governing 
their right to withdraw from the deal if they have second thoughts). However, other aspects of the contract 
(such as what remedies are available if tangible goods are not in conformity with the contract of sale) are 
only subject to EU rules providing minimum harmonisation, with the possibility for Member States to go 
further. When it comes to remedies for defective digital content purchased online (such as e-books) no 
specific EU rules exist at all, and only few national ones. 
Simplified and modern rules for online and digital cross-border purchases will encourage more businesses 
to sell online across borders and increase consumer confidence in cross-border e-commerce. If the same 
rules for e-commerce were applied in all EU Member States, 57% of companies say they would either 
start or increase their online sales to other EU Member States. 
To deliver the right conditions to enable cross-border e-commerce to flourish, the Commission, as 
announced in its Work Programme for 2015, will make an amended legislative proposal2 to allow sellers 
to rely on their national laws, further harmonising the main rights and obligations of the parties to a sales 
contract. This will be done notably by providing remedies for non-performance and the appropriate 
periods for the right to a legal guarantee. The purpose is to ensure that traders in the internal market are 
not deterred from cross-border trading by differences in mandatory national consumer contract laws, or to 
differences arising from product specific rules such as labelling. 
However, just having a common set of rules is not enough. There is also a need for more rapid, agile and 
consistent enforcement of consumer rules for online and digital purchases to make them fully effective. 
The Commission will submit a proposal to review the Regulation on Consumer Protection Cooperation 
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that will clarify and develop the powers of enforcement authorities and improve the coordination of their 
market monitoring activities and alert mechanisms to detect infringements faster. Furthermore, the 
Commission will establish in 2016 an EU-wide online dispute resolution platform. 
The Commission will make an amended proposal before the end of 2015 (i) covering harmonised EU 
rules for online purchases of digital content, and (ii) allowing traders to rely on their national laws based 
on a focused set of key mandatory EU contractual rights for domestic and cross-border online sales of 
tangible goods. 
The Commission will submit a proposal for a review of the Regulation on Consumer Protection 
Cooperation in order to develop more efficient cooperation mechanisms.” 
Without further ado the European Commission is promoting the development of rules that promote the 
digital distribution channel over other forms of distribution.
296
 There is no discussion on the potential 
impact of the one sided support of digital sales over analog sales, on the impact on the society at large. 
The history of the privatization of public services and its impact on the society should serve as a 
reminder.
297
 One might wonder where the European Commission takes the legitimacy from. Does the 
plea for jobs and growth suffice? In legal terms it means that the EU is obviously giving up the idea of 
having a European Sales Law that governs all forms of transactions independent of the means of 
communication by which they have been negotiated. Favoring digital sales over analog sales means 
that the ‘new digital’ rules will compete with the ‘old analog’ rules. This is in fact a new form of open 
competition, new forms of contracting via the internet against old forms of contracting via the old 
means of communication, language and letters. 
The EU has developed a dense body of digital rules on e-commerce (b2b and b2c), on distant selling 
(under the Consumer Rights Directive b2c), on distant selling for financial services (b2c). These rules 
are mainly dealing with the modalities of contract conclusion. The envisaged new regulation could 
easily mean that the European Commission is trying to unite too suspended initiatives: the revision of 
the consumer acquis and the common European sales law (for b2b and b2c). it would have to do so, 
however, in facing the question whether the price can remain the only parameter for governing the 
competition between the two distribution channels. The key to the understanding of the changes in the 
economy and the society is ‘net neutrality’. The US Federal Communication Commission has most 
recently taken a landmark decision confirming the neutrality of the net. The net neutrality debate 
suggests a far reaching way of thinking about all kinds of online services and business models, from 
Amazon, to Uber and Airbnb.
298
 It reopens the old debate on what the appropriate parameters for 
competition shall be. The EU will not be able to escape that debate. 
Conclusions – are there conclusions? 
There are three different projects that guide European Integration – the Internal Market, the Banking 
Union and now the Digital Single Market. Each of the three is governed by a different competition 
paradigm, even more complicated each of three demonstrate different competition paradigms 
depending on what kind of private law we are talking about, traditional private law, regulatory private 
law, b2b and b2c relations. On top of this the three projects are standing side by side and they will 
continue to stand side by side. So in a way one might even raise the question whether there is 
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297 W. Sauter, Public Services in EU Law, CUP 2015; see the various contributions in M. Cremona (ed.), Market Integration 
and Public Services, OUP, 2011, which also look into the societal impact of liberalization and privatization of public 
services. 
298 See K. S. Rahman, Curbing the New Corporate Power, Boston Review, Monday May 4 2015 
http://bostonreview.net/forum/k-sabeel-rahman-curbing-new-corporate-power  
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competition between the three projects, which is the one that ‘wins’ and how does this impact private 
law relations.  
There is no clear answer to the future of private law in this new triangle. Much will depend on the 
future of European integration. The standard answer to the future of the EU is the reference to 
understand European constitution building as a process or Europe as laboratory for the post nation 
state. This perspective, however, leads us to the conclusion that the observed transformations are 
taking place quite independently of the future of the EU. In so far the EU is indeed a wonderful subject 
of research. 
  
SECTION II. SPECIFIC FIELDS 
 
  
Long-term upstream supply contracts and EU energy law:  
Regulating contracts in the times of security of supply crisis 
 
Lucila de Almeida 
 
“Go on. Quickly, hurry, keep thinking and keep looking beyond the purely necessary, even when you 
have the feeling that there is no more, no more to think, that it’s all been thought, that there’s no more to 
see, that’s all been seen.” 
Javier Marías, Your Face Tomorrow: Fever and Spear 
Introduction 
How have contracts been regulated in the energy sector since the EU has pursued the creation of 
integrated and competitive gas and electricity markets in the late 1990s?
299
 Has the EU multilevel 
system of law cast its net toward private ordering,
300
 and then reshaped the parties’ free and informed 
consent by restricting the default rules domain? To answer these questions, we might take a leaf from 
Javier Marias’s book: Keep thinking and keep looking beyond the purely necessary, even when you 
have the feeling that that’s all been thought or seen. Some scholars still argue that the EU lacks the 
competence to encroach on the boundaries of contract law, which are still embedded in national legal 
systems. By contrast, European regulatory private law goes beyond this textual interpretation by 
claiming that, while lacking competence in the Treaties, the EU may intervene in national contract law 
through public ordering by the Community in the fields of competition and industrial policy.
301 
Taking 
the latter realistic approach to law, instead of the formalistic one, as a primary assumption, we might 
pause to ask how regulatory instrumentalism, which is highly prevalent in the activities of the 
Community, could to some extent regulate contracts by either establishing hard mandatory rules or by 
softly affecting the parties’ reasonable expectations. Following what Javier Marias suggests, my thesis 
is dedicated in the first place to investigating whether, and if so how, the EU has interfered through 
hard or soft means in the private ordering governance of contract law in energy markets. To test this 
paradigm, instead of starting by looking into the substantive law customarily referred to as EU energy 
law, which consists of a series of directives and regulations that have continuously approved advanced 
modes of sectoral governance, I will take contracts as my primary subject and starting point. 
Historically, European energy-supply chains have always been organized into a mixed governance 
system that operates not only through a network of vertically integrated firms but also through 
contracts, even early on when the Community emerged as simply a coal-and-steel integrated market. 
Of course, this governance system has not always kept its balance over the years. Whereas energy 
undertakings mostly relied on networks of integrated firms at the beginning of energy market 
                                                     
299 Although the First Energy Package [Directive 1996/92/EC and Directive 1998/30/E] was approved in the second half of 
the 1990s, it was preceded at the EU level by some first steps toward integrated and competitive energy markets. These 
were the Transit Directives on Electricity [Directive 1990/547/ECC] and Gas [Directive 1991/296/ECC] and the Price 
Transparency Directive [1990/377/ECC].  
300 Here I have in mind the three ideal-typical models of ordering societies defined by Roger Brownsword: private order, 
public order, and ordre public. Roger Brownsword, The Theoretical Foundations of European Private Law: A Time to 
Stand and Stare (2011), pp. 160–61. 
301 That is the original claim that motivated the European Regulatory Private Law Project. Hans-W Micklizt, “The Visible 
Hand of European Regulatory Private Law: The Transformation of European Private Law from Autonomy to 
Functionalism in Competition and Regulation” (2008), EUI Working Paper 2008/14. 
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consolidation, the distribution of weight since liberalization has increasingly shifted towards relational 
contracts. Contracts have always been among the governance models used to firm up relationships, 
especially at the upstream level of energy markets. For example, contracts have always tied parties 
that hold the right to explore natural gas resources and buyers that lack this natural competitive 
advantage, or those that own intellectual property rights in new forms of electricity generation and 
those that pay usage rights. However, contracts were scarcer as energy goods moved along the supply 
chain to downstream levels. Many energy undertakings usually ran activities from transmission to the 
supply of end-users through a single firm or through its subsidiaries. As the governance of the energy 
sector has increasingly tended toward de-verticalization of integrated firms for economic and legal 
reasons, contracts have become a cornerstone of energy supply-chain governance. Aside from 
upstream agreements, there are transmission-service contracts between energy suppliers and TSOs 
(transmission system operators), lease contracts between pipeline owners and DSOs (distribution 
system operators), storage contracts, wholesale contracts, and consumer contracts. Obviously, it is far 
from my intention, and even far from feasible, to make an exhaustive list of the contracts now being 
used in energy markets, but illustrating the complexity of contractual relations along energy-supply 
chains is crucial in justifying my methodological choice to select a single contract model. By focusing 
on a single type of contract, I will be able, in the first place, to trace how the parties’ consent on 
default rules in one type of transaction subsequently turned into commercial practices recognized as 
customary clauses. Once the contractual model is described, the second step will be to inquire whether 
the EU has in any way interfered in this existing private ordering by legislating on contracts—thereby 
directly imposing mandatory rules, in virtue of the EU public order having precedence over private 
ordering—or by interpreting EU legal provisions which are primarily competition and industry 
policies but which could wind up setting standards when contractual relations are under dispute. 
For the purposes of this article, I will make my discussion shorter by focusing on a single contract 
model: that of long-term upstream supply (LUS) contracts. LUS contracts are agreements between a 
gas producer (or promisor) on one side, typically a state-owned firm owned and incorporated in non–
Member States with large natural gas reserves, and European undertakings as buyers and importers 
(the promisee), on the other. This contractual model has traditionally been a backbone for the purchase 
of natural gas in Europe since the 1960s, when gas markets were first taking shape, and it later 
consolidated into a indispensable good and a public service obligation. From the 1960s to late 1990s, 
while the EU remained indifferent to energy markets, LUS contracts were formed and performed 
under freely agreed conditions and also under national private laws. Their clauses followed certain 
paths. Long-term clauses, take-or-pay clauses, destination restrictions, profit-sharing, and oil-price 
indexation were often found in LUS contracts before the sector was liberalized. Since the late 1990s, 
when the EU began to move toward creating an integrated and competitive energy market, sector-
regulation and competition law have been the two possible means by which LUS contracts have been 
regulated. 
Since the late 1990s, the EU has shifted toward common rules for internal gas markets by approving 
three gas packages: the first in 1998, the second in 2003, and the third in 2009. By taking into 
consideration the provision of law involving B2B (business-to-business) relations that could 
potentially affect LUS contracts, directives and regulations have established rules for (i) ensuring the 
security of supply, (ii) creating a governance system to regulate third party access (TPA) in 
transmission and distribution systems, and (iii) enforcing unbundling obligations that gave rise to 
management, legal, and subsequent ownership unbundling of TSOs and DSOs. Despite the broad 
scope of the three gas packages, none of their substantive rules regulated LUS contracts. Au contraire, 
the first thing EU sector regulation did was to bring into being a governance system for managing 
capacity in pipelines so as to make possible the full performance of LUS contracts. Moreover, even the 
unbundling of ownership does not regulate LUS contracts directly, even if it affects the corporate 
governance of the parties involved in LUS contracts. Consequently, we could preliminarily conclude 
that EU substantive law has never affected the private order of LUS contracts, either by establishing 
mandatory rules or by enforcing industrial policies. But, again, Javier Marias is worth going back to 
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when he insists that we keep looking. When we have the feeling everything has been seen or thought, 
the gas supply crisis in 2009 laid the first stone toward a new paradigm. Disputes involving Russians 
and Ukrainians led to the shutdown of gas flow from Ukraine to the EU for about twenty days. If this 
crisis scared European leaders and consumers, it also has served as a political argument for the 
European Commission to support the introduction of mandatory rules in LUS contracts, and this plan 
has since been put into effect. While in 2010 the European Parliament and Council approved 
regulation of security of supply with timid provisions on “supply standards,” which are in fact a set of 
mandatory rules for preventing and managing future crises, in 2015 the Energy Union’s 
Communication goes further. Here the Commission has recently called for more regulation of 
upstream supply contracts, which can be understood as a way to steer toward mandatory rules and a 
sector-oriented European contract law. 
We can then answer the question asked at the outset and say that, yes, the EU multilevel system of law 
making has cast its net toward private ordering in the energy sector by taking LUS contracts into 
account.  
Long-Term Upstream Supply Contracts on the Groningen Model 
Apart from the Netherlands, the UK, and Denmark,
302
 that is, the countries that have held sufficient 
gas resources to satisfy domestic consumption at different times and for differing durations,
 
European 
Member States have long been known to be dependent on gas imports to supply demand. In the 1980s, 
the domestic production of gas in Italy and Germany accounted for only 8.6% and 5% of final 
consumption, respectively,
303
 and these circumstances have remained to date the same. As gas buyers 
rather than producers, the EU natural gas markets have been led to take different governance paths 
from those of electricity markets. Whereas, before liberalization, electricity supply chains were mostly 
enclosed within national boundaries and were carried by vertical integrated state-owned firms from 
production to supply, EU natural gas markets have always rested their upstream governance on 
relational contracts. In spite of operating through intra-firm governance as electivity industries, the 
vast majority of European states have first been compelled to purchase gas from net exporters, since 
gas has overwhelmingly replaced coal in cookers, heaters, and power plants. Moreover, this lack of a 
natural advantage left European states without alternatives for growing its international relations 
toward large gas producers owned by the non-European Member States Russia, Norway, and 
Algeria.
304
 Those countries are geographically located within a distance that enabled gas transmission 
through a network system of pipelines, the only feasible way of transporting gas in the early ages of 
market consolidation.
305
 
                                                     
302 Natural gas has played an important role in the Netherlands since the discovery of the Groningen gas fields in 1959, the 
largest non-associated gas field in Europe, whose volume of total production is still accounting for the Netherlands’s 
status as a net exporter. On the other hand, the production of gas in the UK portion of the North Sea in the Southern Gas 
Basin and the Continental Shelf has progressively decreased over the years, and most recently it has shifted Member 
Status to the status of net importer. IEA, Oil and Gas Security: Emergence Response of IEA Countries: Netherlands 
(2012), p. 17–18; Oil and Gas Security: Emergence Response of IEA Countries: United Kingdom (2010), p. 15. 
303 Terence Daintith and Leigh Hancher, Energy Strategy in Europe: The Legal Framework (Berlin and New York: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1986), p. 60–64.     
304 “More than three quarters (76.8%) of the EU-28’s imports of natural gas in 2012 came from Russia, Norway or Algeria.” 
Eurostat, Energy Production and Imports, March and May 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Energy_production_and_imports#Further_Eurostat_information.  
305 Although gas is imported through pipelines and LNG terminals, the LNG industry in the EU represented an irrelevant 
market until the early 1990s and has gained market share only in the early of twenty-first century. Yichen Du and Sergey 
Paltsev, “International Trade in Natural Gas: Golden Age of LNG?” (2014), MIT Joint Program on the Science and 
Policy of Global Change, Report No. 271, p. XX. http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/document/MITJPSPGC_Rpt271.pdf. 
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The lack of natural gas reserves hindered the chance to replicate the intra-firm governance model in 
the EU gas market at the upstream level. However, since gas became an essential utility, contracts 
have been the alternative solution for tying up relationships between producers and EU importers. 
From there on out, the LUS (Long-term upstream supply) contractual model played a key role in the 
EU gas market, and that is the reason why I have made it the subject of this investigation. To 
understand how LUS contracts have evolved from isolated supply agreements to a contractual model 
considered as a benchmarking tool, we need first to look at the history of how and why LUS contracts 
were first used, and then consider how their default rules became embedded in commercial practices 
until it was broadly recognized as standard contract model. 
Although there have three optimal contract portfolios in all commodity markets (long-term, short-
term, and spot),
306
 the dominant practice of relying on long-term contracts as the tool of choice for 
purchasing gas has generally been grounded in economic and political reasons.
307
 If we think broadly 
about the legal framework in the second half of the 20th century, we can see that there were obvious 
economic reasons for parties to choose LUS contracts as their preferred contractual governance model. 
On the producer’s side (that of the promisor), long-term agreements were the imperative model with 
which to ensure the ability to recoup the extremely high upfront costs involved: not only the costs of 
gas exploration, drilling, and refinement, but also the investment in infrastructure for the pipelines 
needed to transport gas from the reserves to the outer reaches of its own territory, which are named 
exit points. On the importer’s side (that of the promisee), which before liberalization was mostly made 
up of national and local firms simultaneously running distribution and supply operations, there were 
also investments in infrastructure to develop the national pipeline network from entry points at their 
boundaries to the end-user. Furthermore, either producers or importers, whether working with third 
parties or not, were allied in putting up the investment for cross-border transmission pipelines. These 
transnational network operations often cut through the territory of Member and non–Member States or 
take offshore courses to reach the territory of the end-users. For instance, the Yamal-Europe pipeline, 
built from Russia to Germany in the early 1990s, crosses Belarus and Poland over two thousand 
kilometres. Thus, to provide the net exporter with a substitute for security of demand, and the importer 
with security of supply, LUS contracts became the main vehicle in these deals that involve high-sunk 
investments by averting opportunistic behavior. This contractual governance choice is thus aligned 
with theories developed in law and economics and in relational contracts.
308
 
In the EU, LUS contracts have traditionally been used as the cornerstone of the purchase of natural gas 
since the 1960s, when contracts were originally designed for export from the large reserve discovered 
in 1959 in the Groningen gas field in the Netherlands. So it is not a coincidence that the kind of 
governance adopted by LUS contracts is also known as the Groningen model.
309
 Although the 
Netherlands is among the founding members of the EU, their LUS contract model has since served as 
a point of reference for most gas imports in continental Europe irrespective of whether the producer 
was located within the Community or without. But there is more. The Groningen model persisted as a 
benchmark over the next four decades. Here are some examples that can illustrate the spillover of this 
contractual governance into the EU. Russians used the Dutch LUS model to export to Germany, 
                                                     
306 Karsten Neuhoff and Christian von Hirschhausen, “Long-Term vs. Short-Term Contract: A European Perspective on 
Natural Gas” (2005), University of Cambridge Working Paper, 
https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/1810/131595/eprg0505.pdf?sequence=1, p. 3. 
307 Karsten Neuhoff and Christian von Hirschhausen, “Long-Term vs. Short-Term Contract: A European Perspective on 
Natural Gas” (2005), op. cit., p. 3–5.  
308 Benjamin Klein, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian, “Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the 
Competitive Contracting Process,” Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 1, no. 2 (1978): p. 297–326; and Oliver E. 
Williamson, “Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange,” The American Economic Review, vol. 73, 
no. 4 (1983): p. 519–40. 
309 Aad Correljé, Coby van der Linde, and Theo Westerwoudt, Natural and Gas in the Netherlands: From Cooperation to 
Competition? (Amsterdam and Zuidoost: Oranje-Nassau Groep, 2003). 
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Austria, France, and Italy in the early 1970s, and this was replicated in the early 1980s under the SGE 
IV project. Over the same period, Algerians reproduced the standing formula to export to Italy via 
pipelines, as well as to France, Belgium, Greece, and Spain through LNG (liquefied natural gas), and 
it was again used in the early 1990s to export to Spain and Portugal via the Maghreb pipeline. Most 
recently, the Norwegians started to export gas from the large Troll gas field to Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium, France, Austria, and Spain in the 1990s by adopting the LUS contracts based 
on the Groningen model.
310
  
Although some scholars had predicted the change in contractual governance in the early 21st century, 
the market share of LUS contracts fell significantly: this meant an increase in spot and short-term 
contracts, and their predictions therefore turned out to be wrong in relation to the EU.
311
 LUS contracts 
have so far been the dominant contractual governance for importing gas into the EU. While 100% of 
gas imports consisted of trade through LUS contracts in the 1990s, this model to date still accounts for 
85% of trade volume.
312
 This shift is far from being considered a large loss of market share, and it 
accordingly underpins my methodological choice of picking LUS contracts in studying how contracts 
have been regulating the upstream level of the gas market. 
Bearing in mind that the original Groningen model for LUS contracts has long framed the contractual 
governance of the entire upstream gas market in Europe, more needs to be said about the default rules 
inherent in this model. Specifically, we need to consider the conditions and time clauses written into 
LUS contracts on the basis of the customary practices adopted by gas market players. The most 
recurrent conditions, some of them still in use, were take-and-pay clauses, destination and/or use 
restrictions, and profit-share and price-indexing clauses. But before turning to these conditions, let me 
begin with the most obvious one: the long-term time clause. 
The Long-Term Time Clause  
As noted, the reason why the parties chose long-term time clauses was to ensure a return on the high 
upfront-cost investments on either side of the contract. In the EU, the typical duration of LUS 
contracts in 1985 was about 15 or 25 years.
313
 While LUS contracts in the 20th century were 
discharged by performance,
314
 the negotiation for renewal has wound up narrowing the time clause to 
about 8 and 15 years, especially after 1998.
315
 The reasons for curtailing time clauses are economic 
and legal. Economically, asset recovery from infrastructure investment commonly took place while 
performing the first LUS contracts. Afterwards, in the second negotiation, there was less of an 
                                                     
310 This is certainly not an exhaustive list of LUS contracts in EU history but a mere illustration of the extent to which the 
major EU gas suppliers took up the Groningen model. Energy Charter Secretariat, Putting a Price on Energy: 
International Pricing Mechanisms for Oil and Gas (2007), p. 143. 
311 Peter Hartley and Dagobert Brito, New Energy Technology in the Natural Gas Sector (Houston, Texas: The James A. 
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, 2001).   
312 International Energy Agency, Security of Gas Supply in Open Markets – LNG and Power at a Turning Point (Paris: 
OECD, 2004).  
313 For a quantitative analysis, see Anne Neumann and Christian von Hirschhausen, “Less Lon g-Term Gas to 
Europe? A Quantitative Analysis of European Long-Term Gas Supply Contracts,” Zeitschrift für 
Energiewirtschaft, vol. 28, no. 3 (2004): p. 177. https://tu-
dresden.de/die_tu_dresden/fakultaeten/fakultaet_wirtschaftswissenschaften/bwl/ee2/dateien/ordner_publikatione
n/wp_gg_07_hirschhausen_neumann.pdf; and Jonathan Stern, Security of European Natural Gas Supplies 
(London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2002), p. 9.  
314 Solvere dicimus eum, qui fecit quod facere promisit: “We say that someone who does what he has promised performs.” 
Ulp. D. 50, 16, 176 cited by Reinhard Zimmermann, The Law of Obligations: Roman Foundations of the Civilian 
Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1996). 
315 For a quantitative analysis, see Neumann and von Hirschhausen, “Less Long-Term Gas to Europe?” op. cit., p. 
180. 
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incentive to renew these agreements for over 15 years.
316
 In addition to economic considerations, LUS 
contract parties seeking to operate transmission and distribution systems have been precluded from 
doing so under provisions of EU secondary law enforcing different degrees of unbundling, a subject 
that will be discussed at greater length in Section 2. Apart from the investments or divestments made 
in pipelines, LNG terminals have increasingly been built onshore in countries across the world, and 
this has opened up new markets for net exporters and net importers alike seeking new buyers and 
suppliers beyond the range of the pipelines’ geographical constraints. Natural gas produced in the US 
could thus cross the oceans and reach European consumers, but Russian gas could also be reallocated 
to South American countries. 
The Take-or-Pay Clause 
In addition to making the long-term time clause standard, the Groningen model played a pioneering 
role in its use of the take-or-pay clause, which it introduced from the US, and which would 
subsequently also become standard in LUS contracts in the EU. This is why it is an established custom 
to refer to LUS contracts with take-or-pay (ToP) clauses as take-and-pay contracts, which therefore 
become a species under the genus of LUS contracts. Before 1960 in the US, gas producers ignored 
seasonal fluctuations in gas demand, surging in winter and declining in summer. This was a source of 
financial hardship for them at the time. Gas purchasers were also pipeline owners at the time, and 
winter forced them to acquire extra capacity. To protect their interests, these buyers insisted on pre-
empting and exclusively reserving rights to the seller’s gas-production capacity, but with no obligation 
to buy if supply outstripped demand. As a result, when buyers acquired smaller volumes of gas in the 
summer, producers were unable to sell the remaining volume to third parties, for they were prevented 
from doing so under the exclusive-dedication clause, and so they would lose revenue from the sale of 
gas. Hence, the take-or-pay clause was designed to safeguard the interests of producers. The provision 
requires the buyer to purchase a minimum volume of gas for each period based on daily rates of 
production. So, even if the buyer takes less than the minimum quantity of gas, that buyer is still a 
contractual obligation to pay that quantity in full.
317
 A typical take-or-pay clause resembles the text 
below:
318
  
Buyer agrees to purchase and receive from seller or to pay for it if available but not taken, a quantity of 
gas equal to the Sum of the Daily Contract Quantities herein specified [...]. The Daily contract quantity 
shall be the daily rate of production equal to seventy-five percent (75% of the delivery capacity of each 
well). 
As much as the take-and-pay clause was first introduced into LUS contracts to protect the producer 
from any opportunistic behaviour by buyers, it ended up benefiting both parties as global demand for 
gas increased. On the producer’s side, the take-or-pay condition shields them by assuring certain 
minimum revenues regardless of their offtake. The importer, on the other hand, boosts its security of 
supply. It is noteworthy that since the 1970s, when the Dutch model took hold, take-or-pay clauses 
have been written into all long-term LUS contracts (including those currently in force) for gas 
exported from Russia (then the Soviet Union). According to a recent study on reducing European gas 
dependence on Russian gas, LUS contracts originally provided for a take-or-pay level of 85% of the 
                                                     
316 The trend toward decreasing LUS contract durations to 8–15 years does not mean that agreements of over 15 
years vanished from the EU gas market. The 25-year contracts between European importers and Azerbaijan in 
2013 shows that when guarantees are needed to finance large infrast ructural projects, the duration of LUS 
contracts can still be very long. See Luca Franza, “Long-Term Gas Import Contracts in Europe: The Evolution 
in Pricing Mechanisms,” Clingendal International Energy Programme, CEIP Paper 2014/08, p. 18.  
317 J. Michael Medina, “The Take-or-Pay Wars: A Cautionary Analysis for the Future,” Tulsa Law Review, vol. 27, no. 2 
(1991): p. 288. 
318 J. Michel Medina, “Take-or-Pay Oklahoma Style,” The Oklahoma Bar Journal, vol. 60, no. 12 (1989): p. 705. 
Long-term upstream supply contracts and EU energy law Regulating contracts in the times of security of supply crisis 
71 
delivery capacity of each well, while post-2008, that level in many of these contracts dropped to 
70%.
319
 
The Destination Restriction Clause: Territorial and use 
As is the case with the take-or-pay clause, the vast majority of LUS contracts in the EU contain 
clauses setting forth a destination restriction, which can fall into either of two categories: territorial 
restrictions and use restrictions. The territorial restriction clause was designed to prohibit buyers from 
reselling gas to other countries or regions beyond the restricted territory for which it was originally 
destined.
320
 Irrespective of whether the demand was lower than the minimum volume of gas contracted 
under the take-or-pay clause, territorial restrictions precluded gas flow from the negotiated entry point 
to areas beyond the virtual zones previously sought in the contract. First used by the Dutch firms in the 
EU gas market in the 1970s, the territorial restriction ensured that when gas destined for remote 
markets like Italy was sold at a low price at the exit point within Dutch borders, it could not be used to 
undercut higher-priced gas in other markets like Germany.
321
 Consequently, by foreclosing the ability 
to resell gas, the producer remained in control of the prices of gas traded in the downstream side of gas 
markets in different territorial destinations.
322
 For four decades promisors and promisees managed in 
their arrangements to override territorial restrictions in the gas market; this is surprising if we consider 
that the practice patently violated the principle of free movement of goods. But in any event the 
territorial restriction clause vanished from LUS contracts in the early 2000s. The approval of the First 
Gas Package gave a green light to the European Commissioner for Competition to declare war on 
territorial clauses in upstream gas markets using competition law as the weapon.  
In parallel to territorial restrictions, as mentioned, some LUS contracts also contained clauses 
restricting the use destination. While the former are barriers designed to preclude the reselling of gas 
to different Members States, the latter place restrictions, not on territory, but on market players. If the 
parties to a LUS contract agree that the promisee, such as a downstream gas supplier, may resell gas 
exclusively to industrial customers and consumers, the promisee would fall into a breach of contract 
by reselling it on spot markets or to gas power plants. 
The Profit-Sharing Clause 
Once territorial destination clauses in LUS contracts came under the close scrutiny of the Commission, 
profit-sharing mechanisms (PSMs) began to be used as an alternative in gas markets. Whereas the 
former is a hardcore restriction on reselling gas outside of a defined geographic area, the profit-sharing 
clause employs a much softer private regulatory mechanism that makes resale economically less 
attractive. Its provision obliges the buyer to share a certain share of the profit with the producer if the 
gas is resold to an undertaking outside the agreed territory, as well as if the resale targets a customer 
                                                     
319 Ralf Dickel, Elham Hassanzadeh, James Henderson, Anouk, Honoré, Laura El-Katiri, Simon Pirani, Howard Rogers, 
Jonathan Stern, and Katja Yafimava, “Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: Distinguishing Natural Gas 
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using the gas for a purpose other than the one agreed upon.
323
 This means that the profit-sharing 
mechanism has served as a substitute for either territorial restriction clauses or clauses restricting use 
destination. Moreover, the profit-sharing clause is typically written in such a way as to provide for a 
50/50 split of the additional profits between promisor and promisee, even though the question of what 
the additional profit is and how it is to be calculated is contentious.
324
 
By comparison with the previously discussed clauses like take-and-pay, whose customary use in the 
gas market lasted for at least four decades, the profit-sharing mechanism is a recent development in 
LUS contracts, particularly in contracts involving gas supplied via LNG. LUS contracts based on the 
use of pipelines precisely state the location of exit and entry points, and the same happens with LUS 
contracts based on the use of LNG: the parties agree ahead of time on the port of shipment and the port 
of destination for a long-term contract. However, pipelines are heavy immovable structures attached to 
the land, while LNG ships (carriers) are not. Therefore, like any other international freight, they can be 
diverted to a different port of destination, meant as a different LNG terminal. The profit-sharing 
mechanism has thus been written into these LUS contracts to split the additional profit made by the 
buyer if the destination of the LNG carriers is reallocated to a different LNG terminal not provided for 
in the agreement. Such a request to redirect the ship could take place when gas prices in the market 
served by the port of destination falls below the price in other locations served by a different LNG 
terminal. The buyer thus has the freedom to change the port of destination so long as it shares the 
additional profits with the producer.
325
 
In the early 2000s, taking the same path as that of territorial-restriction clauses, the European 
Commissioner for Competition also raised concerns about the incompatibility of profit-sharing clauses 
with provisions of the EU Treaties. However, while it is to a certain extent easy to claim that territorial 
destination clauses in the gas market are unlawful, considering the well-established precedents the 
CJEU has set in relation to different markets,
326
 the same reasoning cannot transfer without 
controversy to profit-sharing clauses. In the latter case, the Commission neatly distinguished profit-
sharing mechanisms in LUS contracts via LNG under the FOB (free on board), DES (delivered ex-
ship), and CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) contractual regimes, which are internationally recognized 
commercial terms established by the ICC (International Chamber of Commerce). 
The Price Indexation Clause: From oil-based to hubs 
Last, but certainly not least in importance, LUS contracts in the EU also inherited the gas pricing 
clause from the Groningen model. Going back to the 1960s, the EU gas market was not effectively 
launched until the discovery of the Groningen field, which was a large onshore reserve with low 
development and production costs. In order to maximize revenue for the Netherlands by charging 
royalties on gas exports, the Dutch Minister of Economic Affairs approved the Dutch gas policy in 
1962, a domestic public law that, among other conditions, included the gas price mechanism by 
paradoxically naming it the market value principle.
327
 In spite of using a cost-plus pricing approach—
                                                     
323 An example would be if the buyer resells gas to power plants instead of to consumers. Eleonora Wäktare, “Territorial 
Restrictions and Profit Sharing Mechanisms in the Gas Sector: The Algerian Case,” Competition Policy Newsletter, no. 3 
(2007): pp. 19–20. 
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326 Case 56/65, Sociéte Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U) [1966] ECR 389. 
327 Here it is worth taking into account the historical research done by Aad Correljé, Coby van der Linde, and Theo 
Westerwoudt. The authors dug up official documents to reconstruct how the negotiation between the 
Netherlands minister and the oil and gas firms Shell, Exxon and DSM put an end to the market value principle. 
“Thus, three years after the discovery of the large Groningen gas field in 1959, the Minister of Economic 
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which means pricing goods according to the production cost added by a reasonable surplus value—the 
national government made a public choice to weigh the gas price with other fuels, principally fossil 
fuels. As a justification, the Netherlands government argued that gas was by nature a good that would 
compete with oil and coal for home heating and power generation.
328
 While oil-indexation-pricing 
schemes were first used in LUS contracts by Dutch firms in compliance with a national mandatory 
rule, the adoption of this contractual governance mechanism by non-Dutch gas producers in 
continental Europe was made on a voluntary basis, which substituted the clause for its original one and 
rearranged it as a default rule. On the Dutch model, the vast majority of LUS contracts in the EU gas 
market endorsed the indexation of gas prices to oil products, mainly crude oil and gasoline, with 
periodic price reviews usually every three years.
329
 Notwithstanding the predominance of oil-indexed 
price in LUS contracts, this pricing mechanism has dramatically changed since 2008 and, if we are to 
briefly introduce its cause and effect, the narrative needs to go back to the late 1990s. 
With the liberalization of the UK gas market, the NBP (national balancing point) was created as a 
trading hub in 1996, but the heavy dependence on long-term contracts lead gas prices in this spot 
market to converge with the flows of oil-based pricing. However, this path was first changed in 2008 
when the financial crisis hit, driving down the demand for gas in the EU, at which point trade in gas in 
hubs began to move away from the pricing scheme based on oil indexation. Gas demand in the EU had 
already dropped by 5.7% in 2009, and then by 11% in 2013. The 2008 financial crisis, coupled with 
the loss of market share of growth in the consumption of renewables, led to a problem of production 
surplus, and in response to that problem gas producers reallocated the surplus gas to hubs. The 
consequence was an unprecedented liquidity increase in the EU sport market, and that set the stage for 
decoupling the hub price from the oil-indexation price in LUS contracts.
330
 Graphics comparing gas 
prices between LUS contracts and spot markets began to show a large divergence. Then, furthermore, 
once the line-of-gas price in hubs dropped and created a significant gap relative to gas trade on long-
term bases, buyers began to request that LUS contracts be renegotiated or that they no longer be 
renewed with the oil-indexation clause. Between wholesalers and their buyers, hub prices—notably 
the NBP for the United Kingdom and TTF (title transfer facility) for continental Europe—had already 
become benchmarks in the north-western European market, but the same outcome cannot be said to 
have applied in the same way to LUS contracts between gas producers and their importers.
331
 At this 
top upstream level, producers resisted renegotiating LUS contracts, while the Brent crude prices 
remained at their peak, and this situation unleashed disputes that wound up being taken to courts of 
arbitration.
332
 More recently, the abrupt fall in oil prices in the second half of 2014 has surely 
rebalanced the interests at stake and prompted more and more renegotiation. Although the shift from 
oil-indexed prices to hubs is still in process, it is today a universally accepted reality that hub 
indexation has made major inroads into LUS contracts in Europe.
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(Contd.)                                                                  
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Bearing in mind the standard clauses written into LUS contracts in the EU gas market, we now have to 
shift focus from a description of contractual governance based on default rules, in which a major 
principle is that of the parties’ autonomy, to a discussion analyzing whether, and if so how, EU energy 
law has directly or indirectly regulated contractual governance in LUS contracts. 
EU Energy law: Balancing security of supply and the interest of third parties in not 
regulating long-term upstream supply contracts 
By reading the standard LUS contract, someone could intuitively enquire to what extent clauses like 
territorial restriction have infringed not only competition rules, but also the most fundamental values 
of the Treaties. Territorial restriction clauses preclude the flow of gas from Member States 
geographically located close to the producers’ borders to further Neighborhood State within the Union 
and, therefore, this contractual barrier could be contested as an infringement of the free movement of 
goods. Moreover, Member States that refuse to resell the surplus of gas to others that face a shortfall in 
their supply, basing their arguments on the same territorial restriction clause, could be accused of 
violating the principle of solidarity. Thirdly, the gas producer’s behavior of charging different prices 
for the same good could be argued to be also a transgression of the non-discrimination principle. 
Altogether, the principles of the EU Treaties – freedom of goods, solidarity, and non-discrimination – 
could be addressed as a doctrinal argument against the validity of these LUS contracts. Of course, the 
development of this legal reasoning would lead the discussion to a conceptual level about the balance 
of private law principles - legitimacy expectation and legal certainty - with the principles laid out in 
EU primary law. Yet, it could also bring us to a second discussion on the external effects of EU law 
considering the gas producers (or promisors) of the LUS contracts have never signed the EU Treaties, 
being aliens of the European Union. Notwithstanding the relevance of these discussions at the 
conceptual level, they are far removed from the scope of this chapter. Here, we are still committed to 
the empirical legal studies on how contracts have in fact been regulated directly through provisions of 
law, or indirectly through interpretations of these provisions by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union. Therefore, let’s then move on to what the provisions of the EU secondary law on energy have 
stated about LUS contracts. 
Although the LUS contracts have been the dominant contractual governance system used by the EU to 
purchase gas from producers inside and outside the Union boundaries, the European bureaucrats had 
not moved the spot light onto the gas sectir nor the electricity sector before the late 1980s. In fact, 
scholars 
334
 were those who first raised their voices in favor of bringing  European energy markets 
towards the internal market program and, hence, against the supremacy of the Sacchi doctrine, 
335
 
which had held back the enforcement of the freedoms of the Treaties in utilities sectors.
 336
 
Leaving behind its inertia and following the scholars, the EU’s first shift towards the gas market was 
the approval of the Transit Directive of Natural Gas of 21 May 1991, which was the first attempt to 
                                                     
334 It is worth of attention the work of Terence Daintith and Leigh Hancher in 1980s as part of series of works within the 
framework of research at the European University Institute, whose introduction is remarkable for beginning with a strong 
statement. “Not many people, we would guess, could be found to say that the energy sector offered a good example of 
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336 Jacques Pelkmans, Making EU Network Markets Competitive (2001) Oxford Review of Economic Policy, vol. 17, No. 3, 
p. 433-444.  
Long-term upstream supply contracts and EU energy law Regulating contracts in the times of security of supply crisis 
75 
monitor transit contracts.
 337
 Transit contracts were bilateral or multilateral transnational agreements in 
which firms enrolled in a transmission system or even the sovereign states themselves agreed with the 
transportation of gas through their territory, regardless of being part of the EU or not. It is a standard 
agreement where one party commits to pay transit fees insofar as the other party grants exclusive 
rights to pipelines in order to ensure the cross-boundaries of natural gas without interruption.
 338
 To 
clarify the purpose of transit contracts, this is the model applied by Russian, Belarusian, and Polish 
actors to ensure that Russian gas reaches German borders via Yamal-Europe and Jamal pipelines, as 
well as between Russians and Ukrainians for the safe delivery of gas to Slovakia and then Austria 
though Brotherhood and Transgas pipelines. Through this, we can come to understand that Transit 
contracts are obviously not LUS contracts. The object of the former is about rights to access 
transmission capacity combined with service provision, while the latter is about sales of natural gas 
between producers and buyers in the long-term. However, the Transit Directive matters here because it 
represents the first movement of the EU towards the regulation of gas markets at the Union level, 
which indeed set the scene for further Directives and also opened the Commission’s eyes to LUS 
contracts. Already in the preamble of the Transit Directive, the Council approved a text calling for the 
development of a Community energy strategy on security of supply. 
339
 Secondly, the directive stated 
that transit contracts, pursuant to the rules of the treaties, should comply with the non-discrimination 
principle, should not include unfair clauses or unjustified restriction to access pipelines and, most 
importantly, should not endanger security of supply.
 340
 Thirdly and lastly, the sector-regulation 
demanded the Member States to take measures to TSOs (transmission system operators) and to notify 
the Commission and the national authorities concerning any request to transit 
341
. Considering these 
three different propositions, someone could argue that, on one hand, the transit directive never 
challenged the contractual governance of LUS contracts, nor did it shackle the market structure status 
quo.
 
On the other hand, the transit directive established two guidelines in 1991 that slight affected 
LUS contracts. First, it granted to the Commission the right to access general data about transit 
requests, which were in fact mostly motivated by the performance of LUS contracts. Thus, the 
Commission became aware of their terms and conditions.
 
Secondly and most importantly, the transit 
directive foreshadowed the EU position which concerns the balance between security of supply and 
TPA (third party access) when upstream gas supply agreements are under scrutiny.
 342
 In this regard, 
Article 3(2) clearly weighted the security of supply value over the non-discrimination principle, the 
cornerstone of TPA rights, by aligning the Treaties’ principle with the specific-sector value. Hence, 
the transit contracts should be non-discriminatory insofar as they do not erode security of supply 
within the community. From there on, the EU has always stuck to this position whenever the 
importation of gas into the EU has been at stake. 
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First, Second and Third Gas Packages: weighting security of supply to not regulate long-term 
upstream contracts 
From the Transit Directive in 1991 to the approval of the first gas package in 1998, there were a 
temporal gap of seven years filled with intense discussion about settling what we could call a check 
and balance between EU and Member States which concerns the limits of harmonization within the 
EU legal system. Some who were optimistic about the EU expected the approval of provisions of law 
materializing via a visible European hand holding a brush and repainting contractual governance 
structure in business-to-business relations, similar to the Unfair Contractual Terms Directive in 
business-to-consumer contracts.
 343
 However, those EU optimists certainly underrated the economic 
and political complexity involving LUS contracts and the issues of security of supply in gas markets, 
which has been a dilemma handled by the EU from the first gas directive hitherto. Unlike long-term 
reservation of capacity contracts, LUS contracts have not been regulated through the propositions of 
law in EU sector-specific regulation. Rather, whenever the provisions of law in the three gas packages 
mentioned LUS contracts, they explicitly recognized their great value for the sake of security of 
supply, in particular those including take-and-pay clause, hereafter called take-and-pay contracts as the 
EU legislator has referred to them.  
Already in February 1992, the Commission formally released the first proposal for stand-alone 
harmonization through a Council Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in natural 
gas. 
344
 It was founded on three policy goals.
 345
 First, Member States would grant a transparent and 
non-discriminatory licensing system for building or operating LNG facilities, as well as for 
transmission and distribution pipelines.
 346
 Secondly, vertical integrated natural gas companies would 
separate their managerial functions into as many divisions as there were activities. The operations of 
natural monopolies, such as transmission and distribution systems, would be unbundled from other 
ordinary commercial activities like gas importation or wholesale, which have conventionally been 
called management unbundling. Thirdly, transmission and distribution operators would not 
discriminate against system users except to ensure security of supply.
 347
 Again, like the Transit 
Directive, the Commission established in 1992 the balance between non-discrimination and security of 
supply values. However, unlike the Transit Directive, this proposal would encompass not a single 
transaction, the transit contracts, but the entire EU gas market. Additional to the substantive law 
written into the proposal for the first gas Directive, the Commission also attached a long general 
explanatory memorandum accounting for the sector-related policies. There, the rule-maker dedicated 
an entire section to delineate a caveat about existing take-or-pay contracts, 
348
 even though there was 
just a short note in the preamble of the proposed Directive about this type of LUS contract.
 349
,
 
Unwrapping the explanatory memorandum and preamble, the Commission upheld the position that 
take-or-pay obligations would need to be taken into account when liberalizing the natural gas market 
in order not to endanger the economic viability of its promisees. For them, since take-and pay clauses 
oblige importers to pay for a prefixed annual gas volume irrespective of their taking it, the compliance 
with non-discriminatory principles could engender the squeeze of the capacity in pipelines reserved 
for the performance of the take-or-pay contracts. Therefore, it could lead European importers to an 
insolvency situation by paying for the gas but not taking it. What interests us about the first 
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Commission proposal is the EU argument to support take-and-pay contracts. Notwithstanding that the 
draft of the directive exempted TSOs and DSOs (Distribution System Operators) from compliance 
with non-discriminatory rules insofar as it would ensure security of supply, on the earlier occasion the 
Commission took a position in favour of the performance of existing take-or-pay contracts, basing its 
arguments not on security of supply, but on granting economic stability to promisees. This was the 
exact point redrafted in the approved version of the First gas Directive.  
First Gas Package 
Although the commission put forward the First Gas Directive in 1992, the European Parliament and 
Council approved it far later, in June 1998, with some changes to the original text.
 350
 On one hand, the 
three policy goals remained unchanged in general terms: a non-discriminatory license system
 351
, non-
discriminatory access to networks 
352
,
 
and management unbundling 
353
. On the other hand, the EU 
legislator made the choice to shift the Commission’s concern about how the non-discriminatory 
principle could affect performance of take-or-pay contracts from the explanatory memorandum to the 
substantive provisions, and not only that. Despite justifying the derogation of network access to take-
or-pay contracts for safeguarding the economic viability of gas importers, as the Commission 
originally did, the EU legislator raised security of supply as a supplementary reason to support the 
public regulation. This conclusion can be drawn from a simple reading the preamble, as well as 
Articles 17 and 25 of the First gas package. Already in the preamble, the Directive entrusted the 
Member States with monitoring functions of take-or-pay contracts “in order to keep up the date with 
the situation on supply” 354 and also acknowledged that “take-or-pay contracts are a market reality for 
securing Member States security of supply” 355. Besides the clear statement in the preamble about the 
connection between take-or-pay contracts and security of supply, rule-makers also inserted provisions 
into the substantive law of the gas Directive that clearly establish the right to derogate from access to 
networks if it jeopardizes the performance of take-or-pay contracts. If a pipeline has committed all or 
part of its capacity to the performance of take-or-pay contracts, TSOs and DSOs could refuse access to 
a third party based on existing take-or-pay commitments with undertakings. When there is no 
available capacity to third parties for this reason, it is considered a contractual congestion of network 
capacity.
 356
 However, the right to derogation, of course, has been not unrestricted. The network 
operator could refuse access insofar as providing access would engender serious economic and 
financial difficulties to the gas importer, the promisees in the take-or-pay contract. 
357
 Furthermore, 
any derogation has to be informed to the Commission by Member States or National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs), which in turn holds the rights to request withdrawal of or amendments to the 
decision that granted derogation.
 358
 This multi-level assessment of the derogation is to ensure that this 
refusal of access would not undermine the objective to construct an integrated and competitive gas 
market.
 359
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Taking into account the First gas Directive of 1998, and the prior discussion put forward by the 
Commission, we could reach some preliminary conclusions about the early EU understanding of LUS 
contracts. First, whereas the Commission’s explanatory memorandum claimed the need to protect the 
performance of take-or-pay for the sake of promisees’ financial stability, the Directive of 1998 twisted 
the commission’s original argument and justified the derogation from the non-discriminatory principle 
on security of supply reasoning. Thus, risking the financial stability of promisees has been written not 
as a justification to refuse access, but as a prior condition to it. Secondly, the approval of the Directive 
settled the position of the EU legislator when it is balancing the non-discriminatory principle with 
security of supply regarding take-and-pay contracts in gas markets. Thirdly, although some could see 
the right of restricting access as a way of regulating take-and-pay contracts, in fact it is the opposite. 
The Directive established governance mechanisms for managing congestion in transmission and 
distribution capacity systems that have indeed granted the full performance of take-and-pay 
agreements. No mandatory rules have been approved to reshape clauses of LUS contacts so far. 
The first gas directive made a significant contribution by setting up controversial policies against legal 
monopolies and exclusive rights. However, there was a certain common understanding that it was not 
effective in reshaping markets status quo ante towards the internal market.
 360
 After nearly two years, 
the Council called upon the Commission to speed up liberalization to fully achieve the internal market. 
As a speedy response, the European Parliament first approved the Second gas Directive concerning 
common rules for the internal market in June of 2003 
361
, which repealed the first directive, and later 
approved the Regulation on conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks in 
September 2005.
 362
  
The Second Gas Package 
Together, Second Gas Directive 2003/55/EC and Regulation 1175/2005 have been conventionally 
called the Second Gas Package, although the Regulation is innocuous to LUS Contracts.
 363
  Therefore, 
let’s give more attention to the Second gas Directive. Although parts of the first Directive were 
essentially taken over by its successor, there were in general significant changes in the content towards 
more interventionism which concerns TPA,
 364
 unbundling,
365
 and the need for independent regulatory 
authority 
366
. Specifically in relation to LUS contracts, the same premise can be applied. Already, the 
Preamble of the second directive played a constructive role by recognizing not only take-or-pay 
contracts as important to security of supply, but extended this statement to general Long-term 
contracts, which obviously covered LUS contracts.
367
       
 “(25) Long-term contracts will continue to be an important part of gas supply of Member States and 
should be maintained as an option for gas supply undertaking in so far as they do not undermine the 
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objectives of this Directive and are compatible with the Treaty, including the competition rules. It is 
therefore necessary to take into account long-term contracts in the planning of supply and transport 
capacity of natural gas undertaking.”        
Whereas the first gas directive asserted the importance of take-or-pay contracts to the security of 
supply in gas market, the second stretched the same statement to any LUS contract that has pumped 
gas through the borders of the Member States. Furthermore, besides the assumption in the preamble, 
the EU legislator reinforced the compatibility of LUS contracts in a broad sense with the non-
discrimination rules for access to networks in Article 18. While the system of regulated tariffs were 
first established and enforced for TSOs, DSOs and storages facilities under the section of TPA rights, 
the Directive clarified how the EU stands in relation to long-term contracts by adding the provisions 
stating that it should “not prevent the conclusion of long-term contracts in so far as they comply with 
Community competition rules”. 368 Observe that, at this point, the EU legislator upheld long-term 
contracts in general as far as they do not blunt competition. This means this statement covered not 
only upstream supply contracts, but also capacity contracts directly dealing with transmission service.  
Different to the first package, the second gas directive positively acknowledged the importance of 
LUS contracts for security of supply and, beforehand, refused an unchecked position against any long-
term contracts when TPA is under scrutiny. But identical to the first package, the Directive of 2003 
repeated the provisions concerning derogation of TPA to existing take-or-pay contracts.
 369
  If 
providing access to transmission, distribution and storage systems in favour of third parties over this 
LUS contract would provoke serious economic and financial damage to the promisee, the operator 
could refuse access. Moreover, the proceedings for the assessment of the derogation remained the 
same, which retained the authority of the Commission and NRAs to assess the reasons for the refusal 
of access requests.  
Besides the provisions that openly made reference to LUS contracts, there was another rule introduced 
by the second package that affected them, however this cannot be inferred through textual 
interpretation of the second gas directive. This was a large step towards the legal unbundling of TSOs 
and DSOs. To understand how this is linked to LUS contracts, there is a need to contextualize how this 
public regulation affected contractual governance in gas markets. Since the early years of the 
liberalization, there has been a common understanding that non-discriminatory access to networks 
would depend on having independent TSOs and DSOs, whose decisions could not be interfered with 
by those who operate competitive markets. This premise has had obvious grounds. If undertakings 
operating vertically could interfere in the decision making of networks, which are natural monopolies, 
they would tend to restrict access to pipelines for new entrants and, therefore, keep their market share 
in the downstream side of gas sector. 
370
 Since the first directive, the EU has approved regulatory 
provisions with the aim of tackling this issue. Already in the first directive, the EU required the 
management unbundling of vertical integrated firms, which required them to separate decision-making 
power about transmission and distribution operations from any other ordinary economic activity. This 
was a rule that merely affected the corporate governance of vertically integrated firms. By separating 
the decision-making power within the same legal entity, the rule-maker expected to solve the issue of 
conflict of interest. Departments carrying the natural monopoly operation would not suffer the 
interference of another department operating in competitive operations. Of course, as we could expect, 
the means were not appropriate to achieve the ends, and the compliance with TPA was  
insignificant.
 371
 As an alternative, the second gas directive went one step further and approved the 
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legal unbundling.
 372
 Instead of keeping natural monopoly operations together with competitive 
operations within the same legal entity, vertically integrated firms were forced to reallocate 
transmission and distribution operations to independent legal entities. An undertaking that imported 
gas, owned and operated pipelines, and also supplied the gas to end-users had to create a new legal 
entity to take over the operation of the pipelines. Moreover, this new legal entity should be 
independent also in terms of organization and decision-making, although there was no need to 
unbundle ownership. Vertically integrated firms could then keep holding shares of the legal entity in 
charge of providing services of transmission and distribution insofar as they did not interfere in the 
decision making involving operations. Furthermore, they could still hold the real property of physical 
pipelines as long as they complied with the same conditions. This means network operators could be 
subsidiaries of firms acting in competitive markets, but they could not join these operations into a 
single legal entity from then on.  
After describing how EU energy law evolved from unbundling management to legal unbundling, I still 
need to explain how the latter affected LUS contracts. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, one of the 
reasons that the LUS contracts were originally signed with long-term time clauses was to ensure the 
recovery of upfront investments for building pipelines. In the second-half of the last century, vertically 
integrated firms imported gas through LUS contracts and resold it into their domestic markets for a 
price that enabled the earning back of gas prices paid to producers, and also investments in building 
pipelines. Of course, promisees had long signed LUS contracts by taking into account their absolute 
control over the system’s operation. However, through a top-down approach, the EU legislator has 
imposed a more effective governance system that substantially removed this control from promisees’ 
hands for the sake of creating competition. Thereafter, to access transmissions promisees have to pay 
regulated tariffs to legal entities operating pipelines, even if they were their own subsidiary. The 
regulated tariff has been based on daily operational costs, and the need to build new pipelines. Even 
considering that the second gas directive preserved the right to derogation of TPA for the passage of 
take-or-pay contracts, we must admit that legal unbundling has affected the interests of parties while 
negotiating LUS contracts. Although the EU has not directly regulated the LUS contract through 
establishing mandatory rules, it has imposed restrictions upon the governance of vertically integrated 
firms, the promisees, and has indirectly affected bargains usually involved in the negotiation of LUS 
contracts.        
By analysing the provisions of the First and Second Directive, there is an undeniable shift towards 
strengthening the importance of LUS contracts for security of supply. While the first directive brought 
forward this statement through a timid reference in the preamble, the second gave prominence to the 
importance of LUS contracts by explicitly restating the EU’s prior position. To reinforce this point 
besides the second gas package, the EU also approved a Council Directive in 26 April 2004 
concerning measures to safeguard security of natural gas supply.
 373
 In the introduction, the rule-maker 
reproduced the same provisions of the second package, which were written down in the 25
th
 paragraph 
of the preamble, about the importance of LUS to security of supply in the long-term, and the need for 
companies using these contracts in their overall supply portfolio.
374
 Beyond the restatement of what 
was already said, the 2004 Council Directive established monitoring obligations for both Member 
States and the Commission. While the Member States should report upon existing LUS contracts by 
which the promisee is established into their territory concerning time duration and the degree of 
liquidity of its gas markets,
 375
 the Commission should keep track of new LUS contracts with third 
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countries.
 376
 Observe that the Transit Directive of 1991 requested Member States to report Transit 
contracts, which were mostly agreements in which the state was a party or acquiescent, whereas the 
2004 the Council Directive demanded Member States to report data concerning LUS contracts, which 
were mostly agreements between private parties. Since information has flowed from indoor private 
negotiations to state level bureaucrats and therefore to the EU, the Commission has awoken to the 
issue of increasing reliance on the importation of gas by expressing its concerns in the Communication 
released first in March 2006 
377
 and again in January of 2007 
378
. There they called for stronger 
solidarity ties between Member States in the event of energy crises caused by the interruption of gas 
supply,
 
which kicked the ball toward the Third Gas Package. 
The Third Gas Package 
The Third Gas Package came out in 2009 and encompassed several regulations and directives at EU 
level. For the gas market, the European Parliament and Council approved the Third gas Directive
379
 
concerning common rules and repealing the prior second directive, establishing Regulation 713/2009 
creating the ACER (Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulator)
 380
, and Regulation 715/2009 on 
conditions for access to the natural gas transmission networks, and repealing Regulation 1775/2005.
 381
  
Similar to the second gas package, whilst the third directive has readdressed the issue of security of 
supply and LUS contracts, the two regulations have looked at transmissions systems and their 
operations especially when it is dealing with the cross-border flow of gas, which has still been a 
barrier for consolidation of the internal market programme in some Member States. When the matter is 
buy-sell agreements between an EU undertaking and gas producers, which are increasingly composed 
of third states, the Directive is still the source of ground rules at EU level.  
Those who expected at last a heavy visible hand regulating LUS contracts at EU level, thus giving 
consideration to the Commission Communication of 2007, might have been astonished its absence. 
Concerning the LUS contracts, the Third Gas Directive has been a repetition of what the Second 
Directive had already ensured seven years earlier, except for two changes. Similar to prior directives, 
the provision on the importance of long-term contracts to EU security of supply has been copied and 
pasted from the second directive, which means that the wording is exactly the same.
 382
 Moreover, 
concerning non-discriminatory access, the right to derogation of TPA for the performance of take-or-
pay contracts remained unchanged in its two dimensions: the substantive legal dimension of the right 
to derogation, and the procedural dimension of the competence to assess the lawfulness of derogations 
at state and EU level. 
383
 However, two changes have been introduced in the Third Gas Directive. One 
had already been in the preamble, where the EU rule-maker has made a clear reference to the EU 
dependence on gas produced and imported from third countries, therefore drawing the attention of 
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Community law to the characteristics of natural gas markets, such as the concentration of supplies, 
LUS contracts and the lack of downstream liquidity.
 
The other change has been in the unbundling 
rules. Whereas the first and second directives established respectively management unbundling and 
legal unbundling, the third directive took another step further by enforcing ownership unbundling.
 384
  
Recalling the Second Gas Directive, the legal unbundling required vertically integrated firms to 
separate transmission, distribution and storage operation into different legal entities from those 
carrying out activities in competitive markets. Within these terms, vertically integrated firms were 
allowed to keep shares in firms operating natural monopolies as long as they would not interfere in 
decision-making power, such as defining which firm should or should not have access to networks. To 
safeguard even further the independence of firms operating natural monopolies, the Third Gas 
Directive has excluded the option of TSOs and DSOs being subsidiaries of firms operating in 
competitive markets. Thereon, vertically integrated firms have had to divest their shares from legal 
entities operating natural monopolies. Nevertheless, despite the divestment in operators, vertically 
integrated firms could continue to own the tangible property of pipelines or storages facilities insofar 
as the operations are assigned to a third party, for example through lease agreements. Although the 
ownership unbundling is indeed a rule that regulates the corporative governance model of vertically 
integrated firms by restricting their intangible status as shareholders in network operators, it does not 
directly regulate LUS contracts. The argument addressed above about legal unbundling is still valid to 
ownership unbundling. It does not regulate LUS contracts straightforwardly, albeit it affects the 
conditions that have originally influenced the formation of LUS contracts.
 385
       
Having in mind the evolution of EU Energy Law from the early 1990s to the last broad reform with 
the Third Energy Package, which concerns how it affects directly and indirectly LUS contracts, we 
could come to a negative preliminary conclusion. Neither the three gas packages, nor the Regulation 
of 2004 devoted to security of supply in gas markets, have ever regulated LUS contracts. No single 
mandatory rule has been established to regulate terms or clauses of LUS contracts through a top-down 
approach. Au contraire, what the EU sector-regulation has first done is to bring into being a 
governance system of capacity management in pipelines that has allowed TSOs and DSOs to derogate 
from TPA obligations in order to grant the full performance of take-or-pay contracts. In spite of 
regulating the contractual terms, the EU legislator has in fact removed by law barriers that could 
preclude the full performance of LUS contracts by creating an exclusive right allowing non-
compliance with TPA rights. Secondly, the evolution of the unbundling obligation from management 
to ownership disrupted the corporate governance structure of most of the promisees in LUS contracts. 
By coercing vertically integrated firms to divest their asset from network and storage operators, the 
law has not regulated LUS contracts. Instead, it has reshaped the interests of parties entering into LUS 
agreements ahead of the negotiations. While promisees had originally signed LUS contract to cover 
investments in network infrastructure owned and operated by promisees, this side of the bargain has 
vanished from negotiations through command-and-control regulation at EU level.
 386
 Lastly, and most 
obviously, while the Second and Third Gas Directive inserted the provision on the importance of LUS 
contracts to security of supply, the EU legislator is neither regulating terms or clauses, nor creating 
rights and obligations. It is merely revealing the position of the Union, which might be taken into 
consideration by Member States for the sake of the integrity of the law. 
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The Gas Supply Crisis of 2009: security of supply as an argument to regulate Long-Term Upstream 
Supply Contracts 
From the First Package in 1998 to the Third in 2009, EU energy Law was extremely prudent in gas 
markets while LUS contracts were subject to its provisions. The laws either emphasized the 
importance of LUS contracts to security of supply, or created a governance mechanism to reserve 
pipeline capacity for their full performance. However, establishing mandatory rules to LUS contracts 
had never fit into the scope of EU Energy Law. Perhaps the reasons why can be find in the peculiarity 
regarding the parties to LUS contracts of promisors located in third states committing with promisees 
incorporated within the boundaries of the Union. Alternatively, the reasons could lie in the historical 
stability of gas supply, though the increasingly dependence upon gas produced by third states had held 
EU bureaucrats back from interfering in the conditions of LUS contracts. Finding reasons to justify 
why the EU legislator had not looked into the clauses of LUS contracts until the third energy package 
requires deeper research that goes through understanding the political dimensions of upstream 
agreements in gas markets, the European Foreign Policy before the Lisbon Treaty, and most 
importantly, the absence of EU legislative competence in the field of private law. Discussing these 
factors is far from the aim of this chapter; however, there have been ongoing changes in the EU 
Energy Law approach to LUS contracts since 2010, and this matters to the empirical legal study 
conducted at this stage. However, to understand these changes, there is a need to narrate international 
disputes beyond the EU boundaries, which brings us back to 2005 and 2006. 
First in March 2006 
387
 and later in January 2007 
388
, the Commission and energy experts alerted the 
European Parliament and Council about the risks of interruption of gas supply. Taking into 
consideration the increasing dependence for gas supply on a few producers in third country, the 
Commission’s wariness was clearly based on the consequences of protracted disputes between 
Ukraine and Russia in 2006. Although disputes between Ukrainians and Russians concerning gas 
debts and non-payment by Ukrainians appeared immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the consequences of the frequent disputes had never affected third states before 2006, when, for the 
first time, Ukrainians diverted Russian gas transiting to the EU. This cut-off of gas in 2006 was 
motivated by the dispute between the state owned companies, the Russian Gazprom and Ukrainian 
Naftohaz, during 2005 on the negotiations over gas transit fees paid to Ukrainians and gas prices 
produced in Russia for 2006. The failure in the negotiations over the gas price delivered to the 
Ukrainian domestic market led Gazprom to reduce the pressure in pipelines from Russia to Ukraine in 
1
st
 January 2006. As more than 80% of the gas supply from Russia to Europe transited through 
Ukrainian territory,
 389
 Ukraine made the decision to compensate the loss of domestic supply by 
diverting gas flowing to European Member States, which obviously faced a reduction of gas supply in 
the middle of the winter season.
 390
 Under immediate pressure from the EU, Member States, and the 
international community 
391
, Gazprom reacted by pumping an additional 95 million cubic meters 
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volume of gas per day into the Ukrainian network on 2
nd
 January. The gas flow to Europe was then re-
established on 4
th
 January after an urgent agreement signed between the Ukrainians and Russians. 
392
 
Diverting gas intended originally for Europe for a couple of hours did not seriously resound through 
the downstream side of gas markets. End-users such as consumers still had gas being pumped into 
their cookers or heating systems. However, it gave a red alert to the European Commission. Jonathan 
Stern perfectly framed the dilemma that the EU had just started to deal with in his statement in the 
aftermath of the crisis: “it is not clear whether the major European gas security problem is that not 
enough gas will be available at some date in the future, or that gas providers will prove to be 
unreliable”. 393 Stern was right to point his finger at the issue of reliance on third countries as gas 
suppliers or transit territory. This was also the assumption adopted by the Commission in the 
aforementioned Communications of 8
th
 March 2006 and 10
th
 January 2007, though neither the Green 
Paper nor the White Paper acknowledged the bridge of the transit contract with the Ukrainians. 
Anyhow, the European Commission called, first, for enhancement of the security of supply in the 
internal market through strengthening solidarity between Members States and, second, for a rethink in 
the EU approach to the emergence of gas stocks and prevention of disruptions. The former requires 
regulation that compels gas firms in one Member State to rescue another suffering from gas 
interruption by quick releasing its gas through interconnectors. Gas supplied by Norwegians and 
delivered to Germany via the North Sea could be quickly pumped to Hungarians if other disputes lead 
to successive interruptions of gas transiting though Ukrainian. The latter communication demands 
more investments in gas storage infrastructure. Bearing in mind the Commission’s recommendations, 
we can reach the conclusion that the regulation of LUS contracts at EU level was not in the toolbox of 
possible solutions. This was the early position endorsed by the European Parliament and Council 
during the two years of discussion that culminated in the approval of the Third Gas Package in July 
2009. Reiterating what was said earlier, the EU legislator has not given the required attention to LUS 
contracts which concern security of supply. As the Parliaments usually does not respond immediately 
to crises, the Third Directive approved in July of 2009 was already obsolete and did not giving 
answers to the contractual dimensions of the most serious Gas Supply crisis in Europe which started 
on 1
st
 January 2009. 
The very short-term interruption of gas flow in 2006 was a forewarning of what would happen in 
2009. Similar to the occurrences in 2005, Russians and Ukrainians once again failed to reach an 
agreement on gas prices for 2009 and, in addition, on the repayment of an accumulated debt with 
Gazprom. Like a déja vu, Russians reduced again the pressure of pipelines connecting to Ukraine. But, 
differently to 2006, the reduction was dramatically higher. 90 million cubic meters of natural gas per 
day were halted completely on 1
st
 January 2009, approximately 30% of the volume export to Europe 
through Ukraine. Immediately, the lack of gas was detected by Member States, but the tensions 
between Russian and Ukraine led to a far more serious crisis.
 394
 On 7
th
 January, the entire gas supply 
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travelling through Ukraine was cut off and the state of shock overwhelmed the whole of Europe, from 
political leaders at EU and state level to simple householder consumers. Ukrainians and Russians 
accused each other of shutting down the flow of gas. From the contractual dimension, either Russians 
could have breached their LUS contracts with European promisees by shutting the gas supply down 
into European territories, or Ukrainians could also have breached the transit contract by diverting the 
gas initially directed towards the EU. Although the mutual accusation ended in a settlement that hid 
the identity of the guilty party, this second dispute between Russians and Ukrainian resulted in the 
drop of gas supply in most of the Member States, as an avalanche beginning from the east and 
tirelessly devastating the west. Hungary, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, France, Romania, Poland, 
Bulgaria, and Greece reported very low gas in its entry points; even the UK announced entry of its gas 
reserves. Extreme situations were reported in eastern regions such as east Hungary, where citizens had 
been deprived of heating in the winter season as the region received only 20% of the normal volume 
supplied.
 395
 Despite the several appeals for clemency by the international community, Russians and 
Ukrainians only reached a settlement on 19
th
 January, and on 20
th
 January the gas started to flow again 
into the EU. 
What started as a terrifying experience for European Member States served as a reason for the 
Commission to mobilize efforts and release, on 16
th
 July 2009, a proposal for a Regulation concerning 
the security of supply thus repealing the Directive of 2004. Unlike the prior Communications, the 
Commission obviously and openly recognized the risks of security supply, and forewarned a third gas 
supply crisis from similar or different causes. The exposure to a third gas supply crisis brought about 
the EU Regulation 
396
 on security of supply, thus introducing several mechanism that has represented a 
large step towards the regulation of LUS contracts at EU level.  Whereas the First, Second and Third 
Gas Packages have never imposed rules intrinsically regulating LUS contracts, Regulation 994/2010 
has devoted the entirety of its Article 8, curiously entitled “Supply Standard”, to the issue. Already in 
the preamble, the EU rule makers gave the reasons for their unusual intrusion into the field of contract 
law. For them, “sufficiently harmonized security of supply standards covering at least the situations 
that occurred in January 2009”, should be established. Moreover, it states that those “standards should 
be stable, so as to provide the necessary legal certainty, should be clearly defined, and should not 
impose unreasonable and disproportionate burdens on natural gas undertakings, including new entrants 
and small undertakings”. 397 Stability, Clarity, Reasonableness and Proportionality are material rules 
that certainly have a vague linguistic meaning. They need construction in order to create subsidiary 
rules that translate the semantic content into legal content.
 398
 This is what the legislator tried to 
implement in Article 8. EU law has designated to the Competent Authority 
399
 the obligation to identify 
the gas undertakings that are promisees in upstream supply contracts, without distinguishing short or 
long-term thereof. Hence, this Competent Authority should “require these natural gas undertakings to 
take measures to ensure gas supply to protected costumers of the Members States in the following 
cases”: 400 
(Contd.)                                                                  
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1. Extreme temperatures during a 7-day peak period occurring with a statistical probability of 
once in 20 years;  
2. any period of at least 30 days of exceptionally high gas demand, occurring with a statistical 
probability of once in 20 years; and  
3. for a period of at least 30 days in case of the disruption of the single largest gas infrastructure 
under average winter conditions. 
Observe that the European Parliament and Council for the first time have established mandatory rules 
for general upstream supply contracts. By speed-reading the norms in the provisions, one could have 
the impression that the regulation a priori loads European gas undertakings. The promisees seem to be 
the party who has to ensure supply covers demand for a minimum period of time as much as it 
increases in case of extreme temperatures, exceptionally high demand, or disruption of the single 
largest gas infrastructure. However, the promisee could never comply with the EU rules if they don’t 
transpose these obligations to promisors through upstream supply contracts, which obviously includes 
LUS Contracts. Since promisees are not under the control of production or, in other words, how much 
volume of gas is extracted from the natural gas reserves, the way to comply with the new approach in 
EU law is to replace this obligation with the promisor though including this mandatory rule in the 
contractual governance. Yet, being LUS contracts, the major instrument to import gas into Europe, 
shifting these obligations to the promisor is even more crucial as long as the volume of daily gas trade 
is defined ahead in the take-or-pay clauses. In addition to the exhaustive list of supply standards, the 
second paragraph has inserted a provision insofar as obligations go beyond the 30-day period referred 
to in points (b) and (c) or relating to any other obligations imposed for reasons of security of supply. If 
an extra commitment is incorporated to supply standards, it has to be based on the risk assessment 
written down in the Regulation, in conformity with the Preventive Action Plan, and it must not unduly 
distort competition or hamper the functioning of internal gas markets.
 401
        
In 2010, the provision on supply standards, which is in fact a clear regulation of contractual 
relationships in the upstream supply agreements, was approved as a response to the scandalous crisis 
of gas supply in 2009. These rules fit exactly into the understanding of preventing crisis through 
contracts. The European Parliament and Council would hardly have voted in favor of the supply 
standards if there were not the Ukrainian-Russian disputes that culminated with the shutoff of gas to 
EU Members Sates for almost fifteen days during wintertime. If this assumption is correct, we can 
assume that the shift provided by the Regulation of 2010 fits in which the new institutionalism calls 
transitional rupture. The political and economic crisis of security of supply in 2009 created an abrupt 
change in the quality of the community resilience and, therefore, broke open a positive pathway for 
changes to path dependence.
 402
  In this case, the EU legal system, which had been resilient to 
expanding its shadow toward private law, hitherto locked-in to national legal system, seems to have 
begun to weaken the walls restricting EU legislature competence to public law.  
Someone could argue, however, that Regulation 994/2010 on gas supply is an isolated circumstance 
prompted by a crisis and, therefore, deny that the EU is expanding towards the field of contract law. 
However, the most recent Commission Communication on the Energy Union released in February 
2015
403
, can confirm that there is a trend towards harmonizing contractual rules of LUS agreements 
through sector-regulation. The European Commission transparently addressed its ambitions in the 
bottom of the communication, where they defined the Energy Union in 15 actions points. The 3
rd
 point 
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states “the Commission will propose a revision of the Decision on Intergovernmental Agreements 
[Transit Contracts] in 2016 to ensure compatibility with EU legislation before agreements are 
negotiated, involve the Commission in such negotiations, develop standards clauses covering EU rules 
and make commercial contracts more transparent.
 404
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The transformation in the making of private law via telecommunications regulation 
 
Marta Cantero Gamito 
 
Introduction 
This paper focuses on the transformations operating in the making of private law through the 
regulation of a particular market; telecommunications. Following the liberalization of formerly public 
monopolies in the field of utilities, telecommunications have been regulated at EU level in a 
comprehensive way. This inclusive approach reaches up to the private law relations that take place 
among participants in telecommunications markets. Particularly, the overarching principles for the 
telecoms sector, such as (non-discriminatory) and universal access, heavily impact not only on the 
nature of private law but also imply a transformation in the contractual relations arising from 
transactions within the sector.  
The shift of telecommunications from the public to the private sphere as a result of the liberalization of 
the sector has entailed not only substantive but also institutional transformations. Internal Market 
harmonization has been the driver for the rise of “European supervisory powers” in order to ensure the 
proper implementation of EU law in many fields covered by EU competences. In the 
telecommunications sector, the amplitude of these, largely European, control mechanisms overseeing 
compliance with sector-specific policy goals interferes with other spheres traditionally belonging to 
the Member States, such as private relationships.  
The development of the telecoms sector has triggered a visible transformation that concerns private 
law and contract law in such a way that it is also used as a tool to achieve higher policy goals, mainly 
the creation of a Digital Single Market (Connected Continent), while promoting competition and 
protecting users at the same time, or even as part of such a harmonization programme. In so doing, the 
EU is following a functionalist approach (Internal Market as a finalité and as an objective) that also 
touches upon contract/consumer law (integration through private law
405
). This makeover has been 
noticeable in the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, which has evolved over 
time. So far, there have been three different packages of rules. Their evolution is characterized by an 
initial liberalization goal, but later on, the objectives were more focused on harmonization of the 
internal market and consumer protection.
 
 
Furthermore, the transformation of private law via telecommunications regulation does not take place 
in an isolated manner; rather it occurs at three different (and interlinked) levels, giving rise to three 
different layers of transformation. These transformation processes in private law take place at the level 
of decision-making, substantive law, and enforcement and, hence, they alter the making, the 
substance, and the enforcement of private law when it comes to the private law contained in the legal 
regime of the so-called regulated sectors. Against this background, this paper focuses on the first 
transformation (transformation in decision-making) as the epitome of a transformation from legislative 
rule-making to specialized delegated powers under a networked decentralized structure which, in 
practice, works hierarchically under sector-specific supervisory mechanisms.  
                                                     
405 Caruso, D. (2006) ‘Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization’, New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics, 39, pp. 1–74. 
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To understand this claim, one may have to start from the assumption that “European Union private law 
is different”.406 The EU is not (and it will not be) a State, but its ambitions reach all economically 
relevant sectors.
407
 In so doing, according to its nature as a non-state actor, the European Union 
organizes its action in networks.
408
 We find that the Internal Market rationale and the promotion and 
preservation of competition underpin economic (and social) regulation. This process is 
“disintegrating” the classical core of private law and its systemic character undermining “the 
coherence of private law as a whole”.409 (Transformed) private law now serves “instrumentalist” 
purposes.
410
 This surrender to the achievement of the overarching objective of the market-building 
project results in the emergence of different legal frameworks (one for each sector) that encompasses 
public and private law elements, weakening the clear-cut distinction of public/private law.
411
 
The incorporation of private law provisions in telecommunications has certainly implied a shift in the 
traditional approach of law-making in private law. On the one hand, the role of National Regulatory 
Authorities (NRAs) has spread to the field of private law.
412
 The EU regulatory framework for 
telecoms has vested NRAs with competences that have an effect on private law, e.g. price setting in 
B2B relationships.
413
 On the other hand, the Nation-State has a more modest role in terms of law-
making. The EU’s lack of specific competences in the field of private law is overcome via the 
incorporation of national supervisory actors (in this case, the NRAs). There is no (formal) hierarchy 
between the EU and the national levels or any transfer of powers; rather, it is a type of “multi-layered 
institutional structure”.414 However, in order to guarantee that NRAs exert their powers in the EU 
interest, the EU Regulatory Framework sets up a system of supervision, giving the European 
Commission policing powers to achieve the intended policy goals.
415
 Accordingly, this networked 
institutional setting aims to create a governance network that, by regulating certain aspects concerning 
private law relationships, becomes a new private law-maker.  
Against this background, even though the legislator has opted for a system of co-regulation, the 
effectiveness of EU soft-law is increasing. The system has evolved through different interactional 
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(networked) levels aimed at a chief purpose: harmonization of the Internal Market. Accordingly, it is 
crucial to analyze these new regulatory structures, which seem to contrast with those belonging to 
traditional spheres of private law. In addition to this, the normative design displaces the border of 
private law and triggers confusion in the definition of what is private and what is regulatory within 
telecommunications regulation.  
By exploring a real case on the implementation of the European legal framework in the field of 
telecommunications, this paper provides an answer to the question of to what extent the new model of 
decision-making implies a shift with regard to traditional methods of law-making in private law.  
The (internal) market-building project and the transformed role of private law-making 
in telecoms 
The law-making procedure is a decisive factor in the content and quality of the legal provisions that 
are produced.
416
 A potential transformation of private law therefore calls for examination of the 
institutional choice and design, particularly where the process of rulemaking is understood “as a 
dynamic process, in which rules are not simply the result of a single legislative procedure but the 
outcome of continuing interaction between legal, political, and economic institutions”.417 This is 
particularly the case in the making of European Private Law. 
Within the internal market, the four fundamental freedoms are a new foundation for private 
relationships, meaning that European legal integration takes place (also) via private law.
418
 In this 
evolution, the “private law society” has turned into a “market society”419 and so has the State, by 
turning into a Market-State.
420
 Yet, while the creation of the Internal Market project has implied the 
extension of private autonomy beyond national markets, the role of the State as a law-maker has been 
undermined. Private law has been de-nationalised. Thus, alongside Globalization –in Europe, 
Europeanization–, the role of private law has decreased and it has been instrumentalized,421 giving rise 
to a less clear-cut distinction between public and private law. Not only has the role of the State been 
weakened, but also the role of the law itself.
422
 
In the European arena, this process of internationalization of markets has been cherished as an 
opportunity to enlarge national markets by way of diversifying into a bigger and supranational market: 
the (EU) internal market. The management of a single market calls for intervention aimed at market 
integration, be it via positive or negative integration.
423
 The combination of positive and negative 
techniques of integration enlarges the array of regulatory options. This means that new regulatory 
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techniques do not find accommodation within the traditional legal taxonomy. Thus, the emergence of 
new actors has deeply transformed the distribution of (legislative) powers within the State.
424
 
On the other hand, the “New Social State” has also triggered the transformation (redistribution) of 
powers within the State.
425
 The inevitable delegation derives from the fact that the State cannot be 
responsible for everything.
426
 Complexity and technicality have also driven the internal redistribution 
of powers inside the State.
427
 This, together with the phenomenon of Globalization –in Europe, 
Europeanization–, has given rise to a process of functional differentiation.428 Thus, oversight functions 
have increasingly been displaced from the Congress to specialized government agencies and the 
private sector.
429
 The emergence of specialized agencies implies a sort of compartmentalization of the 
law according to policy concerns and expertise.
430
 The “law machine” (State) becomes an instrument 
to achieve policy aims. Regulatory intervention is giving rise to heavily regulated sectors. The 
telecommunications sector in the European Union is overregulated and it pursues different policy 
objectives ranging from liberalization, competition, and harmonization of the Internal Market, or even 
consumer protection; i.e. it pursues economic and social goals. In addition, the telecommunications 
sector in the European Union is configured under a regulatory network-like approach of different 
sector-related National Regulatory Authorities for telecommunications. This, in turn, gives rise to a 
new set of relationships of interconnection and interaction among the actors involved in the legislative 
development.  
The commissioning of NRAs responds to a strategy aimed at securing the liberalization process via 
institutional design. With a similar object, a process of network-building for cooperation in regulatory 
matters can be identified as part of the development of the mandate of NRAs. These new modes of 
governance in the EU are an example of legal transformation.
 431
 As pointed out by Majone, the 
delegated functions of rule-making lead to paradoxes of privatization, sub-delegation, and issues and 
problems related to quasi-legislation.
432
 In a decentralized model, diagonal conflicts are inevitable as 
they are inherent to the EU Multi-level system of governance.
433
 These diagonal conflicts, and the way 
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they are resolved under the established regulatory structure, suggest a significant erosion of national 
sovereignty.
434
  
A case of (empirical) evidence: the implementation of termination rates in the 
Netherlands 
First of all, it is important to recall here that, in Europe, National Regulatory Authorities in 
telecommunications are required to perform their regulatory duties in line with the policy objectives 
contained in Article 8 of the Framework Directive, namely: promotion of competition, contribution to 
the development of the Internal Market, and promotion of the interests of the citizens of the European 
Union.435 The European framework requires NRAs (in the case at issue, OPTA, the former Dutch 
NRA, now ACM436), among other regulatory duties, to investigate market termination and to impose 
regulatory obligations upon operators enjoying Significant Market Power (SMP).437 Among the 
different regulatory obligations, price control is a regulatory intervention required in order to prevent 
excessive pricing and margin squeeze. To that end, the European framework enables NRAs to impose 
cost accounting obligations.438 Under such obligations, NRAs may compel SMP operators to 
structure their cost accounting system (CAS) and pricing system under a certain methodology to meet 
the regulatory requirements in order to support price controls, grouping activities in specified accounts 
and applying particular rules for the allocation of costs to different services in order to prevent unfair 
cross-subsidies, excessive or predatory prices, with the aim of preventing margin squeeze as well as 
promoting sustainable competition and efficiency for the benefit of the user.439 Accordingly, NRAs 
must impose obligations to implement the CAS at the national level. This regulatory system was 
transposed in the Netherlands into national law440 and in particular, regarding the imposition of 
regulatory remedies, the national framework provided that regulatory obligations shall be appropriate 
if they are based on the nature of the problem identified in the market concerned and are proportionate 
and justified in the light of the objectives of Article 1(3) of the Dutch Telecommunications Act.
441
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In order to harmonize pricing control measures in Europe, in 2009 the European Commission issued a 
Recommendation on termination rates.
442
 Without much elaboration on the technical details, 
termination rates are the rates which telecoms networks charge each other to deliver calls between 
their respective networks; i.e. how much mobile phone operators can charge to connect calls on each 
other’s networks. These costs are ultimately included in call prices paid by consumers and businesses. 
The 2009 Commission Recommendation establishes that termination rates (fixed and mobile) should 
be calculated on the basis of the costs effectively incurred by an efficient operator using the pure 
Bottom-up Long Run Incremental Cost (BULRIC) methodology for its calculation. This method 
imposes a stricter costs measurement method than the previous one operating in The Netherlands, 
BULRIC+.  The BULRIC+ model not only assumes the costs that are incremental to providing 
termination, but also applies a mark-up to non-incremental fixed costs. Thus, unlike BULRIC+, under 
the pure BULRIC methodology some of the costs are not considered for the calculation of the price 
cap.
443
 
On the 7
th
 July 2010, OPTA (now ACM), as part of its regulatory duties,
444
 published its market 
analysis including a decision in relation to:  (a) the review of the wholesale market for voice call 
termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location; and (b) the review of 
the wholesale market for voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands.
445
 
This decision included conditions establishing price control for mobile and fixed termination rates in 
line with Article 13 of the so-called Access Directive.
446
  The methodology used by OPTA (now 
ACM) in that decision, consistent with the Commission’s Recommendation on terminations rates, was 
based on the pure BULRIC cost standard. The national regulator, in issuing that regulatory decision, 
considered that the establishment of the pure BULRIC costing methodology was the best way to 
regulate for the “highest consumer welfare”, provided that lower termination rates in the wholesale 
markets would be translated in lower retail prices.
447
 
The above-mentioned regulatory decision gave rise to a judicial procedure before the Dutch Trade and 
Industry Appeals Tribunal (College van Beroepvoor het bedrijfsleven, hereinafter CBb) following the 
appeal of a number of telecommunications operators in the Netherlands.
448
 The appeals raised several 
issues, including the regulator’s decision to set the price controls on the basis of the pure BULRIC 
cost standard. Telecommunications operators contended that the cost-price method based on pure 
BULRIC was not an appropriate price obligation within the meaning of Article 6a.2(3) of the Dutch 
Telecommunications Act, as they considered that this obligation would go beyond what was strictly 
necessary to rectify the potential competition problems by implying that operators were no longer 
allowed to include certain costs in their tariffs.
449
 In particular, they argued that applying a cost-price 
method based on BULRIC+ could also offset the competition problem of excessively high prices. The 
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economic consequences of the case provide an overview of the influence of regulatory measures on 
the (private) relationships amongst operators. In monetary terms, the difference between pure 
BULRIC and BULRIC+ is only about 1 Euro cent. However, that cent, translated into a market where 
millions of transactions take place every day involves important sums. As stated in the CBb’s 
judgment, ACM estimates a loss of revenue suffered by mobile providers to the order of €21 million to 
€219 million; the estimates produced by mobile providers themselves were even higher.450 The 
question to be answered by the national court was whether the adoption of the new costing 
methodology (pure BULRIC) could be considered appropriate in light of the observed competition 
problem within the meaning of the Dutch Telecommunications Act.
451
 
The CBb’s Judgment was released on 31st August 2011, rendering judgment in the first and sole 
instance. In very broad terms, and leaving aside further competition concerns and issues of market 
analysis that were also objects of the plea, the Court, upholding the appeal, argued that despite the 
Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates, conditions remained unchanged and, therefore, 
there was no reason to adjust the methodology for cost calculation from plus to pure BULRIC. The 
Court grounded its reasoning on the requirement of proportionality and justification as to the 
objectives of the Dutch Telecommunications Act (Article 1(3)) when imposing price control 
obligations such as the one in question.
452
 Whereas the authority’s aim is to neutralize consequences of 
market inefficiencies, likely margin squeezes, and excessive retail prices by way of imposing a price 
control obligation, the action “goes beyond what is strictly necessary to correct the identified 
competitive problem”; the national judge therefore casted doubt on the proportionality of the 
measure.
453
 Essentially, the court concluded that the inefficiencies in retail pricing cannot be resolved 
by imposing a “more invasive measure” at wholesale level, given that the retail mobile market was 
already considered competitive.
454
 As a result, the Court established new cap prices for termination 
rates and compelled the regulator to take a new decision setting the relevant rates on the basis of 
BULRIC+ methodology.
455
 
Under the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications, there is a procedure for the 
consistent application of remedies. This procedure – the so-called “Article 7a procedure” as it is 
enshrined in Article 7a of the Framework Directive– establishes a supervisory mechanism that 
involves a notification procedure of the draft regulatory measure to the European Commission by the 
NRA concerned (Phase I). This Phase may take up to 1 month during which other NRAs and the 
BEREC may provide comments on the proposed measure, as well as the European Commission which 
may agree (providing comments or not), or instead raise “serious doubts”. 
In the case at stake, in January 2012, OPTA (now ACM) notified the European Commission of the 
new decision compliant with the court’s judgment and the setting of the rate following the BULRIC+ 
methodology. Since this measure departs from the 2009 Commission Recommendation on termination 
rates, the regulator justified this deviation on the basis of the order by the CBb, as the highest appeal 
body in the Netherlands, to take a new regulatory decision regarding both the price caps for fixed 
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termination rates and for direct interconnection rates following a BULRIC+ cost accounting 
methodology.
456
 During Phase I of the notification procedure, the European Commission raised 
concerns about the newly adopted regulatory measure and sent a serious doubts letter to ACM on the 
13
th
 February 2012, thus opening the Phase II investigation.
457
 The Phase II investigation opens a 
“Regulatory Dialogue” that may take up to 3 months preventing the adoption of the draft measure (the 
standstill period).
458
 In the serious doubts letter, the European Commission expressed reservations 
concerning the compatibility of the measure with the European Regulatory Framework and provided 
reasons why it believed that the draft measure would not only create a barrier to the internal market, 
but would also involve an increase in the retail prices leading to a decline in consumer welfare.
459
 In 
particular, the Commission considered that the measure did not comply with the requirements of 
Article 16(4) of the Framework Directive and Article 8(4) of the Access Directive in conjunction with 
Article 8 of the Framework Directive. In that regard, the European Commission acknowledges that 
NRAs are allowed to deviate from the Commission’s Recommendation but, in such event, the 
deviation must be duly justified in light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles of the 
Regulatory Framework. In the eyes of the European Commission, ACM did not provide any economic 
justification for the departure from the pure BULRIC methodology guaranteeing that the plus 
BULRIC methodology would equally promote efficiency and sustainable competition, as well as 
maximize consumer benefit in the Dutch market.
460
 In addition, the European Commission considered 
that it would create barriers to the Internal Market because mobile termination rates set via the pure 
BULRIC level would contribute to a level playing field at EU level by eliminating competition 
distortions between fixed and mobile networks.
461
  
Within the first six weeks of the Regulatory Dialogue, the BEREC –the umbrella group of European 
telecommunications regulators– may intervene in the procedure by issuing an Opinion expressing its 
views on the Commission’s serious doubts. In such case, there is a process of cooperation between the 
actors involved; i.e. the BEREC, the Commission, and the NRA. This stage may end in 3 different 
ways: a) the NRA withdraws its proposal; b) the NRA amends its proposal taking utmost account of 
the Commission’s serious doubts and BEREC’s Opinion; or c) the NRA maintain its proposal. In the 
case concerned, BEREC was required to issue an Opinion on the serious doubts letter indicating its 
position. To this end, and following the mandate enshrined in Article 7a(3) of the Framework 
Directive, a specific Expert Working Group (EWG) within the BEREC was established.
462
 After 
several meetings, a final Opinion was adopted by the majority of the Board of Regulators.
 463
 In that 
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18.10.2012: “The process of notification requires that you have to notify again to the Commission. So, we came with the 
Commission and said: “ok, we are going to do this, we have a Court decision, we cannot do anything else than this, so 
this is what we are going to do”. And, then, the Commission got very annoyed, because they had serious doubts about 
what we were doing there with regard to the economic analysis underlying the regulator’s decision”.  
458 Article 7a(1) of the Framework Directive as introduced by the Directive 2009/140/EC (Better Regulation Directive). 
459 Commission Recommendation of 13 June 2012, in accordance with Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications 
networks and services ("Framework Directive") in Case NL/2012/1284: call termination on individual public telephone 
networks provided at a fixed location in the Netherlands and in Case NL/2012/1285: voice call termination on individual 
mobile networks in the Netherlands; C(2012) 3770.  
460 SG-Greffe (2012) D/2859. Brussels 13.02.2012, C(2012) 1038. European Commission serious doubts letter.  
461 Ibid.  
462 The EWG was charged with the task of drafting an opinion containing a summary of  the notification and the serious 
doubts, the experts’ analysis, and clear conclusions concerning the compatibility of the proposed regulatory measure with 
the EU Regulatory Framework, as well as the provision of possible alternative proposals (if any). 
463 BEREC Opinion in Phase II investigation pursuant to Article 7a of Directive 2002/21/EC as amended by Directive 
2009/140/EC Case NL/2012/1284 – Call termination on individual public telephone networks provided at a fixed location 
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decision, the BEREC found that the serious doubts raised by the European Commission were justified 
and it agreed that: 1) The regulator had not provided an economic justification for the use of the 
BULRIC+ methodology as the appropriate measure “to promote efficiency and sustainable 
competition and maximize consumer benefits set out in Recital 20 to the Access Directive”; and 2) the 
proposed measure may have created a barrier to the Internal Market. Nonetheless, regarding the 
position on whether the measures should be amended or withdrawn, BEREC did not consider it 
appropriate to impose on the regulator any particular way to proceed due to the legally binding nature 
of the Judgment by the CBb.
464
 
The procedure at hand concludes with a final notification by which, within 1 month after the 
Commission’s position, the national regulator has to inform the Commission and the BEREC about 
the final measures taken, and when it does not follow the Commission, the NRA must provide a 
reasoned justification. In our particular example, ACM deviated from the Commission on the basis 
that, under national law, the CBb’s judgment overturned the original regulatory measure.  
Two years after the original decision that gave rise to the case at hand, the national regulator decided 
to attempt once more to set the pure BULRIC costing methodology.
465
 This second regulatory decision 
following the Recommendation was again appealed in front of the CBb. During the process of judicial 
review, after the initial unwillingness of the national court to refer the case to the Court of Justice of 
the European Union on the most problematic issues at stake ‒i.e. the legal effect of the 
Recommendation–, the national judge has finally decided to suspend the proceedings and request a 
preliminary reference from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) under Article 267 
TFEU.
466
 The preliminary questions submitted for reference (and their implications) are examined 
below. 
The private law dimension 
Implementation of the EU regulatory framework for telecoms and private law  
To begin with the implementation of the EU regulatory framework, a potential solution to this case 
might well have been the opening of infringement procedures. Yet, an infringement procedure is 
against the Member State infringing EU law provisions and it is necessary to recall here that National 
Regulatory Authorities are claimed to be independent.
467
 Accordingly, given that the NRAs are 
independent and also that there was no problem of incompatibility of the national law with the 
European provisions, in an infringement context this case would have raised the question: 
Infringement by whom? The Netherlands or the Dutch regulator?
468
 
In addition to the foregoing, the sector-specific consultation procedure carried out in this case touches 
upon the competences and powers of the regulator, and involves the participation of the regulators’ 
umbrella group (BEREC), the European Commission, groups of interests, and the national judiciary. 
Therefore, some issues concerning implementation and decision-making are the subject matter of the 
(Contd.)                                                                  
in the Netherlands Case NL/2012/1285 – Voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the Netherlands, 
BoR(12)23.  
464 Ibid.: “BEREC  therefore considers that the Commission’s serious doubts, as narrowly expressed in its letter to OPTA of 
13 February 2012 (i.e. without explicitly addressing the legally binding nature of the CBb’s judgment for OPTA), are 
justified”.  
465 Effective as of 1st September 2013. 
466 Case C-28/15, Koninklijke KPN and Others  Autoriteit Consument en Markt (ACM) [in progress].  
467 Article 3(2) Framewrok Directive. See Lavrijssen, S. and Ottow, A. (2012) ‘Independent Supervisory Authorities: A 
Fragile Concept’, Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 39(4), pp. 419–446. 
468 Article 258 TFEU.  
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forthcoming analysis: How are regulatory decisions made? What criteria are taken into account? Who 
intervenes in decision-making processes? What is the role of the judiciary? Whose interests are taken 
into account? What is the actual effect of a European Recommendation (soft-law)? Provided that the 
case is related to the use of Article 7a of the Framework Directive (‘Procedure for the consistent 
application of remedies’) by the European Commission, it turns to be a very good example of the 
interplay between the national and the EU level, and the role of the European Union in the decision-
making processes for issues touching upon private law matters.  
In the field of private law, a problematic matter is represented by the delegation of substantive 
competence to “specialized institutions”.469 The establishment of NRAs in the telecoms sector is a 
clear example of the partial integration or integration by sectors that Pescatore speaks about.
470
 But in 
order to get a clear understanding on this, it is necessary to look at the functional competence of such 
institutions as well as the interplay between the EU, the Member States, and the established 
administrative structures. A closer look to the implementation of the EU Regulatory Framework for 
Electronic Communications reveals a subtle increasing power of the EU Commission’s role at the 
functional level when it comes to the achievement of the regulatory goals; i.e. consistent application of 
the legal framework and harmonization of the Internal Market. This might be the result of the nature of 
the prerogatives reserved to the European Commission with regard to the control mechanisms which 
grant it certain powers aimed at the adjustment of national measures; e.g. via consultation 
procedures.
471
 The rationale of such procedures responds to the political and legal imperatives set out 
at EU level.
472
 
The case at stake concerns the implementation of the Commission’s Recommendation on the 
methodology employed for the calculation of termination rates costs.
473
 When it comes to contracts 
between telecoms operators, NRAs exert price control over the prices that the incumbent charges to 
alternative operators for the use of the network (termination rates).
474
 Therefore, this case is a good 
example for illustrating the implementation process of EU decisions by the Member States with 
implications for private law (price control in B2B contracts). This regulatory pricing control 
prerogative arises in the context of regulatory obligations that might be imposed by the national 
regulator over operators in wholesale markets. In particular, the concerned price control arises from 
cost accounting obligations. Article 13 of the Access Directive compels SMP operators to structure 
their cost accounting system (CAS) and pricing system under a certain methodology to meet the 
regulatory requirements in order to support price controls, grouping activities in specified accounts 
and with particular rules for the allocation of costs to different services in order to prevent unfair 
cross-subsidies, excessive or predatory prices, and to prevent margin squeeze as well as to promote 
sustainable competition and efficiency for the benefit of the user.
475
 In the case at hand, the disputed 
regulatory decision establishes a cap for termination rates so that it can avoid excessive tariffs or 
margin squeeze practices.  
The economic consequences of the case provide an overview of the influence of regulatory measures 
on the (private) relationships among operators. In economic terms, the difference between pure 
BULRIC and BULRIC+ is only about 1 cent of Euro. Yet, the multiplied effect of such price alteration 
                                                     
469 Pescatore, P. (1974). The law of integration, Sijthoff, at p. 27.  
470Ibid. 
471Article 7 and 7a of the Framework Directive. In this regard, see also Curtin (2009), Executive Power of the European 
Union. Law, Practices and the Living Constitution, Oxford University Press.  
472Pescatore supra n 65, at 45.  
473Commission Recommendation (2009/396/EC) of 7 May 2009 on the Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile 
Termination Rates in the EU (OJ L 20.5.2009, pp. 67-74). 
474 In accordance with Article 13(1) of the Access Directive.  
475 Article 13(2) Access Directive.  
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amounts to millions of Euros.
476
 As stated in the CBb’s judgment, ACM estimates a loss of revenue 
suffered by mobile providers that would be of the order of €21 million to €219 million, whereas 
mobile providers themselves have produced even higher estimates.
477
 
Without entering into all the economic, competitive and regulatory consequences of the case, it will 
suffice to examine here the interplay among the actors involved in the implementation of the European 
Regulatory Framework for telecoms. This alone gives rise to governance problems. 
Multi-level (network) governance conflicts 
Essentially, the case is about the principle of national procedural autonomy. As mentioned above, the 
implementation and enforcement of the EU Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications 
follows a decentralized approach. Under this scheme, we can identify three types of conflicts:  
Vertical conflicts 
NRAs are required to perform their regulatory duties in accordance with the regulatory objectives of 
the specific Directives.
478
 In principle, the national regulator enjoys a certain degree of autonomy 
when carrying out its regulatory tasks. However, the European Commission also enjoys a certain 
degree of control by virtue of Articles 7 and 7a procedures and Article 19 of the Framework Directive.  
The vertical conflict arises in relation to the divergence between the European mandate and the 
disputed national decision that occurs as a consequence of the national ruling. This is a very common 
situation that the consultation procedures that are in place attempt to palliate. The internal market 
rationale takes precedence over the national legal regime as has been long established by the case law 
of the European Court.
479
 
Horizontal conflicts of jurisdictions 
The horizontal conflict is epitomized by the discrepancy between two different national jurisdictions. 
A conflict in the field of telecommunications could take place between civil or contract law rules –i.e. 
general contract law– vis-à-vis telecommunications regulation. Another example would be a potential 
inconsistency between telecommunications regulation and administrative law. Such incompatibilities 
might well be solved by rules of conflict and the maxim lex specialis derogate generalis. However, 
jurisdictional conflicts shall be recalled here. In the case at stake, the national regulator maintains the 
application of sector-specific regulation whereas for the national judge major principles such as 
legality and the administrative principle of legal certainty prevail.
 480
  
                                                     
476 CBb Judgment of 31st August 2011, 4.8.3.1.See also Case C-424/07, Commission v. Germany, 3 December [2009] ECR I-
11431, See, in particular, paragraphs 90-92.  
477 Ibid.  
478 Article 8(1) Framework Directive.  
479 Inter alia: Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585, Case C-26/62, NV Algemene Transporten Expeditie 
Onderneming van Gend en Loos v Nederlandse Administratis der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1, and C-106/89 Marleasing 
SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA [1991] ECR I-7321. 
480 On the decay of the legality principle see Lavrijssen, S. and Ottow, A. (2011), ‘The Legality of Independent Regulatory 
Authorities’, in L. Besselink, F. Pennings and A. Prechal (eds.), The Eclipse of Legality, Kluwer Law International.  
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(Multi) diagonal conflicts 
The literature has thoroughly addressed diagonal conflicts in issues of European governance.
481
 
Diagonal conflicts arise particularly in issues of decentralized enforcement, such as the one that 
concerns us here. It epitomizes a multi-dimensional interplay that brings together the national 
regulator, the European Commission, the umbrella organization BEREC (in a more modest way) and 
the national judiciary. The latter steps into the framework of the procedure through the judicial 
scrutiny of regulatory decisions conferred under the right of appeal against such decisions.
482
 
The (potential) diagonal conflict emerges in particular with regard to the sought optimization of the 
market versus the proportionality of the (contested) intervention. As aforementioned in the 
background of the case, the regulator and the judiciary hold divergent views about the suitability of the 
measure. In turn, the judicial conclusion and the subsequent new regulatory decision restoring the 
BULRIC+ methodology triggered the opening of an Article 7a procedure starting a turf war involving 
three parties – the European Commission, the national regulator and the national judiciary.  
On the one hand, the regulator argues that adopting a costing methodology in line with the European 
Recommendation would imply lower costs and, therefore, would be translated into lower consumer 
prices. In the eyes of the European Commission, in re-establishing the former methodology as required 
by the national court, ACM did not provide any economic justification for the departure from the pure 
BULRIC methodology that guarantees that the BULRIC+ methodology would equally promote 
efficiency and sustainable competition, as well as maximizing consumer benefit in the Dutch 
market.
483
 In addition, the European Commission considered that this would create barriers to the 
Internal Market because mobile termination rates set via the pure BULRIC level would contribute to a 
level playing field at EU level by eliminating competition distortions between fixed and mobile 
networks.
484
 
On the other hand, the national court holds the view that the intervention of wholesale markets under 
conditions of inefficiency to resolve retail market prices are disproportionate, provided that NRAs 
cannot intervene in a market that already has been deemed competitive and that, therefore, is not 
subject to ex-ante regulation.
485
 Retail and wholesale markets are different markets operating at 
different –and not interlinked– levels. The Recommendation is about the wholesale market. The court 
reasoning concludes that the regulator –together with the Commission– cannot come up with a 
justification from a different market (i.e. it cannot use the retail market to say something about the 
functioning of the wholesale level).  
Compatibility of the regulatory decision with EU law and institutional conflicts 
Drawing on the empirical analysis consisting of interviews with staff related to this particular case, 
this brief case comment tries to call attention to issues that need consideration when it comes to the 
implications of European telecommunications regulation for private law relationships. Although ACM 
sought to follow the Commission’s Recommendation on termination rates, it was not possible not to 
comply with the CBb’s judgment.486 Formally, the case –including the Commission’s investigation 
                                                     
481 The most representative works on diagonal conflicts comes from Professor Joerges. See Joerges, C. (1997), "The impact 
of European integration on private law: Reductionist perceptions, true conflicts and a new constitutional perspective" 
European Law Journal 3(4), pp. 378-406, and Joerges supra n 4; amongst others.  
482 Article 4 Framework Directive.  
483 SG-Greffe (2012) D/2859. Brussels 13.02.2012, C(2012) 1038. European Commission serious doubts letter.  
484 Ibid.  
485 CBb Judgment of 31st August 2011, 4.8.3.1. 
486Interview with an Economic Expert from OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012: “there was only one outcome possible and it was to 
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procedure− gave rise to a complex situation because ACM has to apply the court’s decision. As such, 
the national court adopted the role of the regulator by overturning the new price caps resulting from 
the recommended new cost accounting model and restoring the previous methodology, and requiring 
the regulator to issue a new regulatory decision as from the 1
st
 January 2012 pursuant to the judicial 
reasoning.
487
 The court here performed the role of a de facto regulator.
488
 
Furthermore, this case was not, in principle, a problem of compatibility of Dutch law (the Dutch 
Telecommunications Act) with EU Law, because the concerned provision (its former Article 6) 
existed from 2004. The European Commission never raised questions concerning the law, but only 
about the specific reasoning of the Court.
489
 This means that the Commission was not arguing about a 
lack of compliance of the Dutch Telecommunications Act with EU law, but was only questioning the 
regulatory decision issued as a consequence of the court’s ruling which set the price cap on the basis 
of the BULRIC+ costing methodology, and to the contrary of the cost model suggested by the 
Commission’s Recommendation. 
This situation perfectly reflects a clear decoupling of the CBb’s Judgment and the EU understanding, 
which places a debate on the nature of EU soft-law –in particular concerning the binding effect of the 
2009 Commission Recommendation on termination rates– firmly on the table. In this regard, NRAs 
(OPTA in the case concerned) are required to take “utmost account” of the Commission comments. 
Once again, utmost account comes into play in order to modulate the relationship among the different 
participating institutions, but this time in a different direction: NRAs are the bodies to take the utmost 
account of the Commission’s position. In reality, the CBb decided that its conclusions were not 
affected by the Commission’s Recommendation and the fact that NRAs have to take the utmost 
account does not imply that OPTA cannot deviate from the (non-binding) Recommendation, 
especially if this would require a breach of national law.
490
 According to the Court, “that Article 19(1) 
of the Framework Directive requires Member States to ensure that national regulatory authorities, 
when carrying out their duties, try their utmost to use the recommendations of the Commission, […] 
does not affect the obligation of OPTA to deviate from the ‒non-binding‒ call termination 
recommendation because they would otherwise act in violation of provisions of national law”.491 This 
is the only reference made to utmost account throughout the Judgment. Utmost account, then, would 
imply that “you do not have to follow it exactly, but you have to take account of it”.492 Unfortunately, 
the Court did not go deeper into the nature of the Recommendation and did not clarify what utmost 
account actually involves either. In the case at issue, OPTA initially followed the Commission’s 
Recommendation because, above all, the new methodology (pure BULRIC) revealed itself after 
economic analyses to be the best solution economically; it was the national Court who overturned that 
decision.
493
  
                                                     
487 CBb Judgment of 31st August 2011, Section 5.  
488 See S. Lavrijssen and M. De Visser (2006), “Independent Administrative Authorities and the Standard of Judicial 
Review”, Utrecht Law Review, no. 1. 
489Interview with an Economic Expert from OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
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The role of soft-law 
Essentially, what is at stake here is the influence of a Commission Recommendation. To this end, it is 
important to determine the nature of the Recommendation. The, let’s say, “soft-law box” encompasses 
those instruments that we are reluctant to qualify as “hard law”.494 Hence, Recommendations would 
fall within the category of “soft-law”. To a lawyer’s mind, that is directly translated into “non-
binding”. However, it is crucial to ascertain the legal effect of the measures contained in the 
Recommendation.  
Article 60 TFEU enables the Commission to issue recommendations in the field of liberalization of 
SGEIs. Pursuant to Article 288 TFEU (former Article 249 in the EC Treaty), Recommendations do not 
have binding force.
495
 Instead, they are indicative guidelines to implement and to interpret legislation. 
Nonetheless, the Court of Justice of the European Union has recognized that they are not completely 
deprived of legal force, and that the national judges should take them into consideration.
496
 As a matter 
of fact, national courts shall take a Recommendation into account “where they are capable of casting 
light on the interpretation of other provisions of national or Community law”.497 Against this 
background, Recommendations would serve the purpose of harmonization or, at least, the performance 
of the European Commission in this particular case study would shed some light on the reading that 
the Commission seems to make of the Recommendation by attributing de facto binding force. 
The reasons that lead the Commission to issue a Recommendation on cost-accounting methodologies 
might well be its impact on private relations; a subject matter which falls outside EU competence. 
Actually, as recognized in Grimaldi, the European institutions generally adopt Recommendations 
“when they do not have the power under the Treaty to adopt binding measures”.498  In the issue that 
has brought us here, the European Commission alleges lack of harmonization in the application of 
cost-accounting principles to termination markets, divergence between price control measures, and 
different practices in implementing costing tools.
499
 In addition, the Recommendation seeks a 
consistent application of the specific provisions concerning cost accounting and accounting 
separation.
500
 
The confrontation of the case does not lie in the proportionality of the measure itself, but in the nature 
of the source where it stems from. Thus, the Court observes that the mandate of Article 19 of the 
Framework Directive for NRAs to try their utmost to follow Commission’s Recommendations, when 
performing regulatory duties, does not preclude the possibility that they might deviate from them. 
Especially, the court acknowledges, it is particularly important that this compliance with EU rules 
entails a violation of national law. The regulatory decision on tariff-regulation setting cap prices using 
the pure BULRIC cost model is at odds with the former Article 6a.2(1), (a), and (3) of the Dutch 
Telecommunications Act.
501
 Accordingly, the legal debate at stake is a supremacy concern: supremacy 
of EU soft-law vis-à-vis hard national law.  
                                                     
494Klabbers, J. (1998), “The Undesirability of Soft Law”, Nordic Journal of International Law, 67, p. 381.  
495 In the same vein the CJEU in the Case C-322/88, Salvatore Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies Professionelles, [1989] ECR 
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496Ibid. para. 18. 
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499Recitals 2, 3 and 4 of the Recommendation on termination rates.  
500Ibid. Recital 6. 
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Determining the legal effect of the Recommendation might give a proper locus standi to other 
operators −those seeking access to the network− to appeal the regulatory decision502 setting cap prices 
via the plus BULRIC methodology on the grounds that the national measure impairs the outcome 
achieved via the application of EU law (i.e. the Recommendation).
503
 Accordingly, the question to 
pose here would be whether the supremacy or precedence principle can be extended to a 
Recommendation that in practice –and as a result of the control mechanisms put in place such as the 
Article 7a procedure−might be considered de facto binding.   
Independence and expertise 
The issues at stake in this case also call for consideration of the roles of the actors involved and the 
governance structure. What is the difference between the Court and the regulatory authority? The 
court has taken over the role of the regulator thus undermining the remit of the regulator authority.  
Independence could potentially be squeezed out of the picture with such a complex procedure. 
Furthermore, a veto power exercised by the Commission not only undermines national procedural 
autonomy, but also interferes with the independence of the national regulator, given that the 
Commission pursues policy goals.
504
 But to what extent does independence guarantee the effective 
application of the law? Regulators’ independence, or independent regulatory decision-making, cannot 
be regarded either as a value or as an instrument. Rather, it would be more appropriate to contextualize 
independence as a (desirable) feature.  
The role of the judiciary as a regulator calls for scrutiny given that telecommunications is a highly 
technical sector. In fact, expertise is one of the rationales for NRAs’ continued existence.505 The 
independence requirement logically also applies to the judiciary. Thus, in order to ensure effective 
legal protection, the court (or the body in charge of deciding the appeal) should also ensure a proper 
level of expertise.
506
 This raises an institutional issue as to which body provides a better 
understanding, the national regulator or the judge? From a technical point of view, it is hardly 
impossible to translate into legal terms these costing methodology issues. Accordingly, the 
interpretation of the national market conditions requires a high level of specialization. In the case at 
stake, it turns out to be that the Dutch court is composed of a specialized team of economist. However, 
this might not be the case in every single Member State.  
 
                                                     
502 See case C-426/05, Tele 2 (See para. 33: are the operators entitled to derive those rights and are affected by the NRA 
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Contextualization in further European experiences: termination of tariff regulation 
As a matter of fact, the above case is neither the first nor the last where the Commission put into 
practice the mechanism of Article 7a. Despite its short life ‒Article 7a entered into force with the third 
package (May 2011)‒ to date there have already been 29 Opinions issued by BEREC in cases which 
have given rise to the Phase II investigation.
 507
 As previously mentioned, in those cases BEREC 
largely shared the Commission’s doubts. In 18 of them BEREC supported the European Commission 
in having serious doubts. In another 5 cases, BEREC only partially agreed with the Commission, while 
in 5 cases BEREC considered that the Commission’s concerns were unjustified.  
Particularly, in the field of termination rates, some NRAs in different Member States have followed 
the Commission’s Recommendation proposing pure BULRIC methodology in this context. In these 
countries, the application of this methodology has “succeeded so far”.508 On the contrary, there have 
been other cases where NRAs are also coming across similar issues in similar cases as the Netherlands 
when implementing the Commission’s Recommendation; this is the case for Germany509 and Italy510 
inter alia. 
The role of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) may become involved in this procedure as a 
consequence of the preliminary reference procedure.
511
 Already within the first appeal procedure 
culminating in the judgment that gave rise to the opening of Phase II of the Article 7a procedure, the 
national judge should have submitted the case for the European Court’s consideration. However, at 
that time, the CBb did not see the need to consult the European Court for clarification.
512
 This seems to 
be a general trend in the Dutch judiciary, at least in the highest administrative court.
513
 In a case such 
as the one at stake, which concerns the validity of a European guidance embodied in the form of a 
Commission Recommendation, the national court is obliged to submit a request for a preliminary 
ruling to the CJEU.
514
 
Be that as it may, the new appeal on the new regulatory decision on termination rates seems now to be 
in the process of being referred by the CBb. The questions referred for preliminary ruling are as 
follows:
515
  
1. Must Article 4(1) of the Framework Directive, read in conjunction with Articles 8 and 13 of the 
Access Directive, be interpreted as meaning that, in principle, in a dispute concerning the 
lawfulness of a cost-oriented scale of charges imposed by the national regulatory authority 
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508Interview with an Economic Expert at OPTA, Florence 18.10.2012. 
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(NRA) in the wholesale call termination market, a national court is permitted to make a ruling 
which does not accord with the European Commission Recommendation of 7 May 2009 on the 
Regulatory Treatment of Fixed and Mobile Termination Rates in the EU (2009/396/EC), 3 in 
which pure BULRIC is recommended as the appropriate price regulation measure for call 
termination markets, if, in that national court’s view, this is required on the basis of the facts in 
the case brought before it and/or on the basis of considerations of national or supranational law? 
2. If the answer to Question 1 is affirmative: to what extent is the national court permitted, in 
assessing a cost-oriented price regulation measure: 
a. in the light of Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, to evaluate the NRA’s argument that 
the development of the internal market is promoted by reference to the degree to which the 
functioning of the internal market is in fact influenced? 
b. to assess, in the light of the policy objectives and regulatory principles laid down in Article 8 
of the Framework Directive and Article 13 of the Access Directive, whether the price 
regulation measure: 
i. is proportionate; 
ii. is appropriate; 
iii. has been applied proportionately and is justified? 
c. to require the NRA to demonstrate adequately that: 
i. the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(2) of the Framework Directive, that the 
NRAs should promote competition in the provision of electronic communications 
networks and electronic communications services is genuinely being attained and that 
users are genuinely deriving maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality; 
ii. the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive, that NRAs 
should contribute to the development of the internal market is genuinely being 
attained; and 
iii. the policy objective, referred to in Article 8(4) of the Framework Directive, that the 
interests of the citizens should be promoted is genuinely being attained? 
d. in the light of Article 16(3) of the Framework Directive, and of Article 8(2) and (4) of the 
Access Directive, when assessing whether the price regulation measure is appropriate, to 
take into account the fact that the measure has been imposed on the market on which the 
regulated undertakings possess significant market power but, in the form chosen (pure 
BULRIC), has the effect of promoting one of the objectives of the Framework Directive, 
namely the interests of end users, on another market which has not been earmarked for 
regulation? 
The first question is expected to result in an important debate on the role of EU law. Furthermore, it 
addresses classic and timely questions about the role and legal effect of EU soft-law in the context of 
the new governance debate. The national judge asks the European court to clarify the discretion of the 
national judge to deviate from a European Recommendation when, at the national level, not only 
national legal but also factual circumstances require doing so. It refers here to the fact that the national 
conditions remain unchanged.  
The second question would challenge the nature and rationale of the Article 7 procedure as a 
supervisory mechanism itself, provided that the effect on the Internal Market would be minimal to 
justify a mandatory compliance with a non-binding European instrument. For the telecommunications 
sector in particular, the court should also determine the suitability of the Internal Market argument to 
follow the Recommendation when it actually has little effect outside the national borders. To this end, 
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the European court will have to address the question of proportionality of the regulatory decision to 
modify a measure in the national market in accordance with the Recommendation, especially when 
national circumstances remain unchanged.  
Interestingly, the national court poses the question(s) on the legitimacy of the court to deviate from the 
Recommendation, yet it does not refer to the NRAs, but only to the national court. This reflects a 
significant decoupling between the regulator and the judiciary, even though, in practice, they are 
performing the same task; tariff regulation. Thus, the role of the regulator might be adulterated by the 
Commission’s view in its pursuit of the internal market-building project, or replaced by the judiciary 
when overturning regulatory decisions. 
From legislative rule-making to specialized delegated powers in a networked 
decentralized structure that, in practice, works hierarchically under sector-specific 
supervisory mechanisms 
The liberalization of the sector has entailed the shift from national regulation to supranational law-
making of former public utilities. In the European Union, once liberalization was put in place, the 
regulation of Services of General Economic Interest (SGEIs) has been carried out mainly under the 
Treaty provisions on Internal Market competence (Article 114 TFEU, former Article 95 EC Treaty). 
Furthermore, this regulation has been accomplished under a sector-related approach, which has given 
rise to the emergence of different vertical sectors. Since the EU took the lead in the liberalization 
process, the harmonization of these services within the Internal Market has been the guiding light for 
legislative development. 
The strategic importance of the regulated networked industries together with its complexity and 
technicality, explain the State-internal redistribution of power.  Thus, the oversight functions lead to 
the delegation (outsourcing) of functions from the Congress to specialized agencies and to the private 
sector. A decentralized delegated implementation system is explained by the lack of information and 
expertise on the part of legislatures, which gives rise to a “perplexingly diffuse administrative state”.516 
In telecommunications –as in the energy sector– the Internal Market project and the level of technical 
complexity of the sector has led to the establishment of National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) to 
oversee the regulatory process at national level. Accordingly, NRAs have been established as a way of 
securing liberalization via institutional design. A more elaborated expertise to monitor telecoms 
market seems to be the appropriate institutional choice in terms of regulatory efficiency and 
effectiveness. Against this background, “(…) [t]o survive the judicial review of such reforms, agencies 
must often justify the markets values and results of deregulation as simply another form of 
regulation”.517 In this regard, empirical evidence verifies Niskanen’s theory of regulation, by which 
even though regulatory institutions are supposed to be of an ad interim nature until the market has 
been rolled out, the sector-related structures find no incentive to abolish them or to eradicate sector-
specific approaches to regulation once markets are fully competitive. Rather, sector-specific 
approaches tend to perpetuate “or at best [they are] modified”.518 This is the trend actually followed in 
Europe with the emergence of different generations of sector-specific regulation once the liberalization 
of the market has been attained. As such, competition law is not only yet to take over entirely –as 
originally designed– but also (sector-specific) regulatory goals are shifting from liberalization to 
broader goals like the achievement of a Digital Single Market for Europe. 
                                                     
516 As Somek has put it. Somek, A. (2014), The Cosmopolitan Constitution, Oxford University Press. 
517 Sassen supra n 21, at 176.  
518 Niskanen supra n 101. For an European account, see Möschel, W. (2009), “The Future Regulatory Framework for 
Telecommunications: General Competition Law instead of Sector-Specific Regulation – A German Perspective”, 
European Business Organization Law Review, 10(01), pp. 149-163.  
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Apart from National Regulatory Authorities in the national markets, additional supervisory 
mechanisms at EU level have been put in place, this time not with the aim of overseeing the 
liberalization process, but with the aim of achieving what turned out to be one of the overarching aims 
of the regulatory framework: development of the Internal Market.
519
 To this end, the sector has 
developed towards the establishment of a network for cooperation (and supervision) in regulatory 
affairs. This network operates at both the national and the European level. The supranational 
dimension operates via networks of regulators. This network has reached its pinnacle with the 
establishment of the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC) in 2009. 
The BEREC is the outcome of a path dependency of a set of practices that was followed in the 
previous years, which first emerged as an informal cooperation (the birth of the Independent 
Regulators Groups), and that later was institutionalized under a formal organization fostered by the 
European Commission (the European Regulators Group, ERG). While it is true that the BEREC was 
originally meant to be a European agency and that its current structure is the result of political 
fragmentation, the reality is that the BEREC, as a forum of regulators, together with other supervisory 
mechanisms (Article 7 and 7a procedures) represent a high level of regulatory convergence bypassing 
complex political commitments such as those associated with the establishment of a European Agency 
and the complex task of endowing it with competences.
520
 Furthermore, the empirical research 
conducted has demonstrated that even though the governance strategy followed in telecoms is rooted 
in the underlying idea of cooperation, in the interplay between the EU and its Member States via the 
national regulators, there is a kind of fake interdependence insofar as the EU is actually the leading 
voice in this cooperative relationship, mostly under internal market rationalities.  
The Internal Market-building project has been reinforced by the establishment of procedures to ensure 
the proper and consistent application of the Regulatory Framework at the national level. The decision 
to establish a decentralized structure to monitor the proper implementation of the EU rules via NRAs 
responds to flexibility and efficiency motivations. In fact, national specialized agencies are potentially 
more efficient and flexible in comparison to the European Commission. In general, these authorities 
possess the necessary expertise and knowledge concerning local particularities. These distinctive 
features enable NRAs to better respond to intricate and incipient problems.
521
 Under Article 7 and 7a 
procedures, NRAs are required to notify the Commission of the adoption of regulatory measures or the 
imposition of regulatory remedies when they concern the development of the Internal Market. The 
analysis of a real case on the effects of a conflict between the national regulatory decision and a 
Commission’s Recommendation reveals the pervasive nature and the practical implications of the 
mandate contained in Article 7a of the Framework Directive. In addition to this governance conflict, 
this case also evidences a jurisdictional (and hierarchical) conflict between the regulator and the 
national judiciary. In particular, the main conflict is between the regulator applying EU (soft)law vis-
à-vis the national judiciary applying national law, which will be ultimately decided by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (CJEU). Should the CJEU rule in favor of the legal impossibility to 
deviate from the Commission’s Recommendation, it would be a landmark in the role and effect of EU 
soft-law. However, such interpretation would also reinforce the assumptions exhibited above based on 
the grounds of empirical research. 
                                                     
519 Article 8(3) of the Framework Directive.  
520 By way of example, the conferring of powers to the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which gave rise 
to the Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber) of 22 January 2014 (ESMA case), also C-217/04, ENISA. See also Ottow, 
A. (2012) ‘Europeanization of the Supervision of Competitive Markets’. European Public Law 18(1), pp. 191–221. 
521 Interview with NRA expert. In the same vein, concerning competition law, see Svetiev, Y. (2010), ‘Networked 
Competition Governance in the EU: Delegation, Decentralization or Experimentalist Architecture?’ in Sabel, C. F., & 
Zeitlin, J. (Eds.), Experimentalist governance in the European Union: towards a new architecture. Oxford University 
Press; and Svetiev, Y. (2015), ‘Scaling experimentalism: from convergence to informed divergence in transnational 
competition policy, in Zeitlin, J. (ed.), Extending Experimentalist Governance?: The European Union and Transnational 
Regulation, 169. 
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These transformations in the governance of telecommunications, largely resulting from the sector-
related approach and linked to the technical complexity of the sector, have caused the emergence of 
new methods and actors in the regulatory process of private law. Thus, the research conducted here 
concludes that, from a private law perspective, this phenomenon has displaced the current law-making 
process for private law far away from the traditional approach in which the Nation State was the main 
–and only– actor in the legislative course. This displacement has not taken place via explicit legal 
delegation, but rather via (formal) heterarchical forms of accountability and legitimation as a result of 
the emergence of global administrative law as Ladeur has put it.
522
 However, evidence suggests that 
the actual implications are comparable to those resulting from a genuine principal-actor delegation. As 
such, under the designed system of supervision, the EU Regulatory framework has put in place a 
hierarchical system based on a process of legal self-review. The case examined evidences how such a 
system might bypass the judicial limitations of the dynamics of sector-specific rationalities.
523
 
To conclude, while the codification (of private law) era went hand in hand with the awakening of the 
Sovereign (Nation-)State, which was enshrined as the single source of lawmaking power, the 
regulatory framework for electronic communications involves a regulatory power transfer that 
represents a new source a law-making that virtually comes from polarized sources. Delegation has 
yielded a new approach in which there are many decision-making centres. Hierarchy is no longer 
paradigmatic and the “society of networks” is setting aside hierarchy, giving rise to an increasing set 
of relationships of heterarchical character (networks). In this new panorama, the legal structure of 
regulation has been heavily altered and the State is not its central actor anymore.
524
 This also has an 
impact in the way law is manifested. Whereas the civil codes symbolized the unity (and sovereignty) 
of the State,
525
 the new configuration eschews any codification or systematization attempt. Law 
sprouts from many sources and practices that do not follow a particular pecking order; instead, law 
derives from different norms and practices in which the domestic and the transnational domains 
intermingle.  
                                                     
522 Ladeur (2011). The emergence of administrative law.  
523 Teubner, G. (2004). ‘Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centered Constitutional Theory?’ Storrs Lectures 
2003/04 Yale Law School. 
524 Ladeur supra n 74. See also Ladeur, K. H. (2002), “The Changing Role of the Private in Public Governance-The Erosion 
of Hierarchy and the Rise of a New Administrative Law of Cooperation. A Comparative Approach”, EUI Working Paper 
Series Law 2002/09.  
525 Zimmermann, R. (2012) “Codification. The Civilian Experience Reconsidered on the Eve of a Common European Sales 
Law”, European Review of Contract Law, 8, 367–399. 
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Introduction 
After the global financial crisis EU law has undergone unprecedented changes. Since 2008 the 
European Commission has proposed more than 40 new legislative measures
526
  and the new European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) have already adopted more than 190 draft technical standards.
527
 
However, in the field of banking and finance the changes in the interpretation and application of the 
law do not always derive from “regulatory innovations”; they often reflect the economic,528 
technological,
529
 societal
530
 changes that have not necessarily been translated into legal texts. In fact, 
the impact of economy, technology and society is stronger on the “law in action” than in the “law on 
books”: enforcers generally react much faster than legislators to the new economic, technological and 
societal developments because they are directly subject to the pressure generated by complaints and 
litigation.
 531
  
The divergence between the “law on the books” and “law in action” is even more acute in the EU 
institutional context. Whilst the EU has gradually expanded its law-making competence in the banking 
and financial sector, its public and private enforcement’s competence is limited.532 The new ESAs 
have only specific supervisory and enforcement powers and the new supervisory and enforcement 
powers of the European Central Bank (ECB), within the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) are 
restricted to the prudential supervision of the significant credit institutions of the Euro area. Moreover, 
the private enforcement of EU banking and financial regulation remains exclusively based on national 
courts and alternative dispute resolution (ADRs) mechanisms. 
                                                     
526 See  European Commission,  A new financial system for Europe. Financial reform at the service of growth. 27 June 2014. 
Available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publications/docs/financial-reform-for-growth_en.pdf   
527 Data available at  www.eba.eu; www.esma.eu; www.eiopa.eu (23 January 2016) 
528 Economisation refers to the process of the removal of the intra and inter-state barriers to the freedom of establishment, the 
free movement of services and capital. See H.-W. Micklitz, The Transformation of European Private Law from 
Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation. EUI Working Paper LAW 2008/14. 
529 Technology refers to the innovations that allow financial markets participants to devise new products, services and 
processes. See J. Lerner-P. Tufano, The Consequences of Financial Innovation: a counterfactual research agenda, 
NBER Working Paper Series No 16780/2011, p. 6 
530 Society refers to the societal factors that change and conform “established and embedded social rules and institutions that 
structure social interactions”. See G. M. Hodgson, The Enforcement of Contracts and Property Rights: Constitutive 
versus Epiphenomenal Conceptions of Law, International Review of Sociology, (2003) 13, 381. 
531 For the purpose of this study, “law in the books” indicates the EU legal acts adopted pursuant to Art. 288 (primary 
legislation) and Arts. 290, 291 (secondary legislation) as well as the national legal acts transposing EU legal acts. The  
“law in action” indicates the legal acts adopted by EU and national judicial and administrative authorities which do not 
fall within the EU legal acts mentioned above.  
532 Public enforcement includes the public mechanisms which enforce the law on the initiative of public authorities; private 
enforcement includes the legal mechanisms, private or public, which enforce the law on the initative of private parties. 
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In addition to this, as the EU has not yet harmonized the contractual duties and remedies of financial 
transactions, their legal governance remains subject to a dual regulatory regime: national law governs 
the contract
533
 and EU law governs the duties of conduct of investment firms vis-à-vis clients.  
Despite the existence of this dual regulatory regime, I argue that the EU post-crisis regulatory and 
institutional changes will affect national contract law and the private enforcement of financial 
regulation. This argument builds on two main findings. First, in the wake of the global financial crisis 
many national courts and ADRs interpreted the national law of contract in light of the purpose of EU 
financial regulation by using important “regulatory inputs” contained in the Directive 2004/39/EC 
(MiFID I)
534
 in order to increase the effective legal protection of retail investors vis-à-vis investment 
firms. This study shows that the Directive 2014/65/EU (MiFID II)
535
, the Regulation (EU) No 
600/2014 (MiFIR)
536
 and the ESAs Regulations could further strengthen this process of 
“Europeanization” of contract law governing retail financial transactions. 
Second, more strikingly, although the EU legislation seems rather reluctant to harmonize the national 
laws of contract related to retail financial transactions, it has recently introduced new contractual tools 
to support the banking resolution procedures which could give rise to a process of “contractualisation 
of EU law”. Both of these processes originate in EU law and materialize through national law. But 
whereas the trend towards the “Europeanization of contract law” responds to the need of strengthening 
the private law rights and remedies of retail investors vis-à-vis financial firms, the “contractualisation 
of EU law” is driven by the need of minimizing the impact of the banks’ crisis and failures on 
sovereigns. It is submitted that this objective, which underpins the Directive 2014/59/EU (BRRD)
537
, 
Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 (SSM Regulation)
538
 and the Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 (SRM 
Regulation)
539
, will inevitably have an impact on the firm-client relationships as well as on the 
supervision of financial market participants. 
The evolution of EU financial regulation 
From the 1966 Segré Report to the FSAP legislation 
The evolution of EU financial regulation is marked by four turning-points: the 1966 Segré Report, the 
1985 White Paper on the completion of the internal market, the 1999 Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP) and the 2008 Lehman Brothers collapse which marked the beginning of the global financial 
crisis.
540
 In 1966 the Segré report advocated for the first time the creation of a European capital market 
                                                     
533 In national law, investment contracts will normally qualify as contracts of mandate or sui generis contracts based on the 
contract of mandate and other contractual schemes (deposit). 
534 Directive 2004/39/EC on markets in financial instruments (MiFID I) O.J. L 145/1 (2004). 
535 Directive 2014/65/EU on markets in financial instruments (MiFID II) O.J. L 173/349 (2014). Art. 94 of MiFID II repealed 
the MiFID I with effect from 3 January 2017. 
536 Regulation (EU) No 600/2014 on markets in financial instruments O.J. L 173/84 (2014). 
537 Directive 2014/59/EU establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms 
(BRRD) O.J. L 173/90 (2014).  
538 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions (SSM Regulation) O.J. L 287/63 (2013). 
539 Regulation (EU) No 806/2014 establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions 
and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Resolution Fund and 
amending Regulation (SRM Regulation) O.J. L 225/1 (2014). 
540 For a more detailed analysis of the evolution of EU financial regulation see T. Tridimas, EU Financial Regulation: 
Federalization, Crisis Management and Law Reform, in P. Craig-G. de Búrca (eds.), The Evolution of EU Law, OUP, 
2011, 786. 
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in order to achieve the monetary and economic union.
541
 This idea underpinned the First
542
 and 
Second
543
 Directives for the implementation of Art. 67 of the European Economic Community Treaty. 
But the process towards the liberalisation of financial markets slowed down over the 1970s and 1980s: 
the directives on financial institutions,
544
 admission listing
545
 and listing particulars,
546
 have been 
adopted after a lag in the decision-making process caused by national protectionist resistances. 
In the 1983 Communication on Financial integration, the Commission affirmed the need to “re-launch 
efforts towards financial integration” after the stagnation of the 1970s.547 This Communication 
anticipated the 1985 White paper on the completion of the internal market which advocated the 
creation of a “minimal coordination of rules” for authorization and supervision in order to foster 
competition between firms. Regulatory competition was intended to be the tool to achieve more 
competition between financial services providers in the EU.
548
 In fact, the most important directives 
adopted during the “minimum standards period” (UCITS I,549 Second Banking Directive,550 and 
Investment Service Directive
551
) have been based on the principle of home country control and aimed 
an EU passport for financial and banking activities. 
Starting from the premise that financial services are a crucial sector to foster economic growth and 
employment expansion,
552
 in 1999 the Commission put forward the Financial Services Action Plan 
(FSAP). The FSAP laid down a timetable for the adoption of a series of 42 ambitious measures aimed 
at establishing wholesale market for financial services, strenghtening investor protection, harmonising 
prudential regulation and financial supervision.
553
 The FSAP was accompanied by the Lamfallussy 
Report which introduced a new policy-making framework aimed at combining harmonisation with a 
sufficient degree of regulatory flexibility in order to rapidly adjust the system to the developments of 
finance.
554
  
                                                     
541 C. Segré, The development of a European capital market. Report of a Group of Experts appointed by the EEC 
Commission. November 1966. 
542 First Directive of 11 May 1960 for the implementation of Article 67 of the Treaty. 
543 Second Directive of 18 December 1962 adding to and amending the First Directive for the implementation of Article 67 of 
the Treaty. 
544 Directive 73/183/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services in 
respect of self-employed activities of banks and other financial institutions O.J. L  194/16 (1973).  
545 Directive 79/279/EEC coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to offical stock exchange listing O.J. L 
66/21 (1979). 
546 Directive 80/390/EEC coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing 
Particulars O.J. L 100/1 (1980).  
547 Financial integration. Communication from the Commission to the Council. COM (83) 207 final, 20 April 1983.  
548 Commission, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European Council (Milan, 28-29 
June 1985). COM (85) 310 final, 28. 
549 Directive 85/611/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities O.J. L 375/3 (1985). 
550 Directive 89/646/EEC on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to the taking up and 
pursuit of the business of credit institutions  O.J. L 386/1 (1989). See also Directive 77/780/EEC on the Coordination of 
Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of the Business of Credit 
Institutions O. J. L 322/30 (1977). 
551 Directive 93/22/EEC on investment services in the securities field (ISD) O.J. L 141/27 (1993). 
552 Commission, Communication on Financial Services: Building a framework for action,  28 October 1998. 
553 Commission, Communication on Implementing the framework for financial markets: action plan. Brussels, 11 May 1999 
COM(1999) 232 final.  
554 Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets, (Lamfalussy report), November 
2000. In the Nineteens important financial innovations have been introduced. For example, in 1987 the bankers of the 
Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. invented the first CDO model. In 1993 the Boston asset manager State Street Global 
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With the FSAP Directives, the EU started to develop its own financial regulatory capacity, as distinct 
from the US and UK regulatory models which had been “passively cross-loaded” in the EU until the 
2000s.
555
 The FSAP directives
556
 have been based on Art. 95 TEC (now Art. 114 TFEU) on the 
assumption that the higher the harmonisation of national laws, the higher the level of market 
integration.
557
 The MiFID I is an emblematic example of the paradigm shift from competition through 
differentiation (regulatory competition) to competition through (minimum) harmonisation. In other 
words, the shift from competition through differentiation to competition through harmonisation. In 
order to foster competition between trading venues the MiFID I removed the “concentration rule”, by 
which Member States required investment firms to route orders to regulated markets only, and 
introduced new (harmonised) trading venues.
558
 This regulatory change followed the first 
“technological revolution” in finance, namely the substitution of the manual transmission order 
mechanisms with the automatic trading or mechanical trading systems.
559
 
The other important MiFID I change concerned intensification of the conduct of business rules. 
Whereas the Investment Service Directive laid down seven general principles that Member States 
were supposed to implement into national law, the MiFID I and the MiFID implementing directive
560
 
designed a new system of conduct of business rules (conflict of interest, appropriateness, suitability, 
best execution, disclosure, conflict of interest client order handling rules) calibrated on the nature of 
client (retail, professional, eligible counterparty), service (advised, non-advised) and product 
(complex, non-complex).
561
  
A distinct feature of the FSAP harmonisation programme was its emphasis on a public enforcement 
rather than private enforcement of financial regulation. The Prospectus Directive
562
, Transparency 
Directive
563
 and MiFID I
564
 harmonised the administrative sanctions but they did not harmonise civil 
law remedies in favour of investors. This regulatory choice has been motivated both by reasons of 
(Contd.)                                                                  
Advisors launched the Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts, known as “spider”, as the first Exchange Trade Fund 
(ETF). In 1994 a group of bankers of JP Morgan designed the first model of credit default swap (CDS).   
555 See L. Quaglia, Europe and the Governance of Global Finance, Oxford, 2014, 63. But see E. Posner, N. Veron, The EU 
and financial regulation: power without purpose?, JEPP (2010) 3, p. 400 ss. who argue that the post FSAP regulation has 
been still based on the agenda elaborated in international fora. 
556 See, in particular, MiFID I, Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services O.J. L 
271/16 (2002); Directive 2003/6/EC on insider dealing and market manipulation O.J. L 96/16 (2003); Directive 
2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading O.J. L 
345/64 (2003). 
557 See N. Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 3 ed., OUP, 2014, p. 27. 
558 See G. Petrella, MiFID, Reg NMS and Competition Across Trading Venues in Europe and United States, Journal of 
Financial Regulation and Compliance (2010), 3, 257-271. 
559 The automatic trading system was introduced in 1976 in the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) (see 
http://www1.nyse.com/about/history/timeline_technology.html) and in 1986 in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) (see 
http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-exchange/company-overview/our-history/our-history.htm). 
560 Commission Directive 2006/73/EC implementing Directive 2004/39/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council as 
regards organisational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms and defined terms for the purposes of 
that Directive O.J. L 241/26 (2006). 
561 See M. Kruithof, W. van Gerven, A Differentiated Approach to Client Protection: The Example of MiFID, Financial Law 
Institute WP 2010/07. 
562 Art. 25 of Directive 2003/71/EC on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to 
trading O.J. L 345/64 (2003). Art. 6 requires Member States to ensure that their laws, regulation and administrative 
provisions on civil liability apply to those persons responsible for the information given in a prospectus. 
563 Art. 24 of Directive 2004/109/EC on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about 
issuers whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 2001/34/EC O.J. L 390/38. 
Art. 7 for a general reference Article 7 requires Member States to ensure that their laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions on liability apply to the issuers. 
564 Art. 51 of MiFID I. 
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necessity (it is easier to harmonise administrative sanctions than civil law remedies)
565
 and convinction 
(harmonised civil law remedies could give rise to opportunistic litigation by professional clients and 
endanger the efficiency of financial markets).
566
  
The EU post-crisis legislation 
Between 2009 to 2015 the EU legislator has proposed more than 40 legislative measures to tackle the 
various “crisis” triggered by the Lehman Brothers collapse: the subprime crisis phase (mid-2007 to 
September 2008), the systemic crisis phase (as of September 2008), the economic crisis phase" (as of 
2009), the sovereign crisis phase (as of 2010) and the crisis of confidence in Europe phase (as from 
2012).
567
 The EU post-crisis legislation could be analysed from the perspective of its harmonisation 
technique and its regulatory objectives. 
Likewise the FSAP legislation, the post-crisis legislation, including the measures setting up the ESAs 
and, more critically, the Single Resolution Board (SRB)
568
, has been based on Art. 114 TFEU, the 
classical legal basis for the measures aimed at strengthening the functioning of the internal market.
569
 
The other shared feature between the pre and post-crisis legislation is the public enforcement based 
approach to financial regulation. Whilst the ESFS, the SSM and SRM have located some supervisory 
and enforcement powers at the EU level, the private enforcement of financial regulation remains 
firmly based on national law and national enforcement mechanisms.
570
  
However, unlike the FSAP legislation,
571
 numerous post-crisis measures have been adopted by means 
of regulations. Directly applicable legal acts are intended to increase the functioning of the internal 
market,
572
 reduce regulatory complexity and investment firms’ compliance costs,573 eliminate 
competitive distortions,
574
 ensure a level playing field between market participants with regard to 
specific obligations imposed on private parties (notification, disclosure, clearing).
575
 Undoubtedely, 
the maximum harmonisation of national laws, combined with the broadening of the scope of 
                                                     
565 See T. Tridimas, EU Financial Regulation: Federalization, Crisis Management and Law Reform, cit., p. 794. 
566 See I. MacNeil, Enforcement and Sanctioning, in E. Ferran, N. Moloney, N. Payne (eds.), Oxford Handbook on Financial 
Regulation, cit., p. 293. 
567 See E. Liikanen, High-level Expert Group on reforming the structure of the EU banking sector. Final report. October, 
2012. For a complete overview of the EU post-crisis reforms, see House of Lords, The post-crisis EU financial 
regulatory framework: do the pieces fit?, European Union Committee, 5th Report of Session 2014–15, February 2015. 
568 The SRM covers the credit institutions that fall in the remit of the SSM (Art. 2(1)). 
569 The CJEU in the case C-270/12, UK v. Parliament and Council, EU:C:2014:18 (Short-Selling case) held that Art. 28 of 
Regulation No 236/2012 improves the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market in the 
financial field and therefore Art. 114 TFEU is an appropriate legal basis for the adoption of Article 28 of Regulation No 
236/2012. 
570 New tortious liability regimes have been introduced by Art. 21 of Directive 2011/61/EU on Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers (AIFMD) O.J. L 174/1 (2011) and Art. 35 of Regulation (EU) No 462/2013 on Credit Rating Agencies O.J. L 
146/1 (2013). The Commission’s proposals to introduce a civil liability regime in the MiFID II and in the PRIIPs 
Regulation have been dropped during the legislative process. 
571 For an exception, see Council Regulation (EC) No 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (SE) O.J. L 294/1 
(2001). 
572 See recital No 3 of MiFIR. 
573 See recital No 12 of Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms 
(CRR) O.J. L 176/1 (2013); recital No 5 of Regulation (EU) No 596/2014 on market abuse (MAR) O.J. L 173/1 (2014); 
recital No 5 of MiFIR. 
574 See recital No 12 of CRR; Recital No 5 of MiFIR. 
575 See recital No 3 of Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 on OTC derivatives, central counterparties and trade repositories 
(EMIR) O.J. L 201/1 (2012); recital No 5 of MAR.  
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regulatory intervention especially in the wholesale segment of the markets,
576
 will substantially reduce 
the margin of manoeuvre for Member States and financial market participants. 
On the basis of its regulatory objectives, the post-crisis legislation can be divided into four groups. The 
first group of reforms reacted to “emergency” situations, such as the speculation on the default of 
sovereign borrowers,
577
 the infamous scandals (Madoff fraud)
578
 and the manipulation of the LIBOR 
index.
579
  
The second group of EU reforms
580
 and particularly the CRR
581
 and the CRD IV,
582
 has reflected the 
objective, laid down by the international agenda (G20, the Financial Stability Board and Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision), to ensuring financial stability namely by addressing the moral 
hazard problems posed by systemically important financial institutions  (SIFIs)
583
 and other sources of 
systemic risk (e.g. shadow banking, market infrastructures, financial instruments, credit crunch, 
market illiquidity, leverage cycle).
584
  
The third group of reforms, in line with the FSAP legislation, aimed at strengthening legal and market 
integration in the EU through substantive law-related and institutional innovations. On the substantive 
law level, the internal market building legislation has placed much emphasis on the protection of retail 
clients. The EU introduced new product distribution rules,
585
 disclosure rules for investment 
products
586
, product governance rules
587
 and product intervention rules.
588
 
This set of measures has reacted to various factors: the widespread detriment caused to retail clients by 
mis-selling practices, the potential risks associated to structured financial products, the shortcomings 
of the traditional disclosure-based paradigm of retail market regulation and the increasing importance 
of financial services in the everyday life of EU citizens. Whereas the FSAP legislation aimed at 
“empowering” investors, through disclosure and financial literacy, this post-crisis measures aim at 
“protecting” investors, through new product governance and product intervention rules. The shift from 
                                                     
576 See the short-selling regulation, the AIFMD, the EMIR. 
577 Regulation (EU) No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps O.J. L 86/1 (2012).     
578 Directive 2014/91/EU on the coordination of laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to undertakings for 
collective investment in transferable securities (UCITS V) O.J. L 257/1 (2014) and AIFMD. 
579 See MAR; Directive 2014/57/EU on criminal sanctions for market abuse O.J. L 173/1 (2014); proposal for a Regulation of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on indices used as benchmarks in financial instruments and financial 
contracts, COM/2013/0641 final. 
580 See recital No 1 of MiFIR (referring to G20); recital No 89 of AIFMD (referring to G20); recital No 5 of EMIR (referring 
to G20); recital No 7 of Regulation (EU) No 1092/2010 on European Union macro-prudential oversight of the financial 
system and establishing a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB Regulation) O.J. L 331/1 (2010). 
581 See recital No 1 of CRR (referring to BCBS and G-20) 
582 See recital No 79 of Directive 2013/36/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on access to 
the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms (CRD IV) O.J. 
L 176 (2013) (referring to FSB, BCBS, G-20). 
583 FSB, Reducing the moral hazard posed by systemically important financial institutions, FSB Recommendations and Time 
Lines, 20 October 2010.  
584 See L. Quaglia, Europe and the Governance of Global Finance, 50 who argued that the recommendations of the 
international fora have not been automatically transposed on the EU level. For a different view see D. Mügge, Europe’s 
regulatory role in post-crisis global finance, JEPP (2014) 3, p. 316 ss. 
585 See Art. 25 seq. of MiFID II. 
586 See Art. 5 seq. of PRIIPs Regulation. 
587 See Art. 16 of MiFID II. 
588 See Art. 40 seq. of MiFIR and Art. 15 seq. of PRIIPs Regulation. 
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the “reasonable investor” to “vulnerable consumer”589 has become apparent also in the institutional 
reforms. In the new European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS) the protection of investors take 
up a crucial role.
590
 The three ESAs
 591
 – the European Banking Authority (EBA), the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) and the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions 
Authority (EIOPA) – have a “consumer protection” task and have specific powers in order to promote 
transparency, simplicity and fairness in the market for consumer financial products or services across 
the internal market.
592
 
The four group of reforms has given rise to the European Banking Union (EBU) which is composed of 
the SSM, the SRM and the “single rule book”593. Whereas the internal market driven legislation has 
been driven by market integration and competition, the EBU is mainly driven by the need of severing 
the vicious banks-sovereign circle and ensure financial stability in the Euro zone.
594
 As it is well 
known, the SSM and SRM do not cover the entire internal market but only the Euro area.
595
 Moreover, 
unlike the ESFS, the SSM and SRM have not been tasked with the protection of 
consumers/investors.
596
 The EBU may well have an indirect impact on the firm-client relationship
597
 
but investor protection considerations will rank after the micro and macro prudential concerns. 
Another important difference between the internal market and EBU concerns the idea of investor 
behind this legislation. Unlike the MiFID II, MiFIR, PRIIPs and ESAs Regulation which endorse the 
model of a “consumer-investor”, the BRRD implicitly backs the model of the informed, reasonable 
and self-responsible investor. The removal of states’ support to failing banks and the emphasis on bail-
in will require investors (especially shareholders or bondholders) to assess the creditworthiness of the 
bank (debtor). This is particularly dangerous for retail unsophisticated clients because in the current 
period of low interest rates they could be attracted by the financial instruments issued by credit 
institutions to meet the minimum requirements for bailinable own funds and eligible liabilities.
598
 
                                                     
589 See in particular N. Moloney, The Investor Model Underlying the EU’s Investor Protection Regime: Consumers or 
Investors?, EBOR (2012) 13, p. 169 ss.  
590 See, in particular, B. Haar, Organizing Regional System. The EU example, in E. Ferran, N. Moloney, N. Payne (eds.), 
Oxford Handbook on Financial Regulation, cit., p. 158 ss. 
591 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking 
Authority) Decision 2009/78/EC (EBA Regulation) O.J. L 331/12 (2010); Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European 
Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) O.J. L 331/48 (2010); Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities 
and Markets Authority) (ESMA Regulation) O.J. L 331/84 (2010). In the hereinafter “ESAs Regulations”. 
592 See Art. 9 of ESAs Regulations. 
593 The single rule book is composed of the CRR, CRD IV, the BRRD and the Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee 
schemes O.J. L 173 (2014). See also European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of 
the Council amending Regulation (EU) 806/2014 in order to establish a European Deposit Insurance Scheme, Strasbourg, 
24 November 2015 COM(2015) 586 final. 
594 See H.-W. Micklitz, The Transformation of Private Law through Competition, in this Working Paper, p. 56; T. Beck, 
Does Europe Need a Capital Market Union? And How Would We Get There?, in F. Allen, E. Carletti, J. Gray (eds.), The 
New Financial Architecture in the Eurozone, 2015, Fiesole, p. 120.  
595 Notably, the SSM has been based on Art. 127 (6) TFEU, the SRM has been based on Art. 114 TFEU. 
596 See recital No 28 of SSM Regulation. 
597 See S. Grundmann, The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and Rulebook, EBOLR 
(2015), p. 1 ss.; C. Hadjiemmanuil, The Banking Union and Its Implications for Private Law: A Comment, EUI Working 
Paper RSCAS 2015/74, p. 7 
598 Article 45 of BRRD and Article 12 of SRM Regulation. In addition to this, the Single Resolution Fund may make a 
contribution to the institution under resolution subject to a number of strict conditions including the requirement that 
losses totalling not less than 8 % of total liabilities including own funds have already been absorbed, and the funding 
provided by the Fund is limited to the lower of 5 % of total liabilities including own funds or the means available to the 
Fund and the amount that can be raised through ex-post contributions within three years 
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Second, banks and investments firms, under the pressure to issue a minimum level of bailinable debt 
may be incentivized to undertake more aggressive distribution practices with the risk of increasing 
mis-selling.  
After the crisis-driven legislation, in 2015 the Capital Market Union project has brought back the model 
of the “responsible investor” in the EU retail market regulation agenda. Disclosure, transparency and 
financial literacy become again a fundamental tool to allow investors, in the present context of declining 
deposit rates,  to shift their financial wealth from banks into market securities.
599
 The “empowering 
investor” strategy underpins also the Green Paper on retail financial services which complements the 
other EU initiatives (CMU, the Digital Single Market
600
 and the Single Market Strategy
601
) aimed at re-
building the consumers’ confidence in the internal market and boosting growth. In fact the Green Paper 
views new technological developments and financial innovations as opportunities to increase consumers’ 
choice rather than a challenge for their effective protection
602
 and reconsiders the importance of 
disclosure in helping investors accessing the internal market, choosing better products and switching from 
one product to a cheaper one.
603
  
The rationales and objectives of contract law in the EU financial markets 
Retail market regulation is at the forefront of economic, technological and societal changes. Before the 
global financial crisis, EU regulators have supported technological developments, financialization of 
economy
604
 and society
605
 in order to increase financial integration in the EU. Between 2009 and 2015 
EU regulators have principally pointed out, through a set of “consumer protective” measures, the 
potential dangers created by these drivers. After 2015 they have strengthened (again) the link between 
technological developments, financialisation of economy and society and market integration. So far 
this new move towards market-finance and competition has remained at the level of policy stances and 
it has not yet been translated into legislative texts. 
Yet, the question arises what role contract law play in EU financial regulation and whether the 
evolution of EU retail regulation will have any impact on national contract law.  
                                                     
599 Commission, Building a Capital Markets Union. Green paper,COM/2015/063 final, p. 20. See T. Beck, Does Europe 
Need a Capital Market Union? And How Would We Get There?, in F. Allen, E. Carletti, J. Gray (eds.), The New 
Financial Architecture in the Eurozone, Florence, p. 120. 
600 Commission Communication: A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe (http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/digital-single-
market/docs/dsm-communication_en.pdf).   
601 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions – Upgrading the Single Market: more opportunities for people and 
business, COM (2015) 550 Final.    
602 Commission, Green Paper on retail financial services. Better products, more choice, and greater opportunities for 
consumers and businesses COM(2015) 630 final. See also See OECD, G20 High-Level Principles on Financial 
Consumer Protection. October, 2011. On the risks of “financial-inclusion” driven policies see, in particular, G. 
Comparato, The rationales of financial inclusion in the changing European private law, cit., p. 22 ss. 
603 Commission, Green Paper on retail financial services, p. 14. 
604 Financialisation of economy indicates the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, financial 
institutions, and financial elites in the operation of the economy and its governing institutions See T. I. Palley, 
Financialization: What It Is and Why It Matters, The Levy Economics Institute and Economics for Democratic 
Economics for Democratic and Open Societies Washington D.C. Working paper 525/2007. 
605 Financialisation of society indicates the increasing importance of financial instruments in everyday life and in the supply 
of welfare-related services (e.g. pensions). See N. Moloney, Regulating the Retail Markets, in N. Moloney, E. Ferran, J. 
Payne (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Financial Regulation, Oxford, 2015, p. 764. 
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Traditionally, contract law has been regarded as one of the externally-imposed regimes which limits 
the private autonomy of financial market participants.
606
 Unlike in other regulated sectors, in the field 
of financial services the EU has not yet harmonised the rules governing the formation, performance, 
interpretation of contracts and contractual remedies. EU law governs the firms’ conduct and financial 
products but does not govern the contract. This is the minimum common denominator across the 
various phases of EU retail market regulation. The harmonisation of financial regulation has been 
achieved through legislative measures of non-contractual nature addressed to Member States and 
NCAs as regulators rather than private parties.
607
 This regulatory choice was intended to set up a self-
sufficient architecture of duties, standards, principles and sanctions in order to achieve its regulatory 
objectives without need to rely on national contract law.
608
  
That means that EU financial regulation is insensitive to national contract law but it does not clearly 
mean that national contract law is insensitive to EU financial regulation. Before analysing the impact 
of EU financial regulation on national contract law, it is important to identify the rationales and 
objectives contract law in financial markets.
609
 What contract law could add to the legal framework of 
retail financial transactions and what could be its functions? 
In financial markets the law of contract can be based on the following rationales: autonomy, efficiency 
or functionalism. The autonomy-based theories consider the law of contract as a tool to protect and 
facilitate the individual autonomy.
610 
The efficiency-based theories argue that contract law should 
maximize the joint gains (the “contractual surplus”) of the parties from the transaction.611 The 
functionalistic-based theories argue that the law of contract should be driven by an heteronomous 
driver which nevertheless does not correspond to efficiency to others regulatory goals, such as the 
protection of weaker parties and the competition between services’ providers.612 Whilst the autonomy 
and efficiency-based theories agree on the fact that the enforcement of contractual obligations is the 
main objective of the law of contract, the functionalistic-based theories claim that the law of contract 
can serve different objectives, including the protection of investors, the stability of individual banks 
and the financial system.
613
  
To increase the protection of the retail unsophisticated client vis-à-vis the information and bargaining 
power of credit and investment firms, some national legislations establish that the contract clauses 
setting lower standards than that laid down by national law transposing EU financial regulation are 
                                                     
606 See C. Goodhart, P. Hartmann, D. Llewellyn, L. Rojas-Suarez, S. Weisbrod, Financial Regulation - Why, How And Where 
Now?, 1998, p. 3. 
607  L. Azoulai, The Complex Weave of Harmonization, in D. Chalmers, A. Arnull (eds.),  The Oxford Handbook of 
European Union Law, Oxford, 2015, p. 610. 
608 On the concept of self-sufficiency see H.-W. Micklitz, Y. Svetiev, A Self-Sufficient European Private Law – A Viable 
Concept?, EUI Working Papers Law No. 2012/31. 
609 For the purpose of this study, the rationale means the reason why contract law exists; the objective means the final 
outcome that the law of contract wants to achieve. See for a similar perspective C. Hadjiemmanuil, The Banking Union 
and Its Implications for Private Law: A Comment, EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/74, p. 7. 
610 See A. Hudson, Law of Finance, London, 2013, p. 13; M. Bridge, J. Braithwaite, Private Law and Financial Crises, JCLS 
(2013) 2, p. 1. 
611 See  A. Schwartz, R. E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, YLJ (2003) 113, p. 1 ss.  
612 See H.-W. Micklitz, The Visible Hand of European Regulatory Private Law—The Transformation of European Private 
Law from Autonomy to Functionalism in Competition and Regulation, cit., p. 1 Undoubtedely, efficiency-driven theories 
have integrated the European functionalism because the limitations of private autonomy, imposed through mandatory 
rules, have been often justified by the need of preventing market-failures (e.g. information asymmetry, market power and 
agency costs). See S. Grundmann, W. Kerber, S. Weatherill (eds.), Party Autonomy and the Role of Information in the 
Internal Market, De Gruyter, 2001. 
613 See H.-W. Micklitz, The Transformation of Private Law through Competition, in this Working Paper, p. 58. 
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ineffective
614
 or confer on retail investors the power to claim compensation for the losses suffered as a 
result of the firms’ breach of their conduct of business rules.615  
To enhance the effectiveness of banking resolution tools, Art. 55 of BRRD requires institutions and 
entities to include a contractual term by which the creditor or party to the agreement creating the 
liability recognises that liability may be subject to the write-down and conversion powers. This 
contractual recognition of bail-in principally aims at preventing the contractual circumvention of bail-
in through contracts governed by a non-EU law and contributes to strengthening the legal and 
commercial certainty.
 616
  
To protect sovereigns in times of market turmoils, Art. 12 (3) of the Treaty establishing the European 
Stability Mechanism provided, amongst other things, for the mandatory inclusion of standardised and 
identical Collective Action Clauses (CACs) in all new Euro area sovereign bonds from 1 January 
2013. The CACs aim to ease the process of sovereign debt restructuring and to discourage holdout 
behaviors but they can also signal an end to bailouts and reassert national autonomy over government 
debt contracts.
617 
  
The role of the national courts 
These three examples are illustrative of the multiple objectives that contract law can achieve. 
However, it is interesting to note that whereas the EU has started to use contract law mechanisms to 
ensure the full achievement of the objectives of the resolution procedure and protect sovereigns, it still 
refrains from introducing harmonised contract law rules for the firm-client relationship.
618
 Similarly, 
the national legislators have generally refrained from introducing express civil law or contract law 
remedies in favour of retail clients when the firm contravenes EU financial regulation (as transposed 
by national law). Both the EU and (the majority of) national legislators have kept separated national 
contract law duties-remedies and financial regulatory duties-sanctions. Therefore, the question arises 
whether the breach of a regulatory duty gives rise to a contract law remedy or, to put it otherwise, 
whether financial regulatory duties can be enforced by means of contract law remedies. To this crucial 
question, national courts have given different answers.  
In many civil law countries, national courts have established that the firm’s breach of its MiFID I 
conduct of business rules gives rise to a contract law remedy, such as the termination of the contract, 
pre-contractual damages or avoidance for mistake.
619
 At the basis of this judicial translation of 
regulatory duties into private law duties lies the functionalistic or purposive-oriented interpretation of 
national contract law, i.e. courts interpret contract law remedies in light of the purpose of conduct 
regulation.
620
 Such judicial reasoning determines the “Europeanisation” of national contract law: 
contract law remedies become a tool to strengthen the retail client regulation. 
                                                     
614 See C. Hadjiemmanuil, The Banking Union and Its Implications for Private Law: A Comment, cit., p. 5; D. Busch, Why 
MiFID matters to private law—the example of MiFID’s impact on an asset manager’s civil liability, CMLJ (2012) 4, p. 
400. 
615 See Section 138D of Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). 
616 A. Gardella, Bail-in and the Financing of Resolution within the SRM Framework, in D. Busch, G. Ferrarini (eds.), 
European Banking Union, Oxford, 2015, p. 373 ss. 
617 See M. Gulati, A. Gelpern, The wonder-clause, Journal of Comparative Economics 41 (2013) p. 367 ss. 
618 See Art. 31 (2) of BRRD. 
619 F. Della Negra, The private enforcement of the MiFID conduct of business rules. An overview of the Italian and Spanish 
experiences, ERCL (2014) 4, p. 590 
620 See Tribunal Supremo, 13 October 2015, n. 550; 26 February 2015, n. 115; 7 July 2014, n. 384; 20 January 2014, n. 
840/2013. 
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By contrast, in the UK the regulatory duties have been translated into private law duties only by the 
legislator which empowered private persons to claim damages for the firm’s failure to comply with 
certain conduct of business rules.
621
 The courts instead refuse to enforce regulatory standards through 
private law remedies and to interpret the common law in light of the purpose of these regulatory 
standards. Therefore, a contract clause disclaiming the firm’s liability for negligent advice cannot be 
attacked on the basis of the fact that, by doing so, the firm breached its conduct obligations.
622
 In fact, 
as a Judge recently pointed out in a case where the bank negligently advised its client but successfully 
disclaimed its liability, “while the result may seem harsh to some, it is not the role of the common law 
and this court to act as a regulator”.623 For this reason, apart from very few cases,624 English courts 
have constantly affirmed that the breach of financial regulation cannot give rise to any remedy based 
on common law.
625
  
The separation between contractual and regulatory standards is based on the idea that contract law 
should facilitate private autonomy and do nothing else. The facilitative role of contract law creates the 
environment for financial innovation,
626
 ensures commercial and legal certainty
627
 and strengthen the 
regulatory power of English courts. The reason why they have become “global regulators”628 of 
financial derivatives contracts is their capacity to give full effect to the self-regulation established by 
standardized terms namely by referring to the historical meaning and the intent of the original drafters, 
rather than to the intentions of the specific parties.
629
  
Yet, there is an important difference between the financial litigation in the UK and in continental 
Europe. Whereas in continental Europe financial litigation mainly concerns retail clients disputes, 
where the value at stake is relatively low and the information/bargaining power asymmetry between 
the parties very high, in the UK financial litigation concerns high value claims between professional 
clients who are supposed to have similar informative/bargaing power.  
The role of the EU courts  
Whilst before the crisis the CJEU had not played a major role in the development of EU financial 
regulation,
630
 after the crisis it has dealt with three important cases concerning the validity of the EU 
post-crisis measures
631
 and, for the first time, with one case regarding the interpretation of the MiFID I 
                                                     
621 Section 138D of FSMA. On the interpretation of this provision see, in particular,  Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal 
Bank of Scotland Plc [2010] EWHC 211 (Comm). 
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WL 2148250. 
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624 See Loosemore v Financial Concepts [2001] Lloyd’s Rep. P.N. 235; Seymour v Caroline Ockwell & Co. [2005] EWHC 
1137 (QB); Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd [2007] EWHC 2509 (QB). 
625 See Green v Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] EWHC 3661 (QB). 
626 At the same time the decisions and ratio decidendi of these complex cases strengthen the transparency of these markets. 
See J. P. Braithwaite, OTC derivatives, the courts and regulatory reform, CMLJ (2012) 4, p. 364 ss. 
627 See M. Bridge, J. Braithwaite, Private Law and Financial Crises, JCLS (2013) 2, p. 1. 
628 C. A. Whytock, Domestic Courts and Global Governance, TLRev (2009) 68 ss.; J. Braithwaite,The impact of crises by 
way of the courts, JIBFL (2014) 3, 147. 
629 See S. J. Choi, G. M. Gulati, Contract as Statute, MLRev. (2006) 104, p. 1129 ss.; R. J. Gilson, C. F. Sabel, R. E. Scott, 
Contract and innovation: the limited role of generalist courts in the evolution of novel contractual forms, NYULRev. 
(2013) 88, p. 172. 
630 See N. Moloney, Financial Market Regulation, Oxford, 2015, p. 772. 
631 Case C-270/12, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European Parliament, Council, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:18 (unsuccessful); Case C‑ 507/13, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v European 
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conduct of business rules (Genil v. Bankinter).
632
 Moreover, some depositors/shareholders have 
brought two actions for damages to the General Court, alleging non-contractual liability of the 
European Union for the damages caused to the applicants by the bail-in measures imposed by the EU 
on the Republic of Cyprus.
633
 
For our purposes, the most relevant case, is Genil v. Bankinter. This case was referred by a Spanish 
court to the CJEU at the peak of the wave of financial litigation on complex financial products which 
has inundated Spain and the other EU countries since 2008. The referring court asked the CJEU, 
among other things, whether the omission of the appropriateness and suitability test provided for by 
Art. 19 (4) and (5) of MiFID I in relation to the distribution of an interest rate swap to a retail investor, 
determines the absolute nullity of the contract entered into between the investor and the investment 
institution. The CJEU held that, since the MiFID I lays down administrative sanctions for the firm’s 
breach of national provisions transposing the directive but it does not require the Member States to 
provide for contractual consequences, it is for the internal legal order of each Member State to 
determine the contractual consequences of non-compliance with those obligations, subject to 
observance of the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.
634
  
By referring to the Genil v. Bankinter case the Spanish Supreme Court has recently declared the 
nullity of an interest rate swap distributed to a retail client because the bank did not carry out the 
suitability test under Art. 19 (5) of MiFID I.
635
 However, in other jurisdictions (Italy, France, 
Netherlands) the breach of this rule cannot determine the avoidance of the contract but only the 
liability of the investment firm
636
 and in the UK investment firms can be held liable only on the basis 
of the statutory cause of action of Section 138D of FSMA 2000.
637
 Whether these different judicial 
approaches are in line with the principle of effectiveness of EU law can be doubted. 
The problem is that the CJEU did not clarify whether Member States have the obligation to establish a 
contractual remedy if the firm fails to comply with its conduct of business rules and how the 
effectiveness of that remedy should be assessed. It could be argued that Member States, in light of the 
principle of procedural autonomy, are free to decide not to introduce any contractual remedy for the 
investors. However, this line of reasoning would give rise to the paradoxical consequence that only 
those Member States that establish contractual remedies could be subject to the requirement of 
effectiveness and equivalence.
638
 Moreover, the case law of the CJEU has shown, in many different 
areas, that the principle of the procedural autonomy does not mean that Member States are free to 
regulate or not to regulate a specific matter but it rather establishes their competence to regulate the 
matters that have not been covered yet by EU law.
639
  
(Contd.)                                                                  
Parliament and Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2394 (The Advocate General JÄÄSKINEN concluded for the dismissal of the 
action and the UK withdrew the action); Case C‑ 209/13, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland v 
Council, ECLI:EU:C:2014:283 (unsuccessful). 
632 CJEU, case C-604/11, Genil v. Bankinter, ECLI:EU:C:2013:344. 
633 Case T-405/14, Yavorskaya v Council and Others v. Council e. a.; case T-680/13, K. Chrysostomides & Co. e.a. v 
Council e.a. 
634 CJEU, case C-604/11, Genil v. Bankinter, para 56. 
635 Tribunal Supremo, 26 February 2015, n. 115. 
636 See O.O. Cherednychenko, Contract Governance in the EU: Conceptualising the Relationship between Investor 
Protection Regulation and Private Law, ELJ (2015) 21, p. 500 ss. 
637 See P. Reynolds, Selling financial products: the interface between regulatory and common law standards, JIBLR (2014) 
5, p. 269 ss. 
638 See also S. Grundmann, The Bankinter Case on MIFID Regulation and Contract Law, ERCL (2013) 3, p. 267 ss.  
639 See, for this opinion, W. Van Gerven, Of Rights, Remedies and Procedures, CMLRev (2000) 3, p. 501 ss.; C.M. Kakouris, 
Do the Member States Possess Judicial Procedural “autonomy”, CMLRev (1997) 6, p. 1389; S. Prechal, Community 
Law in National Courts: the Lessons from Van Schijndel, CMLRev (1998) 2, p. 681 ss.  
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The role of extra-judicial enforcement mechanisms  
It is not possible to understand the institutional role played after the global financial crisis by national 
courts without taking into account the increasing relevance of the ADR mechanisms. At the EU level, 
the harmonization of ADRs has become an essential element of the retail financial market regulation 
and it reflects the societal trend of the transformation of the citizen into a “financial citizen”. As 
financial services have become essential for the everyday life, the settlement of disputes between 
services’ providers and clients should be designed in order to ensure an effective, cheap and informal 
access to justice for retail clients. This rationale accounts for the trend from a convergence towards the 
harmonization of ADR schemes in the EU. In 2001 the European Commission launched an out-of-
court complaints network called “FIN-NET” in order to facilitate cross-border retail client dispute 
resolution,
640
 in 2004 the MiFID I required Member States to establish “efficient and effective 
complaints and redress procedures for the out-of-court settlement of consumer disputes” (Art. 53) and 
in 2014 the MiFID II reiterated the same principle and further imposed to the national authorities the 
obligation to notify ESMA of the complaint and redress procedures (Art. 75). Moreover, under the 
MiFID II, Member States shall set up mechanisms “to ensure that compensation may be paid or other 
remedial action be taken in accordance with national law for any financial loss or damage suffered as a 
result of an infringement of this Directive or of Regulation (EU) No 600/2014” (Art. 69). Although 
this innovative provision, which was added by the Parliament to the MiFID II Commission’s 
proposal,
641
  does not introduce an express remedial action for the firm’s breach of MiFID II and 
MiFIR, it seem to transpose to the EU level the model of the consumer redress scheme operated by the 
FCA in the UK on the basis of Section 404 of FSMA 2000.
642
 
The most important question is whether these extra-judicial mechanisms represent only a means to 
resolve a dispute or whether they can also perform an EU law-enforcement function. This question is 
relevant in order to assess whether the EU is considering the private enforcement via ADRs as a part 
of its regulatory strategy to improve the functioning of the internal market. In some Member States 
(Italy and Spain) ADRs have been originally designed as an “emergency measure” to compensate the 
losses suffered by investors due to widespread mis-selling scandals and lighten the work load of 
national courts. The research has shown that, although the procedural schemes remain very diverse 
even in the same jurisdiction, national ADRs (e.g. Arbitro Bancario Finanziario in Italy and the 
Comisionado para la Defensa del Cliente in Spain) increasingly take into account statutory law, the 
case law of the Supreme Courts and the principles of financial regulation to motivate their decisions.
643
  
In the UK the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS) determines the complaint by reference to what is 
“fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case”.644 English courts have emphasized the 
special nature of this adjudicating body by holding that the FOS is not bound by common law
645
 and 
that its determinations can be set aside by means of judicial review only if “his opinion as to what is 
                                                     
640 See also Commission, Communication on alternative dispute resolution in the area of financial services. Brussels, 
11.12.2008 MARKT/H3/JS D(2008). 
641 Art. 72 of MiFID II (version adopted by the European Parliament on 26 October 2012 (COM(2011)0656 – C7-0382/2011 
– 2011/0298(COD)). 
642  The FCA can require financial firms to establish and operate a consumer redress scheme when there may have been a 
widespread or regular failure by relevant firms to comply with its conduct of business rules, consumers have suffered (or 
may suffer) loss or damage and it considers that it is desirable to make rules for the purpose of securing that redress is 
made to the consumers. It is for the firm to investigate whether it has failed to comply with the conduct of business rules, 
to determine whether the failure has caused any loss or damage to consumers and to award compensation. 
643 See F. Della Negra, The private enforcement of the MiFID conduct of business rules. An overview of the Italian and 
Spanish experiences, ERCL (2014) 4, p. 590 
644 See Section 228 FSMA 2000. The FOS shall take into account, among other things, the relevant law and regulations 
(DISP 3.6.4 of FCA Handbook Dispute Resolution Complaints). 
645 See R. (on the application of London Capital Group) v Financial Ombudsman Service Ltd [2013] EWHC 2425 (Admin).  
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fair and reasonable in all the circumstances of the case is perverse or irrational”.646 The nature of the 
FOS’ adjudication, together with its broad competence (up to 150,000£), gives to retail 
unsophisticated investors, who could not afford access to courts, an effective way to protect their 
rights vis-à-vis financial firms.  
The role of EU supervision and public enforcement  
The establishment of ESAs and conferral of micro-prudential supervisory powers to the ECB confirm 
the public enforcement-oriented approach of the EU. However, the new tasks and powers conferred on 
these EU authorities and, in particular the consumer protection task of the ESAs, increase the 
interactions between financial regulation and national contract law. The ESMA has been entrusted 
with the objective of protecting customers (Art. 1 (5) (f)) and with the task of protecting investors 
(Art. 8 (1) (h)) and consumers (Art. 9). Strangely whereas the legislator refers to the different notions 
of consumer, investor, customer, it has not mentioned that of client which is expressly defined by the 
MiFID I/II and other relevant financial directives.  
Despite this terminological confusion, both consumers and retail clients fall into the ESMA’s remit. 
Firstly, ESMA can take action not only when the service involved a retail client, as defined by the 
MiFID II, but also when it involves a consumer if its action is necessary to ensure the effective and 
consistent application of EU law (Art. 1 (3)). This interpretation also reflects the composition of its 
Stakeholder Group which shall include, among others, representatives of “consumers and users of 
financial services” (Art. 37 (2)). Moreover, ESMA can take action to protect both retail and 
professional clients. Had the ESMA’s mandate been restricted only to the protection of consumers, 
ESMA could protect only the retail clients who are natural persons.  
The ESAs do not have direct competence with regard to complaints against a credit or financial 
institution. However, under Art. 17 of ESAs Regulations they can open investigations and take further 
actions concerning the failure of national competent authorities to comply with their obligations. 
Moreover, in the framework of their consumer protection’s task, the ESAs can adopt a wide range of 
measures (draft technical standards, guidelines and recommendations, warnings and product 
intervention) which can have an impact on both the contract-making and enforcement. First, both 
(quasi) regulatory and supervisory acts may perform a contract-shaping function namely they can be 
used to (or they may have the effect to) limit the parties’s autonomy to enter into transactions or to 
decide the content of the transaction.
647
 In particular, guidelines/recommendations can set higher 
standards of client protection than those established by EU law.
648
 Although guidelines are not 
binding, the NCAs and market participants shall make every effort to comply with them and the 
reiterated firm’s non-compliance with a guideline, in so far as determines a breach of the relevant EU 
                                                     
646 See R. (on the application of IFG Financial Services Ltd v Financial Ombudsman Services Ltd v Mr and Mrs Jenkins 
[2005] EWHC 1153 (Admin). 
647 By referring to the content of the transaction, rather than the contract, I consider both the rules which impose certain 
duties to conduct to the parties (e.g. pre-contractual information duties) and those that specify the content of the contract 
(e.g. the price of goods and services).  
648 See Y. Svetiev-A. Ottow, Financial Supervision in the Interstices Between Private and Public Law, ERCL (2014) 4, p. 
496 ss. 
See ESMA, Guidelines on certain aspects of the MiFID suitability requirements, 6 July 2012, ESMA/2012/387. ESMA states 
that the age, family situation or educational level of the client should be included into the “necessary information” the 
firm must collect when assessing client’s suitability under Art. 25 (2) MiFID II (para 34). See also ESMA, Guidelines on 
ETFs and other UCITS issues, 18 December 2012, ESMA/2012/832 where ESMA imposes to the UCITS’ managers 
duties to conduct that have not been laid down in the relevant UCITS legislation (para 22, 37, 43). 
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law, may activate enforcement proceedings under Art. 17 of ESAs Regulations.
649
 Similarly, practical 
convergence tools intended to build consistent supervisory practices pursuant to Art. 29 (2) of ESAs 
Regulations,
650
 may have the effect of driving the parties’ conduct and to affect the content of their 
contracts.  
Against the contract-shaping function of ESAs acts it could be argued that ESAs, unlike some NCAs, 
do not have the power to terminating, suspending, modifying obligations arising from contracts and 
therefore cannot take measures which interfere with the parties’ contractual obligations. However, the 
fact that ESAs have not been entrusted with express “contract-intervention” powers is the logical 
corollary of the EU choice of regulating financial contracts as products; this choice serves, among 
other things, the purpose of increasing the effectiveness of the EU regulatory intervention by 
preventing Member States to circumvent EU regulation through their national contract laws. This 
consideration does not indicate, however, that the concrete exercise of ESAs powers do not affect 
national contract law. If market participants could challenge an ESAs act addressed to them because it 
interferes with their contractual obligations, the ESAs consumer protection mandate would lose its 
effectiveness and credibility. Financial transactions are based on contracts and any intervention 
affecting the transaction may produce spill-over effects on the contract. 
With regard to private enforcement, the main issue arises whether the decisions of the ESAs (and the 
ECB) can be binding on national courts. For example, in the event that the investors claims damages 
against the bank for the alleged mis-selling of a complex product that has been subsequently banned 
by ESMA, is the national court bound by the ESMA’s decision or can the court decide that the product 
was suitable for this investor? In the field of competition law, EU law requires national courts to take 
decisions that do not run counter the decisions of the European Commission and the NCAs but in the 
field of banking and finance there is a lack of coordination between public and private enforcement.
651
 
It is doubtful whether national courts can deviate from a decision of the ESAs or the ECB.
652
 In 
conformity with the principles of the separation of powers and rule of law, which are common to the 
constitutional traditions of Member States, the national courts should not be bound by the decisions of 
the ESAs and NCAs. But it could also be argued that to the extent that ESMA and NCAs ensure the 
consistent application and interpretation of the EU legislation (Art. 8 (1) (b) ESAs Regulations), 
national courts, which have the obligation to interpret national law in light of the objective of EU law, 
should follow the EU law interpretation given by ESMA. If the court’s judgments run counter the 
ESAs’ decisions, the ESAs mandate of ensuring the effectiveness and convergence of EU regulatory 
standards would be utterly frustrated.  
The impact of the SSM on national contract law is less evident because the ECB does not have any 
investor/consumer protection mandate.
653
 For this reason, the ECB may not take action or base its 
instructions to NCAs exclusively or even mainly on concerns of consumer protection. But when a 
detrimental business conduct is systemic and it is capable of undermining the stability of the financial 
markets the ECB should coordinate with NCAs and take adequate action.
654
 A concrete scenario in 
                                                     
649 See European Commission, Report to the European Parliament and the Council on the evaluation of the Regulation (EU) 
No 236/2012 on short selling and certain aspects of credit default swaps, COM(2013) 885 final. 
650 See, for example, ESMA, Questions and Answers. Application of the AIFMD, 21 July 2014, ESMA/2014/868. 
651 Art. 9 of Directive 2014/104/EU of 26 November 2014 on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law 
for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union O.J. L 349/1 (2014) 
and art. 16 of Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty O.J. L 1/1 (2003). 
652 See S. Grundmann, The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and Rulebook, EBOR 
(2015), p. 19. 
653 Recital No 28 of SSM Regulation. 
654 See S. Grundmann, The Banking Union Translated into (Private Law) Duties: Infrastructure and Rulebook, cit., p. 18. 
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which the SSM’s division between prudential and conduct supervision could be challenged is the mis-
selling of hybrid capital instruments and subordinated debt instruments.
655
 These financial instruments 
provide additional external capital to banks in times of financial distress but they can pose particular 
risk to retail clients due to their complex loss absorption mechanisms
656
 or because they are issued to 
offset limited equity and insured deposits
657
.  
To avoid the risk of consumer detriment, the UK FCA has permanently restricted the distribution of 
COCOs to ordinary retail clients.
658
 By contrast, in Spain the national competent authorities did not 
take any preventive measure to restrict the distribution of hybrid instruments (partecipationes 
preferentes) to retail clients by banks subject to the resolution procedures of the Fund for Orderly 
Bank Restructuring (FOBR).
659
  Rather, given the large scale of detriment caused by such products to 
investors, these banks (Bankia, Catalunya Caixa, NCG Banco) set up a special-purpose arbitration, 
under the supervision of a commission of inquiry (Comisión de seguimiento de instrumentos híbridos 
de capital y deuda subordinada) the main purpose of compensating the investors taking into account 
the need not to aggravate taxpayers. Similarly, in Italy the Government has recently proposed to up a 
special arbitration procedure in order to compensate investors who suffered a loss as a result of the 
distribution of subordinated debt instruments by banks that have been subject to resolution 
procedures.
660
 The Spanish and Italian cases show that the banks’ crisis and large scale distribution of 
hybrid capital instruments are strictly correlated and that widespread mis-selling practices can indicate 
a deterioriation of the prudential situation of banks.  
Concluding remarks  
The unprecedented changes undergone by the EU after the global financial crisis have not directly 
transformed the contract governance of retail financial transactions. The key retail market legislation 
(MiFID I, MiFID II, PRIIPs Regulation) does not harmonise national contract laws and remedies. 
Therefore, whereas regulatory duties and sanctions have been increasingly harmonised, contractual 
duties and remedies remain based on national law. In spite of that, the EU plays an increasingly 
important influence on contract law in the “law in action” because both many national courts and 
ADRs take into account the EU regulatory standards when interpreting national contract law. 
However, this claim cannot be generalised.  
The English courts interpret financial contracts in order to protect the private autonomy of the parties 
and reject any purposive-oriented interpretation of national common law in light of EU financial 
regulation. Contract law serves to facilitate financial innovation and judicial interpretation aims at 
                                                     
655 See also E. Ferran, European Banking Union: Imperfect, But It Can Work, cit., p. 14. Under the CRR, hybrid capital 
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62) 
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ensuring the certainty of legal transactions. By contrast, in many continental jurisdictions, national 
courts interpret contractual duties and remedies in light of EU financial regulation in order to protect 
retail investors against the information and economic power of the financial firm. The emphasis is 
placed on the effective protection of the retail investor rather than on the private autonomy of the 
financial firm or the certainty of legal transactions.  
This purposive-oriented interpretation of national contract law triggers a process of “Europeanization” 
of national contract law governing retail financial transactions which is also reinforced by the role of 
national ADRs and EU supervisory authorities. National ADR mechanisms do not only provide for a 
cheaper and faster retail disputes resolution but they can also contribute to the enforcement of EU 
retail financial regulation because their decisions are significantly influenced by the regulatory 
principles laid down by EU law. The (quasi)-regulatory and supervisory powers of the ESAs have the 
potential for shaping not only the conduct but also the contractual practices and documentation of 
financial market participants. In the framework of the SSM, even if the ECB does not have the task 
and power to protect consumers, prudential and conduct supervision should be coordinated because 
detrimental distribution practices may indicate the deterioration of the solidity of credit institutions. 
Besides the ongoing process of “Europeanisation” of national contract law, this study has shown the 
emergence of what I named the “contractualisation of EU law” in the governance of banks and 
sovereign crisis.  Whereas the law of contract plays a little role in the MiFID I and MiFID II – the 
most important EU conduct-shaping regulatory instruments – it has recently been used as a device to 
support the resolution tools introduced by the BRRD. In this context, contract law does not serve to 
protect investors vis-à-vis credit and investment firms but it aims at ensuring the full achievements of 
the resolution’s objectives.   
  
Contorting the law of torts 
 
Ronan R. Condon* 
 
Introduction 
Tort law has been traditionally concerned with attributing to actors rights and duties. These rights and 
duties are justified on the basis of isolating from individual harmful conduct that is legal relevant. In 
the common law, the conceptual tools used by tort law are wrongful conduct, duty, reasonable care, 
causation and harm.
661
 These conceptual tools place the individual, her rights and duties, at the centre 
of tort law. In general, the law is more willing to protect negative liberties, harmful interferences with 
another’s person or property, than to make parties conform to good ends.662  
EU law, on the other hand, is a functional legal order. It uses the individual as a tool to construct the 
internal market.
663
 Therefore, while judged in terms of legal outcomes the individual’s rights may be 
enhanced by EU law, especially vis-à-vis the state, the individual, her legal rights and duties, is not at 
the core of EU law.
664
 The enlargement of the scope of individual legal rights are, more properly, 
considered secondary or incidental to the market-building objectives of the EU.
665
 The objectives of 
EU law are regulatory.
666
 In this context, the regulatory tasks undertaken by the EU have grown 
considerably in the past thirty years with the EU involving itself, more and more, in what is usually 
referred to a programme of positive integration. While tort law is mostly touched somewhat indirectly 
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661 The conceptual tools used in leading civil law jurisdictions such as France or Germany are quite similar. The main 
difference vis-a-vis France relates to duty. Whereas, duty is an important control mechanism in English common law, in 
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662 Affirmative duties have always been somewhat problematic in English law. This is quite obviously the case with regard to 
state liability but is also evident from negligence law more generally. 
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Groussot & F Schulyok (eds) General Principles of EU Law and European Private Law (Ashgate, 2013) 121. In this 
perspective, it is a form of ‘regulated’ autonomy. For an incisive critique see H Dagan ‘Between Regulated and 
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by this process
667
, in product liability law EU law is directly relevant. In this respect, the regime of 
product liability at the EU level was slow to develop. Initially, it was considered a regime of minimum 
harmonisation meaning that national law was free to impose a higher standard of care on producers. 
Second, the presence of a developmental risk defence led some commentators to wonder whether it 
was, in fact, a toothless regime. However, with a number of judgments flowing from France’s late 
implementation of the Directive and, then, the Gonsalez Sanchez judgment, it became clear, somewhat 
dramatically, that it was rather a regime of full harmonisation.
668
    
While product liability law has long been an outlier in terms of the underlying (individualistic) 
philosophy of tort law, concerned more with enterprise liability than fashioning rules of individual 
responsibility, such strict enterprise liability can be fitted into the conceptual tools of tort liability 
stated above. The main difference between enterprise liability and more traditional tort liability is at 
the standard of care stage: causation alone is sufficient to give rise to liability without a requirement of 
fault being made out. Before the Boston Scientific judgment, a main concern of the ECJ was to police 
national courts such that they might not surreptitiously bring fault back in via their interpretation of the 
requirements of product liability.
669
 However, it is submitted that Boston Scientific is of a different 
order: it is a far more, shall we say, ambitious judgment that throws the conceptual tools of tort law 
into disarray. It is an attempt to pursue full-fledged risk management via tort law, a functional 
subjectification of the ‘individual’, to be sure, but also a functionalization of tort law to this end. A 
minimum basic corrective justice is replaced by the concept of private enforcement leading to a 
transformation of liability, developed in the USA, but particularly new in the European context. While 
this might be criticised from a traditional tort law perspective as a poorly reasoned judgment, we argue 
that it should be analysed rather to understand its underlying normative commitments to bring to the 
surface, as it were, the Court’s basic commitments. 
This short paper, thus, proceeds in three steps. First, by briefly analysing the twentieth-century re-
shaping of tort law. Second, by briefly sketching the New Approaches’ relevance to tort law. Third, by 
examining the recent Boston Scientific judgment with a view to how liability is transforming under the 
influence of EU law. The claim of this paper is that these developments impact on the internal 
rationale of tort law and, consequently, more generally on the division of labour in ‘private’ 
obligations between contract and tort law. 
National regulatory tort law 
The idea that private law, and tort law in particular, is transforming is not a new one. It is claimed that 
tort law has always served both an internal and external function.
670
 Traditionally, internally tort law is 
linked to corrective justice while externally serves a market function: market building (nineteenth-
                                                     
667 One might read Francovich in this manner. While it challenges state liability law, it leaves largely untouched the core tort 
doctrine of negligence. ECHR law is more relevant in this domain especially with regard to state liability e.g. Osman and 
post-Osman case-law. 
668 This development was much bemoaned in France see G Viney L'INTERPRÉTATION PAR LA CJCE DE LA 
DIRECTIVE DU 25 JUILLET 1985 SUR LA RESPONSABILITÉ DU FAIT DES PRODUITS DÉFECTUEUX. 44 La 
Semaine Juridique 177. 
669 We might recall, famously, C-300/95 Commission v UK [1997] ECR I-2649. 
670 More generally regarding private law see C Schmid ‘The Thesis of the Instrumentalisation of Private Law by the EU in a 
Nutshell’ in C Joerges & T Ralli (eds.) European Constitutionalism without Private Law: Private Law without 
Democracy (Arena Report 3/11); and those scholars applying and influenced by a systems’ theory analysis e.g. K-H 
Ladeur ‘The Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of Postmodern Administrative Law’ Osgoode 
CLPE Research Paper No. 16/2011; M Renner ‘Death by Complexity – the Financial Crisis and the Crisis of Law in 
World Society’ in P Kjaer et all The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective: The Dark Side of Functional 
Differentiation (Hart Publishing, 2011).  
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century), mediating social interdependence (twentieth-century), and now perhaps market regulation 
(EU – a possible role for tort law as ex post regulation).671  
Ever since the industrialization of Western society at the end of the nineteenth-century, courts and 
scholarly treatment of tort law has outpaced legislatures in finding novel solutions to problems of mass 
production and the injuries such activities engender.
672
 The story of enterprise liability is a well-told 
one, especially in the United States.
673
 Outside of the United States the regulatory mix is different but 
nonetheless a broadly similar pattern is evident whereby tort law is expanded and utilised for 
regulatory purposes. We might call what developed during the welfare state as national regulatory 
private (tort) law.
674
  
While the instrumentalization of tort law towards substantive ends, e.g. consumer protection or 
economic efficiency, has developed at the national level, this competition of ideas, has not been 
resolved at the European level.
675
 We propose to examine Boston Scientific (manufacturer liability) in 
this short note to examine the relationship between regulation and liability, and how the former might 
be shaping the latter its aims and doctrines. This concerns what is called above the internal aspect of 
tort law, which might be thought to be disintegrating under the functionalist approach in EU law i.e. 
functional subjectivisation, no droit subjectif.
676
 In other words, a fundamental question is whether this 
new transnational regulatory private law can be undergirded by a conception of relational justice, 
whether a weak conception or whether it is entirely functionalist? In terms of the external dimension 
of tort law, the question is whether a model of ‘institutional complementarity’ is developing.677 Before 
fixing on the Boston Scientific judgment, however, it is necessary to reconstruct the development of 
national regulatory private law to delineate the differences between this form of ‘instrumentalization’, 
and the approach the CJEU appears to be pursuing. 
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accessed 10 June 2015). 
672 Legislatures began by introduction acts such as Workers’ Compensation Acts, and social insurance but tort law soon 
developed to reflect similar purposes. For example, the rise of strict liability can be read in this light especially if one 
considers the American gloss placed on Rylands v Fletcher allowing strict recovery for ultra-hazardous activities. For a 
more detailed analysis, see G Brüggemeier ‘Risk and Strict Liability: The Distinct Examples of the Germany, the US and 
Russia’ EUI Working Paper Series LAW 2012/29. 
673 G Priest ‘The Modern Expansion of Tort Liability: Its Sources, Its Effects, and Its Reform’ (1991) 5(3) The Journal of 
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674 O Kahn-Freund ‘On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law’ (1974) 37 MLR 1. His thesis on ‘transplants’; and T 
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‘Three Forms of Responsibility: On the Relationship between Tort Law and the Welfare State’ (2001) 60(3) CLJ 553. 
Also, D Priel ‘British Politics, the Welfare State and Tort Law’ (ssrn, accessed on 10 June 2015).  
675 See BS Markenisis & S Deakin ‘The Random Element of their Lordships’ Infallible Judgment: An Economic and 
Comparative Analysis of the Tort of Negligence from Anns to Murphy’ (1992) 55(5) MLR 619 reconstruction of the 
policy questions at issue in the English case-law from an economic perspective. This analysis remains valid, although has 
become more complex in light of the impact of human rights on tort law. 
676 M Rüffert ‘Rights and Remedies in European Community Law: A Comparative View’ (1997) 34 C.M.L.R 307. 
 N Reich ‘Rights without Duties? Reflections on the State of Liability Law in the Multilevel Governance System of the 
Community. Is there a Need for a More Coherent Approach in European Private Law? EUI Working Paper Series LAW 
2009/10. Although obviously one can have an objective law that protects individual liberties, which might be as extensive 
as the protection of individual rights. Nevertheless, the latter model i.e. traditionally associated with the common law, is 
more open to a utility calculation. G Samuel ‘“Le Droit Subjectif” and English Law’ (1987) 46(2) CLJ 264. 
677 Cafaggi. ‘A Coordinated Approach to Regulation and Civil Liability in European Law: Rethinking Institutional 
Complementarities’ in The Institutional Framework of European Private Law (OUP, 2006) 191. 
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The emergence of national regulatory tort law 
The first transformation of liability law can be traced to the nineteenth-century.
678
 In Brüggemeier’s 
terms, nineteenth-century tort law derives its structure from the natural law premised on individual 
responsibility and fault-based liability.
679
 This law aimed at market-building by providing procedural 
ground rules of interaction via contract law, and fostered growth by ensuring that not all externalities 
were internalized.
680
 These rules were developed in a world of small entrepreneurial activity in which 
the large vertically integrated firm had not yet emerged; nevertheless, this structure of liability 
persisted for quite a while thereafter.
681
 Indeed, despite the rise of industry in the latter-half of the 
nineteenth-century, which included the rise of firms, technical risks and insurance, by the end of the 
century this individualistic model remained largely intact:   
Notwithstanding these social upheavals civil law in general and law of delict in particular of the 
continental European codifications adhere to their pre-industrial moral heritage: namely, Roman law 
(iniuria/culpa) and natural law. In a similar way the law of torts of the Anglo-American Common Law 
remained pre-industrial until the 20th Century.
682
 
In the common law, this involved the crystallization of the will theory in contract and the definition of 
tort law as being an excess of will. Tort law’s province was parasitic on that of contract law and 
contractual ways of thinking, as it were, influenced the shaping of tortious recovery.
683
 The most 
famous example of this, in practice, is the well-known Wright v Winterbottom decision.
684
 Atiyah 
refers to the concatenation of values in English contract law as those of ‘…classical economics, of 
Benthamite radicalism, of liberal political ideals, and of the law itself, created and moulded in the 
shadow of these movements.’685 Where contract led, tort law followed. It would appear, therefore, that 
the line between tort law and regulation is blurred because from the very beginning a notion of the 
public-private divide is inherent by giving priority to contract as a means of private ordering.
686
  
                                                     
678 The reorganization of private law in the nineteenth-century, in both common law and civil law jurisdictions, is well-
documented. D Ibbetson A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (OUP, 2001) (contract and tort), GE White 
Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (OUP, 1980) (tort) PS Atiyah The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract 
(OUP, 1979) (contract). Most apparent is the link to the state in France, only later in Germany. 
679 For a general overview see F Ewald L’Etat Provenence (Grasset, 1986); for a more doctrinal analysis of English common 
law D Ibbetson ibid; for the ‘Langwellian revolution’ and its impact on tort law, which led to the creation of the fault 
paradigm see GE White ibid esp. ch.2.  
680 This is the controversial ‘Horwitz thesis’ see M Horwitz The Great Transformation of American Law, 1780-1860 
(Harvard, 1979); See also Howarth (n 14); On the difference between proceduralist private law and substantive private 
law see R Brownsword ‘A Time to Stand and Stare’ in R Brownsword et all The Foundations of European Private Law 
159. 
681 In Germany, the classical contract-tort model was adopted in the BGB without what was perceived at the time as the 
necessary ‘social oil’ (Von Gierke quoted in HW Micklitz ‘Do Consumers and Businesses Need a New Architecture of 
Consumer Law? A Thought Provoking Impulse’ (2013) 32(1) Yearbook of European Law 266. This model continues to 
pose problems for the development of ‘public’ tort law.  
682 G Brüggemeier (n 12) 1. 
683 Famously, the ‘Holy Trinity’ of the doctrines of assumption of risk, common employment and contributory negligence 
which, in effect, denied employees recovery against their employers for workplace accidents in both the US and the UK. 
684 (1842) 10 M&W 109. 
685 PS Atiyah ‘Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations’ in Essays on Contracts (Clarendon, 1986) 10. This formed 
the paradigm of modern contract law, and continues to cause controversy, in terms of its underlying values and secondly, 
in its practical ability to serve commercial expectation. For the former see the legal realists, most prominently, MR Cohen 
‘The Basis of Contract’ (1933) 46(4) Harvard Law Review 553. In the latter vein, see C Mitchell Contract Law and 
Contract Practice: Bridging the Gap Between Legal Reasoning and Commercial Expectations (Hart Publishing, 2013). 
This is not the entire picture, however, because natural law also influence these developments see J Gordley ‘The 
Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business’ (2000) 88(6) California Law Review 1815. 
686 In other words, against the use of what the French refer to as ‘objective law’ to intervene to reallocate contractual risks. 
Contorting the Law of Torts 
131 
This state of affairs led to legislative enactment to circumvent the strictures of the private law of 
contract and tort, providing for recovery based on the ideas of risk spreading, internalization and 
insurance. In the common law, Workers Compensation Acts are the paradigmatic example of this 
move to legislative enactment to circumvent the structural limits of private law. Caffagi remarks:  
In the last part of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth, the emergence of 
regulation, and in particular that of welfare regulation, was primarily due to significant limits of 
compensation. These shortcomings were associated with the internal structure of civil liability and the 
weaknesses of other branches of private law, especially contract and labour law. Worker compensation 
regimes for industrial accidents are only one example of an emerging body of legislation stimulated by 
the combined weaknesses of civil liability and labour law.
687
 
The expansion of regulation was, of course, a fundamental change in the role and function of the state 
and required an expansion of executive power to achieve its ends.
688
 The concept of security replaced 
individual responsibility and self-help, and necessitated an expansion of the domain of state activity.
689
 
The ‘machine age’ required coordinated, social responses.690  
Where regulation led, tort law followed.
691
 Grafting on to its existing conceptual structure, placing 
greater emphasis on arguments based on policy, tort law entered the twentieth-century. In product 
liability, this change is most evidenced through making the firm liable for typical business risks.
692
 In 
the common law, at least, the leading judgments were those of Cardozo J. in McPherson v Buick, and 
in Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Co. These established that the general duty of care could outflank 
contract law, and apply to indirect property and physical injuries.
693
 The first decision, established a 
general duty of care, the second clarified that it applies the emerging policy goals of compensation and 
prevention in tort law to specific relations.
694
 Not all injuries result in liability, only those in which a 
proximate relationship can be established.
695
 This is what Schmid means, it would appear, by the 
‘weak corrective justice’ in twentieth-century private law.696 By this notion, Schmid highlights a very 
interesting dimension to liability law and its relationship to broader conception of the regulatory role 
of the state. On the one hand, one might discern the normative relationship between A and B that 
                                                     
687 Cafaggi (n 17) 192-93. For similar movements in German, American and Russian law see G Brüggemeier (n 12). 
688 M Taggart (ed) The Province of Administrative Law (Hart Publishing, 1997). 
689 Ewald (n 19). C Harlow State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond (Clarendon, 2002) is disquieted by the influence of the 
welfare state on tort law, which she refers to as a ‘distortion’ of the corrective justice basis of tort law. She traces this 
supposedly malign influence to Dorset.  
690 L Josserand L’évolution de la responsabilité (conférence donnée aux Facultés de Droit de Lisbonne, de Coimbre, de 
Belgrade, de Bucarest, d’Orades, de Bruxells, à l’institut français de Madrid, aux centres juridiques de L’Institut des 
Hautes Études marocaines à Rabat et á Casablanca) Évolutions et Actualités Conférences de Droit Civil, (Receuil Sirey, 
1936). 
691 The pressure exerted on tort law was, it is true, less in Europe than in the United States due to the more developed 
functional equivalents to tort law available. 
692 G Brüggemeier Common Principles of Tort Law: A Pre-Statement of Law (BICILL 2004),  
693 Palsgraf was somewhat of a retreat from MacPherson. For analysis see GE White (n 18). 
694 Although if one examines the early scholarship, the emphasis is more on compensation (and risk spreading) than 
deterrence e.g. H Laski ‘The Basis of Vicarious Liability’ (1916-1917) 26 Yale LJ 105. 
695 ibid, 67: ‘Courts are not regulatory agencies that set general standards. They decide concrete cases. In such situations, they 
determine ‘correct’ behaviour, appropriate to the situation and the defendant.’  
696  C Schmid ‘The Thesis of the Instrumentalisation of Private Law by the EU in a Nutshell’ in C Joerges & C Railli (eds.) 
European Constitutionalism without Private Law, Private Law without Democracy’ Arena Report 3/11, no. 14, 17-37, 
21-22 esp.  In other words, despite the fact that the law might serve ‘external’ objectives, here compensation and 
prevention, it can be justified in terms of justice between the parties. Herein, proximity is a way to tie the parties together 
in terms of justice. For a sophisticated inquiry into the duty of care test in English law, its interpersonal justice and policy 
dimensions see A Robertson ‘Constraints on Policy-Based Reasoning in Private Law’ in A Roberston & T Hang Wu 
(eds.) The Goals of Private Law (Hart Publishing, 2009) 261.  
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affixes responsibility, on the other, the role of tort law to intermediate group relations in an 
interdependent world e.g. consumer-manufacturers. Cane refers to this as the distributive justice 
dimension to tort law that uses the duty of care to reallocate benefits and burdens by adjusting rights 
and duties.
697
 However, the paradigmatic tort action – that of motor accidents – resulted in little 
trouble with regard to the ordinary operation of rules of causation, proximity and requirement of harm 
meaning that the normative core of tort law remained unperturbed. The duty of care approach, its 
effluxion, expanded grounds and bounds of tort law without upsetting too much its underlying 
relational structure.
698
 
These internal and external faces of liability relate to the role of liability in creating a normative 
framework and in responding to the state’s regulatory framework. In the latter case, the 
‘secularization’ of the standard of care goes a long way to give to tort law a regulatory function.699 
Renner, in particular, stresses this dimension in relation to strict (enterprise) liability. For Renner, the 
law enhanced its internal complexity to deal with corporate activity: 
The establishment of the legal concept of strict liability was based upon the consideration that liability 
for the causation of damages should, in an age of automated production, not be made contingent upon 
(human) failure. But, in order to impose strict liability for certain types of activities, the courts 
necessarily had, more or less scientifically, to evaluate social risks rather than indulge in the normative 
questions of intent and negligence. In doing so, they specifically had to pay due regard to the technical 
falsibility and to the costs of preventive measures. Thus, cognitive expectations with regard to the 
technological-scientific state of the art, industry-specific standards and economic calculus soon found 
their way into legal reasoning.’700 
Strict liability did not, of course, mean absolute liability. Causation and individual agency remained 
important. It was strict liability largely for high risk activities. In addition, negligence was transformed 
into negligence enterprise liability.
701
 This organizational model of liability existed side-by-side with 
ex ante regulation and complemented it.
702
 The trend was towards the development of an 
organizational-type liability, which by the use of negligence and strict liability law makes enterprises 
internalize their externalities. By the development of separate legal personality for firms at the end of 
the nineteenth-century, the corporation as distinct from the individual entered the law. It entered a law 
that relied on the language of individuals, to be sure, but nevertheless reshaped liability towards an 
internalizing model. A good example of this transformation is given by Brüggemeier when he 
constrasts Thomas v Winchester and MacPherson v Buick.
703
 In the earlier judgment, an assistant of a 
pharmacist sold drugs to an individual, who gave it to the end-consumer, the plaintiff. The plaintiff 
                                                     
697 P Cane ‘Distributive Justice and Tort Law’ (2001) NZ L Rev.  401: ‘...my suggestion is that making rules that define the 
grounds and bounds of tort liability is a distributive task, while applying such rules in individual cases is a corrective 
task.’ (412). 
698 For a clear, recent treatment rationalizing the interaction between relational or ‘interpersonal’ aspects of the duty of care 
and ‘community welfare’ see A Robertson ‘Justice, Community Welfare and the Duty of Care’ (2011) 127 LQR 370. 
Interestingly, Robertson places the relevance of the ‘contractual context’ to tort remedies, a question relevant to Boston 
Scientific, as a question of interpersonal justice, whereas it is submitted that this consideration re-surfaces perhaps more 
strongly at the community welfare stage also i.e. law and economic arguments concerning efficiency.  
699 Some argue that the objective standard of care goes back to the early nineteenth-century, at least in the common law. 
However, we find Ibbetson’s reconstruction more plausible noting that admonitory aspect of the standard of care in the 
nineteenth-century. Ibbetson (n 18). 
700 M Renner (n 10) 103. 
701 Brüggemeier (n 32); A Ehrenzweig ‘Negligence without Fault’ 54(4) Californian Law Review 1422. 
702 A tension existed between providing a tortious remedy and a regulatory one. According to Calabresi, this tension belongs 
to pragmatic bric-a-brac approach of the mixed society. See G Calabresi ‘Torts – the Law of the Mixed Society’ (1977-
1978) 56 Tex. L. Rev. 519. 
703 Brüggemeier (n 32), 133-134. The analogy with Donoghue should, it is submitted, be patent. 
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sued the assistant and the pharmacist for personal injury. The employee was held liable in tort, on the 
old ‘natural or necessary consequences’ rule, while the pharmacist was held liable on the basis of 
vicarious liability. By the time MacPherson was decided, the requirement of showing vicarious 
liability had disappeared. Again, MacPherson concerned a situation that traditionally would have 
failed due to an absence of privity of contract. Instead of examining the primary liability of the seller 
and the secondary liability of the manufacturer, a direct duty of care was imposed on the manufacturer 
to take reasonable care in manufacture.  Brüggemeier states that this represents a profound shift: ‘The 
goal of legal policy was to channel liability to the ‘correct’ address, the enterprise owner, and at the 
same time to reach the “deep pocket”.’704 Outside product liability, vicarious liability remained but 
was increasingly and expediently re-shaped to follow the same policy goals that influenced the 
development of product liability.
705
 Organizations or firms, replaced individuals as the driving force of 
legal analysis; enterprise negligence liability had emerged.  
The law, of course, was not a tabula rasa and the development of legal doctrine was incremental with 
the scope of liability gradually enlarging by means of casuistic reworking of existing principles.
706
 
Nevertheless, these developments all favoured making enterprises pay their way. The extent to which 
the introduction of liability insurance influenced these developments is debated, but is largely thought 
to have been influential.
707
  
The third transformation 
The emergence of regulatory frameworks that are no longer rooted in the state lead, presumptively, to 
a need for an institutional complement to ex ante regulation at the transnational level. The move from 
command-and-control regulation to self-regulation and co-regulation means that, prima facie, a greater 
share of responsibility should be assumed by private actors, including those who fulfil formerly public 
functions.
708
 It is not simply that private firms are held liable for their failures to reach a standard of 
care towards individuals (the horizontal concept of liability) but that a degree of (self-)regulatory 
responsibility is ‘delegated’ to them. This has occurred because of the difficulty of establishing hard 
and fast rules to ensure safety in an era of high technology. The ‘New Approach’ exemplifies a general 
transformation of regulation towards ‘essential requirements’ and self- or co-regulation.709 In 
circumstances in which ex ante controls are less encompassing, liability law takes on a new 
importance from a regulatory perspective.
710
 
The move from government to governance in the new approach 
The move from government to governance is considerably discussed. In terms of its scope, Chalmers 
notes that the incorporation of self-regulatory regimes into ‘policy design and government’ occurs in 
                                                     
704 ibid, 135. 
705 PS Atiyah Vicarious Liability in the Law of Torts (Butterworths, 1967) remains the most canonical treatment in English 
law. Howarth (n 14) is critical of Atiyah’s treatment. 
706 Illustrative: Cardozo J. in McPherson: ‘Precedents drawn from the days of travel by stage coach do not fit the conditions 
of travel to-day. The principle that the danger must be imminent does not change, but the things subject to the principle 
do change. They are whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization require them to be.’ (392) 
707 A proper understanding of its role is not assisted by the courts unwillingness to discuss it openly until quite recently. A 
classic example of formulistic reasoning here is Williams. More recently, the courts have dealt with this issue more 
openly see Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923. 
708 Cafaggi (n 17) goes far in analysing this new departure from a liability perspective, drawing largely on Shavell’s 
assumptions in this area. 
709 Ibid. 
710 S Shavell ‘Strict Liability versus Negligence’ 9(1) The Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
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areas as diverse as ‘financial markets, insurance, environmental protection, broadcasting, advertising, 
product standards, and crime prevention.’711 It is not simply regimes, per se, that fulfil a regulatory 
role but under the New Approach considerable liberty is extended to private actors to fulfil the 
essential requirements with limited post-market surveillance afforded to the state.
712
 
Because product liability is an important area of tort law, we will examine the possible response of tort 
law through that lens. From a regulatory perspective, tort law becomes a form of ‘private 
enforcement’.713 The deterrent function of tort law is elevated and the compensatory dimension of tort 
law becomes a ‘function’ of the law of torts rather than a consequence of a corrective normative 
framework.
714
 Thus, the link between the law of torts and the idea of an excess of the subjective right 
is weakened. As we argued above, this was already occurring in the welfare state; however, the sui 
generis nature of European law radicalizes this process.
715
 In European law, it appears non-existent 
unless re-framed in citizens’ rights terms – but this is distributive rather than corrective in focus.716 In 
light of this, it leads to a logic of balancing rights rather than a framework of private sovereignties.
717
 
In the New Approach, thus, private actors are given a greater responsibility to achieve compliance 
with product standards, when they do not one might expect a higher degree of responsibility. The 
governance of society, as distinct from the government-bureaucratic model of the welfare state, means 
that post-1980s the state makes attempts at ‘…steering a self-governing society.’718  This is quite 
separate from the question of state responsibility. It is primary responsibility for failure to reach an 
exacting standard of care. Nevertheless, this forms part of an overall regulatory strategy; it is not 
simply civil liability for private harm but civil liability in the context of a new mix of public-private 
governance because of the ‘delegated’ self-regulatory possibility devolved to private actors via the 
‘essential requirements’ approach.719 
The question for private law, and in this contribution for the law of torts, is what demands does this 
place on European tort law, and whether it leads to a transformation towards a European, as distinct 
from a national, regulatory tort law. The claim, in short, is that this transformation from government to 
                                                     
711 D Chalmers ‘The Government and Citizenship of Self-Regulation’ in F Cafaggi (ed.) Reframing Self-Regulation in 
European Private Law (Kluwer, 2006) 163, 164. 
712 The main directives in this area all follow the logic of limited ex ante controls, and a narrow post-market surveillance role 
for the state. Hodges perceives this as a weakness of the New Approach. Of course, ‘essential requirements’ are simply a 
‘passport’ to access the market and do not constitute an assurance of safety. 
713 P Cane ‘Tort Law as Regulation’ (2002) 31 Comm. L. World Rev. 305 ‘From a regulatory perspective, tort actions are 
often set in this conceptual framework as a form of non-statutory private enforcement of regulatory standards.’ (312) 
714 Ibid ‘Understood in terms of interpersonal responsibility, tort remedies ‘correct’ the harm done by the tortious conduct; 
but understood in regulatory terms they provide an incentive and a reward for the reporting of breaches of regulatory 
standards to the standard setter (i.e. the court).’ (316) Interestingly, Cane is more pessimistic than Schepel regarding tort 
law’s capacity to evaluate complex and contested empirical and scientific data. H Schepel The Constitution of Private 
Governance (Hart Publishing, 2005) who argues that tort law, with regard to the standard of care, should develop a more 
exacting review of standards, in particular focusing on deliberative processes see p. 400.  
715 P Pescatore The Law of Integration (Sijthoff, 1974). Arguments regarding no subjective right e.g. Rüffert (n 3). C Schmid 
‘Goverance and Judicial’ noting how the frame of reference of EU law is apt to distort national law. 
716 F du Bois ‘Private Law in an Age of Rights’ University of Leicester School of Law Research Paper No. 13-03. 
717 The latter is a typical way to conceptualize private law according to the notion of the droit subjectif. 
718 Chalmers (n 51), 166. It could be argued that the extent to which the the idea that the state was the ‘direct government’ of 
society is a gross-overstatement. See KH Ladeur (n 2).  
719 F Cafaggi ‘LE RÔLE DES ACTEURS PRIVÉS DANS LES PROCESSUS DE RÉGULATION : PARTICIPATION, 
AUTORÉGULATION ET RÉGULATION PRIVÉE’ (2004) 119 Revue française d'administration publique 23: notes 
that it is a mistake to view this as purely a question of delegation: ‘Le développement de nouveaux modèles de régulation 
privée a été interprété comme un transfert du pouvoir de réglementation du public vers le privé, dans le cadre des 
phénomènes de privatisation réalisés aux plans législatif et juridictionnel. C’est là une lecture partielle et imprécise car 
plutôt qu’un simple transfert de pouvoir l’on a affaire à de nouveaux modèles de coopération réglementaire.’ (23) 
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governance places strain on traditional tort law to become ever more regulatory in its ‘aims’.720 In this 
perspective, tort law is reconceived on the model of ex post regulation derived mostly from law and 
economics.
721
 In Europe, this ‘economization’ is filtered through the lens of the effectiveness of the 
Internal Market. This impacts on the exact form its takes, nevertheless it is deeply connected with a 
concept of tort law that departs from the bilateral frame of reference, relational justice, and focuses 
instead on the idea of efficient levels of regulation. This profound shift in how we consider tort law 
gradually emerged in the pre-WWII ‘regulatory’ and then welfare state, but has accelerated under 
conditions of globalization, and Europeanization.
722
 The disaggregation of the state and the move to 
self-regulation impacts tort law. Tort law, in particular, its traditional focus on harm and causation 
does not fit well with a the model of regulation established under the New Approach that drastically 
reduces the importance of ex ante controls in favour of minimum standards and post-market 
surveillance.
723
 By way of contrast, Shavell explains the traditional paradigm: ‘Tort law is private in 
nature and works not by social command but rather indirectly, through the deterrent effect of damage 
actions that may be brought once harm occurs. Standards, prohibitions and other forms of safety 
regulation, in contrast, are public in character and modify behavior in an immediate way through 
requirements that are imposed before, or at least independent of, the actual occurrence of harm.’724 To 
the extent that the New Approach results in a regulatory framework with fewer ex ante public controls, 
this may be considered to place additional pressures on tort law to fulfil a deterrence and 
compensatory function. Now, the claim would be that the ‘ethos’ of regulation is permeating tort 
law.
725
 It is at this juncture and from this perspective that Boston Scientific enters our discussion. 
Boston Scientific: Contorting tort law by balancing rights and duties in an overall framework 
The CJEU’s judgment in Boston Scientific is indicative of the interplay between consumer protection 
and market access insofar as the judgment involved the interplay between the dual-aims of the 
Directive.
726
 These broad aims are the motors of the legal analysis, as distinct from the interpersonal 
relationship between the manufacturer and the consumer. 
After its judgment in Gonsalez Sanchez, the court has reinterpreted product liability law in light of the 
aim of maximum harmonization in what appears to be a contra legem manner. This has arrogated a 
large area of policy-making to the court such that it alters the balance between the requirements of 
national consumer protection law and CJEU law-making. In Boston Scientific, the first respondent 
imported and sold pacemakers and defibrillators. It transpired that these products were defective. In 
the case of the pacemakers, a leak in the sealant utilised meant that this over time could lead to the 
depletion of battery rendering the device inoperative. The relevant manufacturer, Boston Scientific, 
following the obligatory procedures under the Safety Directive recalled the product and reimbursed 
                                                     
720 Already in the 1950s, English scholars were discussing the ‘aims’ of tort law i.e. G Williams ‘The Aims of Tort Law’. 
(1951) 4(1) Current Legal Problems 137. This discussion began earlier in the USA with the legal realists e.g. Kessler, 
Llewellyn, and in Germany Bruggemeier avers to Mataja’s claim that the aims of tort law are deterrence and 
compensation already showing a regulatory approach to tort law which goes beyond the natural law inspired scholarship 
of the nineteenth-century. For a summary see J Gordley (n 20). 
721 Cafaggi (n 17). 
722 C Schmid ‘(n 10) 17-37. 
723 Explained by C Hodges European Regulation of Consumer Product Safety (OUP, 2005). 
724 This is, of course, already a ‘functionalist’ account of tort law emphasising its ‘deterrence’ function, which Shavell openly 
avers to by describing his account as ‘instrumentalist’. Shavell (n 50). 
725 An illuminating analysis of the shifting sands of tort law and its relationship to the particular model of the state preferred 
is found in G Calabresi (n 42). 
726 Boston Scientific (unreported, 5 March 2015). The Directive could have been read in a less expansive manner i.e. in a way 
that did not emphasise the difference of these aims but their identity or at least complementarity. Instead, the Court 
favoured ‘splitting’ the aims. 
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the claimant the cost of a new pacemaker.
727
 The claimant, then, sued for the cost of the medical 
procedure to fit a new pacemaker under the Product Liability Directive.
728
 The defibrillators were 
similarly defective, and the claim was largely consistent with the pacemaker claim, namely, the 
claimants sought relief contra the respondent for the costs of the replacement medical procedure. The 
reference was pursuant to a number of a questions by the German Federal court, the most pertinent of 
which involved the interpretation of articles 6(1) and 9(1) of the Product Liability Directive, 85/374. 
According to that directive a producer is liable for a defect product, if and only if, the claimant can 
prove the damage, the defect, and causal link between damage and the defect. This is, of course, 
transposed into German law. The problem for the claimants was that although the product was patently 
defective, the claimants were wont to show that this occasioned specific harm to them, as distinct from 
increasing the harm to individuals more generally, as a group. Hence, the case bears considerable 
similarity to what are known in English law as the ‘asbestos case-law’ which treated, not without 
ambivalence, the relationship between an increase of risk of harm versus the requirement of 
demonstrating a causal link.
729
 In any event, the key questions the CJEU was asked can be summarised 
in the following manner:  
1. Is article 6(1) to be interpreted to mean that an increased risk of failure in the same product 
group means that it also covers situations where no such defect has been discovered in the 
device which has been implanted in the specific case-in-point, i.e. the claimants 
2. If it is to so-interpreted, does article 9(1) encompass the costs of the operation to remove the 
pacemakers/defibrillators 
In his opinion, Advocate-General Bot stated that the defective pacemakers were 17-20 times more 
likely to fail than non-defective pacemakers. The risk that defibrillators might fail represented a lower 
probability but, nevertheless, their defectiveness increased the risk of failure. While the German 
Federal Court accepted that the products in question were defective, on an ordinary causal test this was 
insufficient to demonstrate that the causal link between the increased risk of failure and the specific 
injury to the claimants. A-G Bot drawing on the French version of the Directive at paragraph 29 noted 
that the use of the terms ‘on’ and ‘légitiment’ were sufficient broad to warrant the conclusion that 
‘…the concept of a defect is to be assessed in the abstract with reference not to a specific user, but to 
the public at large, having regard to the standard of safety which the consumer may reasonably 
expect.’ This, for the first time, clarified that the notion of defect is to be interpreted objectively and is, 
perhaps, a rejoinder to certain Member States which tended to diminish the test from strict liability to a 
standard more akin to fault. Hence, the concept of safety is relatively imprecise and calls for an 
interpretation in light of the objectives of the Directive. The A-G, then, turned to the recitals. Recital 2 
mentions that the aim of the Directive is to obtain a fair apportionment of risks regarding modern 
technological development, which is understood as varying depending on the nature of the risk. In the 
circumstances, the risk of failure is particularly grave because were these products to fail they could 
lead to the injury or death of the patient. Hence, once more this type of reasoning echoes national law 
in the idea that for ultra-hazardous products a higher standard of care is required than for less risky 
products.
730
 Hence, it is risk (or safety) and not danger that is relevant for the Directive. As A-G Bot 
states: ‘In other words, the defect for the purposes of article 6(1) of the Directive is a risk of damage of 
such a degree of seriousness that it affects the public’s legitimate expectations in so far as concerns 
                                                     
727 The so-called ‘Safety Directive’. 
728 To be more accurate, the insurance company sued by subrogation. 
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safety.’731 In the circumstances, the mere possibility of failure was considered enough to constitute a 
defect, the claimants were not required to show that a particular pacemaker or defibrillator was faulty. 
A very revealing passage, indeed, is paragraph 35. A-G Bot stated that although an objective of the 
Directive is undistorted competition, another main objective of the Directive is consumer protection. 
Although this paragraph might be considered merely a supporting argument, it reveals the deeper 
balancing at issue.
732
 It is not simply a question of balancing costs and benefits, rather the deeper 
commitment is to balance the underlying values or principles that undergird the EU legal order.
733
  
Notwithstanding A-G Bot’s invocation of the aim of ‘welfare state tort law’, namely compensation 
and deterrence, the analysis suggests a deeper constitutional as well as regulatory dimension.
734
 This 
rationale impacts, then, on the interpretation of the relevant Directive. At paragraph 38, A-G Bot states 
that to make safety subject to the occurrence of specific damage undermines the consumer protection 
regime because it saps the preventative function of the Directive and the risk creation-injury cost 
bearing rationale of the Directive.
735
 Furthermore, A-G Bot links his reasoning to article 35 of the 
Charter and article 168(1) TFEU which aims to guarantee a high level of human health protection in 
the definition and implementation of all Union activities and policies, and states that this should be a 
guide to interpretation regarding the Directive, especially with regard to the concept of defect. This 
argument was not repeated at court; yet, although it was not repeated, the judgment as we will see 
tracks in any event his argument at paragraph 35. The A-G goes on to note the special position of 
medical devices in European law, particularly the higher level of protection legitimately expected by 
consumers with regard to devices implanted in individuals by contrast to, for example, bottled 
water.
736
  At paragraph 55, the A-G summarises his position on the first question. It is sufficient to 
belong to a group alone. There is no need to show that the actual pacemaker is deficient, such that 
were we to follow the manner in which it is treated in English law the ‘gist’ of the action is the 
increased risk of harm rather than damage per se.
737
  
The second question, namely, whether the claimants can recover for the medical expenses of 
replacement receives a differentiated treatment. This is, in effect, a question of pure economic loss. In 
the case of pacemakers, A-G Bot posed a reductio ad absurdum.
738
 The aim of the Directive would be 
frustrated were it to apply to personal injury only. This would require that the injury or death 
materialize. In our terms, for one’s rights to be vindicated one would have to be extinguished entirely, 
and in those circumstances it cannot be said that one has legal rights at all. In consequence, the aim of 
achieving consumer safety that the Directive pursues would be discounted were the Directive to be 
interpreted restrictively such that the cost of removal and replacement were not covered. 
The CJEU’s judgment, by contrast, was not as emphatically pro-consumer. Nevertheless, a number of 
common strands between the A-G’s opinion and the Court, which can be described as pro-consumer, 
                                                     
731 para. 30. 
732 This might be an attempt at providing a ‘corrective’ to the perceived pro-market bias in previous product liability 
judgments. In Reich’s analysis, however, one should be careful to note that AGM-COS.MET was a case of state liability. 
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emerge. The method of interpretation is largely purposive, examining the articles of the Directive in 
light of its recitals.
739
 Unlike the A-G’s opinion, the vulnerability of the parties is stressed more 
overtly.
740
 Given their vulnerability, ‘…the safety requirements for those devices which such patients 
are entitled to expect are particularly high.’741 At paragraph 40, the Court more clearly follows A-G 
Bot by stressing the abnormal nature of the risk as pertinacious to the definition of what safety 
requires on the facts before the Court. In other words, the greater the vulnerability of the claimants, the 
higher and more abnormal (serious) the risk, the more exacting the standard of care, or to put it 
otherwise, the more broadly the provisions of the Directive will be interpreted. This abnormal 
potential for damage justified the relaxation of the causal requirement. In circumstances where 
products of the same group/series are defective ‘…it is possible to classify as defective all the products 
in that group or series, without there being any need to show that the product in question is 
defective.’742 The Court, then, at paragraph 42 invoked squarely the balancing this required. Thus, by 
examining the second and seventh recitals of the Directive the Court stated that the objective pursued 
was ‘…a fair apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production between the 
injured person and the producer.’ Given this objective, there was no requirement to show that a 
particular pacemaker was defective for the purposes of article 6(1) of the Directive. On the second 
question, the Court followed A-G Bot’s reasoning such that this broad interpretation of the Directive 
required the cost of surgical operation to be recompensed, certainly in the case of pacemakers, and 
perhaps in the case of defibrillators the latter was left open to the German Federal Court to decide. 
Analysis 
What Coleman referred to as judgments that cannot be fitted into the traditional notions of tort law, 
such as Sindell, are multiplying in the EU legal order.
743
 The underlying rationale of the Boston 
Scientific judgment is, in a sense, the mirror-image of the AGM.COS.MET decision. The arguments in 
Boston Scientific that provoked the radical interpretation of the court, concern the classic social 
arguments about loss spreading, and deterrence. Although it appears a triumph of the social, we are 
more cautious, and consider it a balancing exercise in which the particular facts of the case provoked 
the court to re-assess its balance between market access and consumer protection, each as distinct 
rationale leading to different allocations of rights and duties. The deeper question would appear to be 
the overall regulatory framework and the extent to which this requires to be modified ex post to give a 
higher standard of protection than required on the face of the Directive. This abstracts from the dispute 
before the Court and focuses instead on the overall architecture of the Internal Market. 
The Court, having assumed the authority to decide such cases by its maximum harmonization 
approach, now is required to resolve social conflicts but on a distinctly case-by-case responsive or 
experimental basis.
744
 The language of colliding rights is not yet overt, but is ‘hidden’ lurking below 
the surface. For example, the whole rhetoric of what level of safety consumers are entitled to expect, 
and the distinction between vulnerable and non-vulnerable consumers assumes a citizen dimension. 
This is not simply arid technical detail, but the shaping of an independent European concept of the 
requirements of consumer protection. Nevertheless, by interpreting the Directive contra legem, or at 
least broadly in Boston Scientific, the rights of consumers are elevated at the expense of those of 
producers leading to at least implicit constitutional balancing. This is troubling for traditional tort 
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scholars. As stated, there is a certain inevitable logic to such an approach once one assumes maximum 
harmonization. 
However, as well as importing a constitutional dimension the judgment more immediately aligns ex 
ante safety regulation and ex post tortious liability by contorting the structure of a tort action to 
abandon the requirement of proving human agency (causation), in effect, and dispensing with the 
specific harm requirement. It might well be that the product in question is not, in fact, defective. 
Although it is certainly true that one should be cautious not to read the judgment in a too-expansive 
manner, it certainly goes some way to redress the perceived inadequacy of the product liability-safety 
approach. This inadequacy was highlighted by Cafaggi a few years ago:  
In the area of product safety, coordination between the two strategies is absent or, at best, implicit. No 
explicit signs of complementarity can be seen in the Directives. The only stated clear principle 
of coordination in the field of product safety is that the regulatory Directives (in particular EC 
Directive 01/95) cannot be interpreted as decreasing the level of consumer protection ensured 
by the PL Directive.
745
 
The Court substantially increased the scope of the Product Liability Directive by interpreting the scope 
of the Directive as including product recall and the attendant (medical) costs this might impose on 
consumers.  To be sure, the Court went on to limit the application of this principle beyond the instant 
case, but nevertheless appears to link regulatory and civil liability strategies such that the latter 
buttresses the former. However, given the contortion of the ‘structure’ of tort law it might go beyond 
simply a question of complementarity and represent, it is submitted, its functionalization.
746
 
Cafaggi has previously stressed, in particular, the role causation plays in civil liability in which the 
concept of human agency is important.
747
 Absent human agency, it is difficult to attribute cause to a 
natural or legal person supporting his thesis that the better framework for understanding the 
relationship between regulation and civil liability is institutional complementarity as distinct from 
functional equivalence. There is no such difficulty regarding cause in regulatory strategy.
748
 Be that as 
it may, the gradually decreasing accent placed on causation at both a national and European level in 
exceptional cases suggests that the divergence between regulatory strategy and tort law as 
compensation or deterrence is less pronounced that previously considered. In Boston Scientific, the 
obvious objection that the risk in question was a general one was dismissed by reference to the overall 
regulatory purpose of the safety and product liability regime, which coloured the A-G’s and the 
Court’s interpretation of the balancing of interests required. This holistic approach reminiscent of 
Traynor J. in Escola fifty years prior calls into question whether tort law is ‘public law in disguise.’749 
However, if it were simply a question of reallocating benefits and burdens in a uni-directional manner 
in all cases, this would understate the constitutional dimension of the judgment. In other words, there 
is an implicit constitutional dimension that elevates citizens’ rights and it is not simply a question of 
internalization of risks for economic or social justice purposes. 
Nevertheless, the strong regulatory dimension, providing a deterrence approach, is more patent when 
one considers that the Court’s reasoning bypasses the relational aspect, that is the relation between A 
and B, in its endorsement of general causation as a sufficient basis for recovery. Boston Scientific 
concerns, mostly, the overall adjustment of benefits and burdens in the Internal market rather than the 
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particularities of the relationship between A and B. The global question, as it were, is who should bear 
the costs when a risk materializes and the argument is premised on the constitutional balance between 
consumer protection and producer economic rights. These aims of European law are filtered through 
the rights rhetoric of the Court with the balance falling on the side of ‘vulnerable’ consumers. This is a 
victim-centred tort law.
750
 This is not an all-or-nothing principle because the vulnerability of the 
consumers in question and the seriousness of the risk involved tip the balance. In other words, a 
preference for consumer protection does not mean in all cases that the burden should fall to the 
manufacturer and the provisions of the Directive should be interpreted in light of these aims. It does 
suggest, however, that the Court is performing a constitutional function by balancing rights, and 
appears consistent with other liability case-law. To be sure, it appears less proceduralist than 
judgments such as Aziz. Neverthless, it is argued that Boston Scientific is a very particular application 
of social thinking within a proceduralist paradigm.
751
 
In addition, it blurs the line between contract and tort by, in effect, implying a warranty extending to 
the cost of medical procedures. It allows recovery for pure economic loss because no physical injury is 
proved. In this respect, it is consistent with the Putz/Weber decision. The doctrinal divisions in 
national law are set aside in the face of overall regulatory imperatives. The notion of legitimate 
consumer expectations facilitates the dismantling of the contract/tort divide or, perhaps, its 
overlooking. This poses problems for national law, particularly in those jurisdictions in which a strong 
division exists between contract and tort premised on the idea that the parties to a contract are best 
placed to decide the allocation of risk or, in the case of pure economic loss occasioned by 
manufacturing defects to third parties, that the spectre indeterminate liability justifies policy-backed 
restraints on recovery. 
This is not without significance, because by stripping the law of the subjective right as traditionally 
understood, it is questionable whether private law’s normativity is not by analogy devalued.752 By 
devaluing or instrumentalising the law in this manner makes it subservient to some other logic, and 
while the ‘weak corrective justice’ of the twentieth century went some way in this direction; EU law 
appears to take the next step into the unknown. 
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Introduction  
The PIP breast implant story is well-known. It is a scandal of enormous proportions. Hundreds of 
thousands of women across the EU and beyond received (potentially) defective breast implants 
produced by a fraudulent French manufacturer. The manufacturer randomly used cheaper industrial 
silicone gel to fill breast implants instead of the required medical silicone gel. There is still a 
significant degree of scientific uncertainty about the precise medical effects of the use of industrial 
silicone gel.
753
 Moreover, many women do not even know whether they received breast implants 
which were manufactured by PIP. And even if they know that they received PIP breast implants, as a 
result of the random nature of PIP’s fraud, they still cannot be certain whether their breast implants 
contained medical or industrial silicone gel. As a result, many victims have decided to have their 
breast implants removed or replaced. They are now trying to obtain compensation for the physical and 
psychological damage which they suffered as a result of the PIP scandal. However, the PIP factory has 
gone bankrupt and the management of the factory is serving long sentences of imprisonment. They 
offer no realistic prospect of compensation. Therefore, victims in several Member States are using 
different litigation strategies to try and obtain compensation. They have often organised themselves 
through group litigation orders or with the support of consumer protection organisations. One of the 
main parties against which actions have been brought is TÜV Rheinland, the German certification 
body which was responsible for the certification of PIP’s quality management system. While there is 
an obvious European dimension to the various claims, the extent to which victims have coordinated 
their strategies at the European level remains limited. This lack of coordination also resonates in the 
judgments of national courts. 
This paper will argue that the PIP scandal ultimately shows that, in the aftermath of the PIP scandal, 
private law is being forced to perform a regulatory function which it is not (yet) able to perform. With 
the New Approach to goods, the EU has placed private certification bodies in the position of 
gatekeepers of the internal market. These certification bodies use private law tools in their regulatory 
activities. They are now also held to account by victims through the application of private law – 
whether on the basis of contract law or tort law. However, “traditional” or national private law does 
not possess the tools to assess the responsibility and potential liability of private certification bodies in 
the New Approach. Essentially, this is because the role of private certification bodies in the New 
Approach is much more like that of public bodies. The public duties or obligations of private 
certification bodies cannot at the moment be adequately translated to private law. There is a gap in the 
construction of the New Approach, in that it does not provide sufficient clarity about how the 
obligations imposed on private certification bodies should be translated to obligations in private law.
754
 
In construing the regulatory framework for the New Approach, the EU has not sufficiently thought 
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about its private law consequences beyond product liability. However, with a bankrupt manufacturer, 
product liability alone does not provide sufficient protection to recipients of goods in the EU’s internal 
market. The various cases after the PIP scandal show that national private law is not able to assess the 
conduct of private certification bodies in the light of the role that these bodies play in the EU’s 
regulatory framework for goods. Clearer guidance at the European level – either through legislation or 
through litigation – is necessary to provide which private law consequences are required to guarantee 
the effective and safe application of the New Approach to goods. 
Overall, the various cases after the PIP scandal show that national private law is not able to provide an 
adequate ex post regulatory framework for victims of defective breast implants. It has to be fused with 
more ex ante European regulation to adapt private law to the role it has to play in the EU’s regulatory 
framework for goods.
755
 At the same time, one has to question to what extent the result of this fusion 
between private law and EU law aims could still properly be described as private law. After all, if 
private law has to be adapted – or even transformed – to hold private parties to account for quasi-
public conduct in the EU’s regulatory framework for goods, the result is that private law becomes less 
private and more public. Such a transformation of private law would be the direct consequence of the 
creation of the New Approach and the role which private parties have to play in that regulatory 
framework. 
Three transformations of private law 
To illustrate how private law came to have to play this role three transformations of private law and 
the drivers of these transformations will be analysed. They coincide with the chronology of the PIP 
scandal. First of all, developments in technology led to the creation of the New Approach to goods. 
The internal market for goods could only realistically and effectively be completed if national product 
standards were replaced by European product standards. Because of the technological and scientific 
difficulties with making these standards, the standard-making process was outsourced to private 
standardisation organisations, while the enforcement of the standards was outsourced to private 
certification bodies. Breast implants are regarded as medical devices and, as such, they are covered by 
the New Approach to goods.
756
 This means that the European standardisation organisation CEN is 
responsible for making European standards for breast implants and that private certification bodies – 
so-called “notified bodies” – have to verify that the production process for breast implants complies 
with the relevant European standards. As such, they have effectively obtained the position of 
gatekeepers of the internal market for goods. Their stamp of approval is necessary before breast 
implants can be placed on the European market. 
Secondly, the globalisation of the market for cosmetic surgery services has resulted in much more free 
movement of both service recipients and service providers. The cosmetic surgery sector is a genuinely 
transnational sector in which there is a lot of competition on price.
757
 Patients are often willing to 
travel to other Member States if they can obtain cheaper treatment there.
758
 In parallel, the New 
Approach has significantly increased the free movement of goods in the EU. As a consequence, 
cosmetic surgery services to receive breast implants might have a number of transnational dimensions: 
the provider might be in one Member State, the recipient might be from another Member State and the 
breast implants might have been manufactured in another Member State. These transnational 
dimensions of both the service and the product have serious implications for the potential of victims to 
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obtain compensation for defective breast implants. They pose a challenge to traditional private law 
claims for compensation, while at the same time they make private law the more likely forum to deal 
with failures in the regulatory framework. 
Thirdly, and finally, in the aftermath of the PIP scandal, it is clear that there have been a number of 
developments in society to deal with the consequences of the scandal. In particular, consumer 
organisations are taking up a more prominent role in helping victims to organise themselves and to try 
and obtain legal redress.
759
 Furthermore, in some Member States group litigation orders are providing 
a tool to victims to join forces and to share expertise.
760
 Similarly, many victims use the Internet to 
exchange views and to inform each other about developments. However, the extent to which their 
attempts to obtain compensation are successful is limited. Lawyers across the EU are struggling to find 
the tools to obtain compensation for victims. The three transformations will now be discussed in 
detail. 
Technology, the EU’s internal market for goods and the New Approach  
In the last decades, the technology for the production of goods has developed enormously. This has 
resulted in the possibility of much more mass production and standardisation of goods. The production 
of such product standards created difficulties for the EU. After all, if all Member States adopt different 
product standards with which products have to comply before they can be placed on the market, such 
national standards would create obstacles to free movement of goods within the EU.761 
Manufacturers would constantly have to adapt their product standards to the specific requirements of 
the Member State in which they wanted to place their products on the market. Therefore, it became 
clear that if the EU wanted to realise a functioning internal market for goods it would have to 
harmonise national product standards. The CJEU’s judgment in Cassis de Dijon provided a clear 
incentive for the EU to make a move from negative integration through the removal of obstacles to 
free movement to positive integration through the adoption of European product standards.762 
However, it was difficult for the EU to decide on the precise tools to achieve harmonisation of product 
standards. The legislative route was extremely slow. Moreover, it proved difficult to agree on 
technical standards through the legislative process. Finally, there were constant technological 
innovations, which meant that the legislative process was not really able to keep up to speed with 
developments in technology. As a result, it became clear that it was not effective to rely exclusively on 
European harmonisation of legislation to improve the internal market for goods.
763
 
The EU then developed an innovative regulatory framework to improve free movement of goods. This 
regulatory approach was given the appropriate name of the New Approach. The set-up of the New 
Approach is relatively simple.
764
 The EU adopts product safety directives which lay down the 
“essential requirements” with which products have to comply before they can be placed on the market. 
The technical specifications are then laid down in European standards developed through the 
European standardisation organisation CEN. If the Commission plans to adopt a directive under the 
New Approach, it will issue a mandate to CEN to ask it to develop a standard in the field of the 
planned directive. It will also provide the funding for the making of this standard. After the European 
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standard has been adopted through CEN, the Commission will publish the reference of the standard in 
the OJEU. Upon publication of the reference, it is automatically presumed that manufacturers who 
comply with the provisions of the European standard also comply with the essential requirements of 
the relevant directive. As such, compliance with the European standard becomes one way for 
manufacturers to show that they comply with the European product safety legislation. For many 
products they can show that they comply with the European legislation by placing the CE mark on 
their products. This is effectively a form of self-certification. For certain more dangerous products the 
CE mark can only be placed on products after the involvement of a private certification body. This 
certification body has to be notified to the Commission by the Member State in which it is based as 
accredited for carrying out certain procedures under the Directive – hence the term “notified body”. 
For most products the certification body will carry out a conformity assessment procedure, which 
means that it will whether the manufacturer’s quality management system and product dossier show 
that they comply with the requirements of the directive. There is no actual inspection of the products – 
this is only necessary for the most dangerous type of products. 
The idea behind the New Approach is that the European legislature remains responsible for the broad 
framework in which the standardisation organisations and certification bodies operate and that all 
political choices are made in the legislative process. As a result, the mandate of the private parties is 
restricted to narrow issues of technology, which can be separated from the more political issues. With 
the New Approach, the EU has effectively outsourced two aspects of the governance of the internal 
market for goods to private parties. For both aspects it is believed that private parties have more 
technological expertise than the State or the EU, which means that it is more efficient to delegate 
certain tasks – traditionally carried out by public bodies – to them. First of all, private standardisation 
organisations become responsible for the standard-setting process. While the European Commission 
will always take the initiative for a European standard under the New Approach, it is unlikely that it 
actually participates in the standard-setting process.
765
 The Standardisation Regulation 2012 is 
supposed to provide a number of procedural safeguards to ensure that European standardisation 
includes the views of a broad and representative group of stakeholders.
766
 However, in reality it is 
difficult for the EU to really exercise direct influence on parties who are involved in the making of 
European standards.
767
 One of the fundamental questions about the New Approach is to what extent 
the outsourcing of standard-setting to private parties was necessary because of a lack of experience of 
the EU institutions or public supervisory agencies. It could be the case that the outsourcing or 
delegation of responsibility to private parties was just a matter of convenience to the EU. To address 
this question in detail is beyond the scope of this paper. In any event, it is clear that the fact that the 
EU has delegated certain tasks to private parties does not mean that it is no longer responsible for 
failures in the regulatory framework in which these private parties act.  
Once a European standard has been adopted, the next question is how this standard is enforced. The 
fundamental basis of the New Approach is that manufacturers are individually responsible for 
ensuring that their products comply with the requirements of a European standard. This is combined 
with the Product Liability Directive, which provides for liability of the manufacturer if defective 
products are placed on the market.
768
 The Directive does not oblige manufacturers to exercise 
monitoring of their products – they are only liable for damage caused by defective products. 
Monitoring obligations are not included in the scope of the Directive. As such, the construction of the 
New Approach places significant reliance on the declaration of manufacturers that their goods comply 
with the relevant European standard. For certain types of products, manufacturers first have to go to a 
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notified body for a conformity assessment procedure. For breast implants, the precise requirements of 
the conformity assessment procedure have been laid down in the Annexes of the Medical Devices 
Directive.
769
 It is important to note that notified bodies are not required to inspect breast implants to 
verify if they comply with the European standards. Their role remains limited to inspecting the 
paperwork of manufacturers – the product design dossier and the quality management system have to 
show that the manufacturer is complying with the European standards.
770
 In most Member States there 
are only a limited number of notified bodies. They do not possess a general competence under the 
New Approach – they must always be notified for a specific directive. Most of the notified bodies are 
private certification organisations, but some of them are in fact public bodies.
771
 The role of notified 
bodies focusses on ex ante regulation. Manufacturers have to obtain the approval of notified bodies 
before they can place their products on the European market. Therefore, notified bodies have obtained 
a key position in the EU’s internal market for goods – they control access to the market for goods. 
However, the principle remains that notified bodies only help manufacturers to make the required 
declaration of compliance. They do not themselves guarantee that the products which have been 
approved by them actually comply with the European standards. Although the focus of notified bodies 
is on ex ante regulation, they also have a role to play after the products have been placed on the 
market. The Annexes of the Medical Devices Directive provide that notified bodies have to carry out 
inspections after the product has been placed on the market.
772
 However, it would appear that these 
inspections do not have to be unannounced. Public supervisory agencies also have an important role to 
play in the supervision of the market. However, their role is limited to the moment after products have 
been placed on the market. As such, they do not exercise the same degree of control over the access to 
the market as notified bodies. Nevertheless, they have the power to remove products from the market 
if it has become clear that they do not comply with the European standards.
773
 This once again 
emphasises the gatekeeper function of notified bodies. They are the only party that really controls the 
access to the market. The control exercised by public supervisory bodies is significantly less strict, 
because they are always one step behind and have no power to avoid the initial step of products being 
placed on the market. 
In the PIP case, the notified body responsible for the conformity assessment procedure was TÜV 
Rheinland (“TÜV”). TÜV is a large German private certification body which is active all over the 
world. The conformity assessment procedure for PIP was undertaken by a French subsidiary. From 
1997 to 2004 TÜV issued a number of certificates to PIP at a time when PIP’s fraudulent conduct had 
already started. As a result, PIP was able to continue to place its products on the European market. 
Furthermore, TÜV carried out a number of announced inspections. After the PIP scandal was finally 
discovered in 2010, a number of victims in Germany and France decided to bring claims for 
compensation against TÜV. In particular, they argued that TÜV had not complied with their 
obligations set out in the Medical Devices Directive. They claimed that TÜV should have inspected 
actual products and should have carried out unannounced inspections. If TÜV had done this, they 
would have discovered the fraud and the damage to victims would have been much more limited. As 
will be discussed below, the German and French courts reached different conclusions about the 
liability of TÜV in the New Approach. These cases will be further analysed below. 
Before we move on to the second process of transformation through economisation and globalisation, 
it is important to emphasise the impact of the creation of the New Approach – driven by technological 
developments – on private law. The New Approach does not only represent a shift from public 
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regulation to private regulation – whether through European standardisation or through the activities 
of notified bodies –, it also has a direct impact on the function of private law in the internal market. 
The relationship between manufacturers and notified bodies is contractual – the conformity assessment 
procedure is a contract for services concluded between the manufacturer and a notified body. It is this 
contract which is necessary for manufacturers to obtain access to the internal market. Certification is a 
common regulatory tool in the services and goods sectors, but normally it remains without direct 
consequences in private law.
774
 Consumers cannot claim that because a product or service is certified 
they are entitled to absolute compliance with the standards on the basis of which certification has 
taken place. In the New Approach, certification has a much more direct legal impact. Certification has 
been upgraded to a precondition for access to the internal market. As a consequence, the New 
Approach has not only had an impact on the question of who provides access to the internal market, 
but also on how access to be market is provided. The contract between manufacturer and notified body 
constitutes a crucial step towards access to the market. Private law has been given a central regulatory 
function in the New Approach. The question which will be discussed later is to what extent the private 
law relationship between manufacturer and notified body has broader legal implications beyond the 
relationship between these two parties. 
Economisation and globalisation of cosmetic surgery services 
The New Approach provided a real boost to free movement of goods in the EU. As a result, PIP was 
able to place thousands of breast implants on the European market. It is estimated that a total of 
300,000 women received PIP breast implants in around 65 countries.
775
 It is clear that the impact of 
the scandal reaches far beyond the borders of the EU. The breast implants would usually be supplied 
by suppliers to service providers in the Member States. Doctors or private clinics would normally not 
obtain the breast implants directly from the PIP factory. The result is a complicated supply chain with 
a number of different actors in different Member States. However, the transnational dimension of the 
PIP scandal is not just restricted to the free movement of goods. Similarly, both cosmetic surgery 
providers and patients frequently move from one Member State to another.  
The success of the New Approach also contributed to a process of economisation and globalisation of 
the provision of cosmetic surgery services in the EU. Cosmetic surgery has become a very profitable 
market. Statistics in the UK show that in 2014 there were 45,406 aesthetic surgical procedures.
776
 This 
was a slight decrease in comparison with 2013. One of the explanations for the decrease could be the 
PIP scandal. Another explanation could be the financial crisis.
777
 Cosmetic surgery is normally offered 
by private healthcare providers outside the public healthcare system. There is a significant amount of 
advertisement, treatments are voluntary and easy to obtain. This means that the patient is not really a 
patient but more of a consumer. This consumer is even prepared to travel across borders for treatment. 
As a result, it is possible to say that cosmetic surgery is offered on a market which is removed from 
the traditional public healthcare systems. Furthermore, the market is truly European, or even 
international. Secondly, the medical professionals who operate on this market have very different 
qualifications.
778
 Various medical specialties perform treatments which could be described as falling 
with the scope of cosmetic surgery. Plastic surgeons are the main specialty which has entered the 
cosmetic surgery market, but dermatologists, ENT-surgeons and even general practitioners also 
operate on the market. Moreover, it is possible for doctors with basic training to be involved in 
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cosmetic surgery. In some Member States it is even possible for nurses to perform cosmetic surgery 
treatments.
779
 This means that the market is full with different service providers. Some do not have a 
fixed location and travel from one Member State to another with their products and materials. Some of 
them have decided to call themselves cosmetic surgeons, which in many Member States is not a 
protected title.
780
 This could create confusion for patients, as the use of the term surgeon would imply 
specialist training as a surgeon. This is just one example of a lack of regulation of cosmetic surgery 
services at the national level. The only Member State which has a very clear regulatory framework is 
France, in which it is provided by law that all aesthetic surgery treatments have to be performed under 
the supervision of a plastic surgeon.
781
 Following the PIP breast implant scandal, the cosmetic surgery 
sector has come under the attention of national regulatory agencies that, in cooperation with the EU, 
are working to fill regulatory gaps and to tighten the regulation of the cosmetic surgery sector.
782
  
The PIP scandal provides a perfect illustration of the economisation and globalisation of the cosmetic 
surgery sector. Many of the Austrian victims who are currently represented by the Austrian consumer 
organisation VKI travelled to the Czech Republic, Slovenia or Hungary for treatment. They often did 
not speak the language, which meant that it was difficult for them to communicate with the doctor who 
treated them.
783
 Moreover, they returned to Austria almost immediately after the treatment. The 
process of after-care was not supervised by the doctor who performed the original treatment. It is clear 
that the price of the treatment – which was significantly lower than in Austria – was the main factor in 
deciding to travel to Central Europe for cosmetic treatment.
784
 The Austrian women regarded cosmetic 
surgery services as a product – they did not think about the qualifications of the provider and the 
potential complications after the operation. They now pay the price for this in the aftermath of the PIP 
scandal. It is often difficult for them to identify the clinic where they were treated and it is even more 
difficult to identify the doctor who treated them. They have limited information about the contract 
which they concluded with the clinic or doctor. Therefore, it is difficult to identify its contractual 
terms. Furthermore, they sometimes cannot even be sure about the type of breast implants they 
received, because they have been given limited documentation. The result of the cross-border 
dimension of the provision of cosmetic surgery is that it is not a realistic option for Austrian victims to 
start legal proceedings in the Member State in which treatment took place. As a consequence, they 
have united themselves through a consumer organisation and have brought their claim for 
compensation against PIP’s insurer, the French subsidiary of the German insurer Allianz.785 This adds 
a number of complications, because Allianz had been obliged to insure PIP by French legislation, 
which provided that they only had to cover damage that occurred in France. On that basis, Allianz is 
now arguing that it is not liable to compensate Austrian victims for whom the damage occurred 
outside France. 
This story has a number of implications for private law. First of all, it is clear that the globalisation of 
the market has reduced the ability of the State to exercise control over the cosmetic surgery sector. 
National legislation has difficulties to regulate the transnational dimensions of cosmetic surgery. 
Consequently, private regulation could potentially obtain a more dominant regulatory function. 
However, the main point is that public law supervision has failed to cope with the PIP scandal. It has 
failed ex ante and its ex post role is also limited. Very few of the victims of the PIP scandal are trying 
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to obtain compensation from the State. This could be for pragmatic reasons, for example because the 
public supervisory agency they would have to bring a claim against is based in another Member State. 
However, a more fundamental issue is that the role of the State in regulating the market for breast 
implants is limited and that the State is not really able to effectively supervise the cosmetic surgery 
sector. The outsourcing of the gatekeeper function to notified bodies has more general implications for 
public supervision of the market. In the New Approach, private regulation is much more prominent 
and dominant. Therefore, the focus of the victims has shifted to private law to obtain compensation. 
Private law has obtained a more dominant regulatory function as a result of the economisation and 
globalisation of the cosmetic surgery sector.  
Within private law, globalisation has also had an impact on the parties against whom victims are now 
bringing their actions. For the reasons set out above, it is only a small group of victims who are now 
bringing traditional private law claims against their doctors. Similarly, victims are unable to start a 
traditional European private law claim under the Product Liability Directive against the manufacturer 
because PIP has gone bankrupt. The result is that they are looking for other options for compensation. 
Inevitably, this process is somewhat opportunistic. It also means that the struggle for compensation 
has become fragmented. In Germany and France actions have been brought against TÜV, while in 
France different actions have been brought against Allianz. In the UK and the Netherlands claims are 
brought against the private clinics where victims received their breast implants. All of this shows the 
fragmentation of the regulatory function of private law. The fragmentation is visible in the different 
fora in which claims are brought, but also in the different parties against which actions for 
compensation brought. While a more fragmented approach to compensation is not necessarily 
problematic, it is complicated because it means that different legal standards are applicable to the 
actions of different actors in the PIP scandal.
786
 For example, the actions of TÜV will primarily be 
assessed under the Medical Devices Directive, while the actions of Allianz will be assessed under the 
relevant French legislation. The question is to what extent this fragmentation makes it more difficult 
for private law to integrate the EU law dimension in the claims for compensation brought by the 
victims. This EU law dimension is necessary, because EU law – in this case, the New Approach to 
goods – is at the very root of the problem. 
New forms of private organisation and transnational private law claims 
As has already been introduced above, after the PIP scandal victims have organised themselves in 
different ways to try and obtain compensation. In many cases they have brought collective claims to 
share the burden of bringing legal proceedings and to be able to share expertise. The transnational 
dimension of their claims makes it even more important for victims to unite. Consumer organisations 
are playing an important role in channelling and coordinating the efforts of victims to obtain redress.
787
 
At the same time, victims have made different choices as to whom to bring an action against. This has 
resulted in several different actions in different Member States.  
The Austrian consumer organisation VKI has brought a claim against the insurer Allianz in Paris on 
behalf of about 70 victims. All victims are Austrian and the case management is coordinated in 
Vienna. However, the lawyers of VKI are cooperating intensively with a French lawyer in Paris, who 
is bilingual in German and French.
788
 She is responsible for conducting the proceedings in Paris. The 
main basis of their claim is that Allianz is responsible and liable to compensate victims for the damage 
which has been caused by the fraudulent conduct of PIP. However, there are two main obstacles to this 
claim. The first is that Allianz is claiming that the insurance contract was invalidated as a result of the 
fraud committed by PIP. Secondly, Allianz had been obliged to provide insurance to PIP under French 
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legislation. The requirement of insurance was imposed by national law and only covered damage that 
occurred in France.
789
 There was no requirement under EU law or under the Product Liability 
Directive for manufacturers to obtain insurance. The French legislation limited insurance to damage 
that occurred in France. In other proceedings against Allianz in France, the validity of the French 
legislation has been upheld and Allianz has only been held liable to compensate victims for damage 
that occurred in France.
790
 However, the French courts have rejected Allianz’ defence that the PIP’s 
fraud meant that the insurance contract was no longer valid. The proceedings in Paris are ongoing. 
In the United Kingdom, victims have brought a group action against a number of private clinics in 
which patients received PIP breast implants. This group action is less transnational, since both the 
service recipients – the patients – and the service providers – the clinics or doctors – are based in the 
UK. The claims are brought in contract law and the victims claim that the PIP breast implants which 
they received did not comply with the implied term that they would be of satisfactory quality. The first 
substantive hearing was supposed to take place in October 2014. The intention of the parties was that 
the judge would deal with two preliminary issues before deciding how the case should proceed.
791
 
First, the issue of satisfactory quality: were the PIP breast implants of satisfactory quality? Secondly, 
the issue of remedies: would victims be entitled to replacement of the breast implants or would they 
only be entitled to damages? These two issues would be decided in four sample cases, which were 
considered to be representative of most of the cases. For all these cases the victims had received the 
breast implants in the same private clinic. However, just before the hearing it became clear that there 
was an ongoing legal dispute between this private clinic and its insurer about the validity of the 
insurance contract.
792
 As such, it appeared that the case might have been brought against a clinic with 
no insurance and, as a result, very limited resources to pay compensation. It has now been agreed 
between all parties that the hearing should be postponed until the insurance dispute has been 
resolved.
793
 The group litigation in the UK shows how difficult it is for claimants to identify potential 
defendants who would actually have the financial means to pay compensation. In the Netherlands, an 
individual victim has also brought an action against the clinic in which she received breast implants. 
The Court of Appeal of ’s-Hertogenbosch has held that the clinic would in principle be liable to the 
victim if the victim could show that her breast implants contained industrial silicone gel.
794
 Therefore, 
it would not be necessary for her to prove that the industrial silicone gel caused medical harm. 
However, she would still have to prove that her breast implants did in fact contain industrial silicone 
gel. The case has now been adjourned for the claimant to provide evidence that her breast implants 
contained industrial silicone gel. This is still quite a challenge for victims, since their original breast 
implants have often been destroyed and it cannot be ascertained with sufficient certainty when they 
were made and whether the series that they were part of were filled with industrial silicone gel. 
The cases in France, the UK and the Netherlands provide a good illustration of the difficulties that 
victims of the PIP scandal face in trying to obtain compensation. First, they have to identify 
defendants who have the financial means to pay compensation. Second, they have to overcome several 
evidential – were the breast implants in fact defective? – and legal obstacles – is there an obligation to 
compensate for damage that occurred outside France? – before their claims can be successful. From 
that perspective, it is not surprising that victims have also tried to identify another potential defendant 
with a significant amount of financial resources. This is why they have also focussed on the role of 
TÜV in the PIP scandal. Both in France and Germany claims have been brought against TÜV. The 
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claims focus on the way in which TÜV conducted the conformity assessment procedure of the PIP 
factory and the way in which they conducted the periodic inspections after the products had been 
brought on the market. In France, the case was brought before the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon 
on behalf of a large group of victims and suppliers based in several countries (not only EU Member 
States). In Germany, most cases were brought by individual victims. Because the French case was 
successful at first instance many victims from other Member States joined the proceedings against 
TÜV in France. In Germany, so far all claims have been dismissed. However, the Bundesgerichtshof 
has now made a preliminary reference to the CJEU with a number of questions about the scope of the 
obligations of notified bodies under the Medical Devices Directive and about whether the aims and 
purpose of the Medical Devices Directive require that notified bodies can be held liable to provide 
compensation to victims of defective goods if they have breached their obligations under the 
Directive.
795
 
Both in France and in Germany the claims against TÜV were based on two foundations. First of all, 
TÜV should have done more during the conformity assessment procedure – in particular, they should 
have inspected actual products. Secondly, TÜV should have done more after the conformity 
assessment procedure – in particular, they should have carried out unannounced inspections of the PIP 
factory. If they had done this, TÜV would have discovered the fraud earlier and the damage caused by 
PIP’s fraud would have been much more limited. In France, the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon 
delivered its judgment in November 2013.
796
 First of all, it criticised TÜV for conducting the 
conformity assessment procedure through its subsidiary in France. This subsidiary had not been 
notified under the Medical Devices Directive and, therefore, was not formally allowed to conduct 
conformity assessment procedures.
797
 The Tribunal held that the functions performed by TÜV 
constituted a real delegation of public services.
798
 Moreover, it found that if TÜV had carried out 
unannounced inspections it would have discovered the fraud committed by PIP. Previous problems 
with the PIP factory in the early 2000s should have alerted TÜV and should have resulted in more 
stringent control of PIP by TÜV.
799
 The Tribunal concluded that TÜV had kept to an absolute 
minimum of its obligations under the Medical Devices Directive. It concluded that TÜV had breached 
its duties of vigilance and surveillance. On that basis, it held TÜV liable to compensate the victims. It 
awarded interim damages of €3000 per claimant. However, in July 2015, the Court of Appeal of Aix-
en-Provence allowed the appeal and found in favour of TÜV. The Court held that TÜV had fulfilled 
its obligations under the Medical Devices Directive. TÜV was not obliged to carry out unannounced 
inspections and it was not required either to inspect products to test if they contained the required 
medical silicone gel.
800
 
The German courts had taken this approach from the start. In March 2013, the Landgericht (“LG”) 
Frankenthal dismissed a claim brought by a German victim against TÜV.
801
 The claim was dismissed 
on three main grounds. First of all, the claimant could not show that she had suffered medical harm as 
a result of receiving PIP breast implants. The implants had been removed pre-emptively.
802
 Secondly, 
she could not prove that she had received implants which contained industrial silicone gel. The 
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approach of the LG Frankenthal was similar to that later taken by the Dutch court – it was necessary 
for the claimant to prove that her specific breast implants contained industrial silicone gel.
803
 Thirdly, 
the LG Frankenthal held that TÜV had not breached any of its obligations under the Medical Devices 
Directive.
804
 The obligations of notified bodies were clearly set out in Annex II of the Directive. TÜV 
had to inspect the quality management system and the product design dossier of PIP, but it was under 
no obligation to inspect products. Moreover, while the Directive obliged TÜV to carry out regular 
inspections, these inspections did not have to be unannounced. The Directive only provided that 
notified “may” carry out unannounced inspections, but they were under no obligation to do so. The LG 
Frankenthal made a clear distinction between the duties of notified bodies – which were merely 
assisting manufacturers to make the declaration required to place products on the market – and the 
duties of public supervisory agencies, which were responsible for the supervision of the market.
805
  
The claimant appealed to the Oberlandesgericht (“OLG”) Zweibrücken, which dismissed her appeal in 
January 2014.
806
 However, the approach taken by the OLG Zweibrücken was significantly different 
from that taken by the lower court. The LG Frankenthal assumed that the obligations imposed on 
notified bodies by the Medical Devices Directive constituted the required duty of care in tort owed to 
women with breast implants and held that these obligations had not been breached. This was 
essentially similar to the approach taken by the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon. However, the OLG 
Zweibrücken went one step back to consider whether a duty of care, either in contract or in tort, was 
owed by TÜV to women with breast implants at all. First of all, it held that the contract between TÜV 
and PIP was a contract for services which did not created protective effects for women with PIP breast 
implants. It constituted merely a “building block” for the manufacturers to show that they complied 
with the requirements of the Directive.
807
 As a result, TÜV did not owe a contractual duty of care 
towards the women. The responsibility for compliance with the requirements of the Medical Devices 
Directive remained with the manufacturer. Similarly, the OLG Zweibrücken held that TÜV did not 
owe a duty of care in tort to women with PIP breast implants. There was no general duty of care to 
prevent bodily harm. Such a duty of care could arise if a specific duty of care was imposed by way of 
legislation, but the Medical Devices Directive did not impose such a duty of care on TÜV – despite 
the reference to the protection of the interests of patients in the preamble of the Directive.
808
 The 
conformity assessment procedure undertaken by TÜV did not create a legal guarantee that the 
products complied with the requirements of the Directive. The OLG Zweibrücken reaffirmed the 
strong separation of duties between notified bodies and public supervisory agencies. Product 
certification could and should not be placed at the same level as market surveillance. Finally, and only 
in the alternative, it held that if a duty of care in tort was owed by TÜV to women with PIP breast 
implants, there had been no breach of the duty of care.
809
 Here, it essentially followed the reasoning of 
the LG Frankenthal. The victim appealed to the Bundesgerichtshof where her case was joined to a 
number of similar cases. The Bundesgerichtshof has now made a preliminary reference to the CJEU. It 
has sent three questions to Luxembourg.
810
 First, is it the aim and purpose of the Medical Devices 
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Directive that notified bodies act to protect individual patients with the result that notified bodies are 
directly liable to patients if they have breached their duties under the Medical Devices Directive? 
Second, are notified bodies required to inspect products under the Medical Devices Directive? Third, 
are notified bodies required to carry out unannounced inspections under the Directive? 
The fundamental difference between the judgment of the OLG Zweibrücken and the judgments of the 
LG Frankenthal and the Tribunal de Commerce de Toulon is that the OLG Zweibrücken made a real 
attempt to translate the regulatory requirements imposed on notified bodies by the New Approach into 
national private law. This makes the judgment more convincing from the perspective of legal 
reasoning. At the same time, it also very clearly shows how the OLG Zweibrücken is struggling to 
understand the role of notified bodies in the EU’s regulatory framework for goods and to decide what 
impact that role should have on liability on private law. Its interpretation of certification is based on 
“traditional” certification outside the New Approach – the kind of certification which does not create 
third-party effects. However, one of the key questions is whether the very construction of the New 
Approach requires that certification – as a way of providing access to the EU’s internal market – 
creates third-party effects and requires that certification bodies can be held liable to users of defective 
goods. The approach of the OLG Zweibrücken is essentially a very formalistic national private law 
approach, which would have been convincing if it had not ignored the EU law dimension of the claims 
brought by victims of PIP breast implants.
811
 The challenge is to identify how national courts could or 
should approach the question of liability of notified bodies in the New Approach. It is clear that 
because the problems which have arisen in the PIP scandal go to the very foundations of the EU’s 
New Approach to goods, the solution also has to be provided at the European level.  
Translating EU law in national private law: towards a European approach 
The judgment of the OLG Zweibrücken illustrates the difficulties national courts encounter in 
deciding what the impact of the regulatory requirements imposed on certification bodies by the New 
Approach should be on liability in private law. According to traditional German private law, an 
obligation to prevent harm could only be imposed on TÜV if it was expressly provided in legislation. 
The Medical Devices Directive did not expressly provide that TÜV’s actions were taken with the aim 
to protect women with breast implants. The problem with this approach is that it takes a traditional 
perspective on certification and ignores the role the conformity assessment procedure has in the New 
Approach.  A preference for coffee which has been produced in an environmentally friendly way 
cannot really be placed at the same level as an assessment of whether breast implants comply with the 
relevant European safety legislation. It has already been emphasised above that certification bodies 
have been given the power to decide whether products can be placed on the European market – their 
traditional function has been upgraded significantly. It is difficult to see how this key role in the 
internal market does not have a direct impact on the safety and interests of consumers and patients. In 
the framework of the New Approach, there is a direct link between certification and the possibility of 
harm to victims of defective products. This means that the EU becomes responsible for providing 
more guidance to national private law as to what the result of this upgraded kind of certification 
should be for the potential liability of notified bodies. The Bundesgerichtshof has now directly 
invoked the assistance of the CJEU to get guidance on what EU law requires from private law in cases 
where notified bodies are alleged to have carry out their obligations under the Medical Devices 
Directive in a negligent way.  Two possible approaches to remedy the inadequacy of national private 
law could be envisaged. The first approach could be described as a bottom-up solution, while the 
second approach could be regarded as more of a top-down solution.  
First of all, guidance to national courts could be provided by applying the principle of effectiveness of 
EU law. Private law remedies could be necessary to guarantee the effective application of EU law – in 
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this case, the Medical Devices Directive – and national courts have to decide claims brought in the 
aftermath of the PIP scandal by taking into account what the effectiveness of the New Approach 
requires.
812
 Such an approach would still leave a significant amount of discretion to national private 
law – the only thing the CJEU would be required to do was to define the boundaries within which 
national private law should operate. However, national private law would still have to assess cases in 
light of the aim and purpose of the EU’s regulatory framework for goods. This is the route chosen by 
the Bundesgerichtshof in the cases brought against TÜV. The challenge for the CJEU is now to define 
what the aim and purpose of the Medical Devices Directive are. This is not a simple question to 
answer. Although the recitals of the Directive explicitly refer to the fact that medical devices should 
provide a high level of protection to patients, the Directive itself is based on the EU’s internal market 
competence (now Article 114 TFEU). The whole construction of the New Approach is very much 
focussed on free movement of goods. At the same time, it is clear that such free movement of goods 
can only be effective if the goods provide the required safety level and do not harm consumers who 
buy them. As such, it cannot be denied that it is also one of the aims of the New Approach to take all 
necessary steps to ensure that goods placed on the European market comply with the required level of 
safety. However, even if this is accepted, it is another matter whether the effectiveness of the 
regulatory framework also requires that consumer or patients have a direct claim against the notified 
body that performed the conformity assessment procedure. The EU has already adopted the Product 
Liability Directive to provide for the possibility of liability of the manufacturer. Is it necessary to 
create an additional type of liability for notified bodies? What would be its relationship with product 
liability? After the PIP scandal TÜV is being sued because the manufacturer has gone bankrupt and 
the Product Liability Directive does not offer a solution to victims. There is a valid case to be made 
that in such cases EU law should provide for an alternative type of liability. But what would happen if 
the manufacturer was still solvent? In such cases, could victims then choose between bringing an 
action against the manufacturer or the notified body? Or would they be required to bring a claim 
against the manufacturer? In practice, they are always likely to prefer the manufacturer, since liability 
under the Product Liability Directive is not fault-based.
813
 As is clear from the questions referred to the 
CJEU by the Bundesgerichtshof, even if the effective application of the Medical Devices Directive 
requires that notified bodies could be held liable in private law, claimants will still have to show that 
they breached their obligations under the Directive. Because the Directive did not oblige notified 
bodies to carry out unannounced inspections and to inspect physical products, it is far from clear that 
TÜV breached the duties provided in Annex II. 
Whatever the outcome of the case will be, the CJEU’s judgment will provide a number of ex ante 
standards on whether notified bodies can be held liable and in which circumstances this can be done. 
The possibility of liability of notified bodies for failures in the conformity assessment procedure could 
encourage them to be more cautious and to invest in stricter and more regular supervision of 
manufacturers. At the same time, the potential liability could also make certification bodies less 
inclined to become a notified body under the Medical Devices Directive. This could ultimately act as 
an obstacle to the effectiveness of the New Approach. Therefore, it is also important for the EU to 
obtain clarification about whether and when notified bodies could be held liable.  
A second possible approach would be to define more clearly in the directives adopted under the New 
Approach what duties or obligations private certification bodies have and what consequences these 
obligations should have in private law at the national level. A significant part of the dispute between 
TÜV and the victims of PIP breast implants is based on differences in interpretation of what notified 
bodies are expected to do under Annex II of the Medical Devices Directive. This is a problem which 
could be dealt with through the legislative procedure. An updated Medical Devices Directive is 
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currently going through the European legislative machinery.
814
 This Directive already defines much 
more precisely what the obligations of private certification bodies are. However, it does not provide 
adequate guidance on the liability of certification bodies in the New Approach. This is something 
which could be expressly provided in the Directive. At the moment, the only thing the Directive does 
is to oblige notified bodies to have insurance.
815
 It could expressly provide that notified bodies are or 
are not liable to victims of defective products if they have breached their obligations under the 
Directive.  
The advantage of the legislative approach is that it has more direct democratic legitimisation than 
solely relying on the CJEU and national courts. Moreover, this approach would lead to more 
uniformity across the EU. It would result in more clearly defined – and stricter – ex ante standards for 
private certification bodies. Exclusive reliance on the effectiveness principle would still mean that 
national courts would be required to determine ex post and on a case-by-case basis what standards 
notified bodies have to comply with. This would result in much more uncertainty – both for 
certification bodies and for victims of defective goods. Overall, it is likely that the two approaches will 
have to be combined to achieve a safer internal market for goods.  
Conclusion 
This paper has discussed three transformations of private law through an analysis of the PIP breast 
implant scandal. It has shown how technology, globalisation and societal developments have each 
contributed to changes both in the form and function of private law. In the EU, the New Approach 
provides a clear example of how private regulation and private law are being instrumentalised to build 
an internal market and to increase free movement of goods. However, the PIP scandal also shows that 
private law has not yet fully transformed to deal with follow-up cases brought by victims of defective 
products which were covered by the New Approach. While the EU has provided for liability of 
manufacturers with the Product Liability Directive, the regulatory framework for liability for potential 
failures in monitoring the market is still incomplete. This gap could be filled by the possibility of 
liability of notified bodies. At the same time, it raises the question how this kind of liability relates to 
the Product Liability Directive. 
Ultimately, the PIP scandal illustrates the interdependence between private law and EU law. EU law 
needs private law to guarantee the effective application of EU law, but private law also needs EU law. 
It could be said that private law has to be regulated by EU law to be able to contribute to the effective 
functioning of the New Approach to goods. This regulation necessarily means that more standards in 
private law are provided by EU law. The aftermath of the PIP scandal has shown that courts in 
different Member States have reached different solutions on the basis of their interpretation of national 
private law. While this is not necessarily problematic, in this case EU law is at the roots of the 
problem and the EU law dimension of the cases cannot be ignored. More guidance is necessary as to 
what exactly is expected from private law to adequately fulfil its regulatory function in the  
New Approach. It has to be recognised that in the New Approach essential and important public 
obligations are fulfilled by private parties through private law tools. As these private law tools have 
been given a public function, this should also have consequences for liability claims in national  
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courts.
816
 Two strategies to provide more EU law input into national private law have been proposed – 
the bottom-up approach of relying on the principle of effectiveness of EU law and a top-down 
approach based on legislative amendments to the Medical Devices Directive. In the end, it is probable 
that a combination of both approaches will be adopted. This should guarantee adequate protection to 
patients or consumers who receive defective medical devices. In essence, this Europeanisation would 
constitute another transformation of private law.  
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